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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Concepts
This dissertation deals with three important types of insurance: equity-linked life, pension
insurance and (pension) insurance guarantee funds.
Standard life insurance contracts, like a term or endowment insurance, provide either
survival benefits or death benefits or both. In equity-linked products these benefits are
linked to the performance of a portfolio, which is usually set up by the insurance company
and which consists of one or several underlying assets. Accordingly, these products offer the
policyholder the opportunity to participate in the financial markets. Another essential fea-
ture of equity-linked life insurance products is that they are usually equipped with certain
guarantees, which make up a substantial fraction of the life insurer’s liabilities. The two
main guarantee types are the minimum guarantee, where the policyholder is for instance
offered a guaranteed interest rate for his investment, and the surrender guarantee, which
entitles the policyholder to receive a certain cash amount when terminating the insurance
contract. In this dissertation both guarantee types are considered, where a particular em-
phasis is put on the surrender guarantee or surrender option.
A (private) pension insurance contract is a contract between the employee, the policy-
holder, and the employer, the insurer or often also called the sponsoring company. The
two major types of private pension insurance are the Defined Benefit (DB) and the Defined
Contribution (DC) pension plan. In a standard DC plan 1 the contributions are fixed. Con-
tributions are usually paid by both the employee and the employer (monthly or quarterly)
and usually constitute a constant percentage of the employee’s salary. These contributions
are paid to a (external) pension fund, which invests the contributions on behalf of the em-
ployee in financial assets. The pension payment is then determined as the market value
of these backing assets. Accordingly, like in equity-linked life insurance products the ben-
efits also crucially depend on the performance of a financial portfolio, thus on the earned
1We use the term standard in order to distinguish between those pension plans with hybrid features,
which also exist in practice.
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investment returns. However, the main difference is that the benefits further particularly
depend on the evolution of the salary of the insured. In a standard DB pension plan the
benefits are predefined, or more precisely the formula which specifies the benefits is known
in advance. This formula mainly takes the years of service, age and the salary of the em-
ployee into account. As in DC plans a (external) pension fund is set up to manage the
pension obligations. The main difference to the DC plan is that the contributions provided
to the pension fund are variable 2 and that only the employer earns the surpluses of the
pension assets. That is, unlike equity-linked life insurance products and DC pension plans
the benefits of the employees in the DB plan are not directly linked to the performance of
a financial portfolio. Althogh the pension payments differ, the DB and the DC plan have
in common that the employee’s salary is the main determinant of the benefits.
The main objective of an insurance regulator is to protect policyholders by ensuring
that promised benefits are paid to the latter, particularly in the case when the insurer is
in financial distress or insolvent. Similar to the banking industry, where depositors are
additionally protected by a deposit insurance, insurance guarantee funds have been set up
as a protection vehicle in many countries as well for the life and nonlife insurance field. 3
Insurance companies are often obliged to enter into these government-imposed protection
schemes. From the policyholder’s perspective insurance guarantee funds can be considered
as a reinsurance. Specifically, the insurance companies (the employer in case of a pension in-
surance) pay premiums to the insurance guarantee funds, which invest the premiums under
certain regulatory rules. If the insurance company is not able to pay the promised benefits
either due to financial distress or insolvency the insurance guarantee fund steps in, takes
the residual assets of the insurance company and provides the payments of the benefits up
to certain limits.4 In this thesis we consider a pension guarantee fund for private DB pen-
sion plans. The essential difference to other insurance guarantee funds is that the pension
guarantee fund only pays benefits if both the pension fund and the sponsoring company are
in financial distress.
1.2 Methodology
The term financial analysis encompasses in this dissertation the pricing of financial guaran-
tees in insurance, the (constrained) expected utility optimization and the expected utility
comparison.
In chapter 2 and chapter 3 we consider the corresponding insurance contracts as con-
2In private sector DB plans the contributions are mainly made by the employer and are often deficit
contributions, which means that the employer provides payments to the pension fund if the market value
of pension assets falls below the pension liabilities.
3For a detailled list of such insurance guarantee funds confer to Schmeisser and Wagner (2013).
4The benefit payments are usually capped, see for instance chapter 3
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tingent claims and apply option pricing techniques in a specific stochastic financial market
model to determine the market consistent value of the insurance contracts. For the equity-
linked life insurance contract we particularly extract the market consistent values of the
different guarantees, focussing on the surrender option value. An accurate pricing or mar-
ket consistent valuation of such guarantees is of paramount importance for any life insurance
company, not only for risk management, but also for regulatory purposes. For example in
Europe the new regulatory regime Solvency II requires insurers to disclose the market val-
ues of their guarantees on the liability side of their balance sheets. In particular, studying
surrender more closely is important since for instance European Union regulators have iden-
tified surrender risk as the main risk driver for life insurance companies after the interest
rate risk. In fact, the recent Quantitative Impact Study (QIS 5) showed that surrender
risk is the most important risk among life underwriting risks, see EIOPA (2011). For the
pension guarantee fund insurance the market consistent value of the insurance contract is
interpreted as the fair initial premium sponsoring companies should pay to the guarantee
fund for providing the pension insurance. The premium is particularly risk-based since it
takes both pension fund and sponsor risk into account. Consequently, such a premium does
not give pension funds and sponsoring companies adverse incentives to introduce risk into
the pension system. Another mechanism, which protects employees in DB plans, is that the
pension guarantee fund can itself prematurely terminate underfunded DB plans. We study
this mechanism in chapter 4 by applying a different methodology. We compute critical
funding ratios under which the pension guarantee fund prematurely terminates the insured
underfunded DB plan in a constrained expected utility optimization model. In chapter 5 we
study the underlying DB contract more closely and compare it to the DC pension contract.
As in the previous chapter, we assume that the policyholder has certain preferences and
that he can choose between a DB and a DC pension plan. The policyholder faces a tradeoff
between different types of risk, which are (more) present in one type of the pension plan
than in the other. Finally, we compare the pension plans by comparing the expected utility
the policyholder can achieve in either pension plan at the retirement date.
More specifically, in chapter 2 we closely study the valuation of a stylized equity-linked
life insurance contract with a surrender guarantee. In order to obtain accurate market con-
sistent values for such a contract one has to specify a model that adequately captures the
dynamics of the financial portfolio and that models the surrender behavior of the policy-
holder in a realistic manner. The second requirement is not compatible with the standard
assumption of a rational agent in the financial literature. In our context this is a policy-
holder who behaves monetary optimal in terms of only surrendering the contract when it
is financially optimal to do so. A large body of the behavioral economics literature rejects
this assumption. More importantly, the empirical literature in the life insurance field shows
that policyholders surrender due to both exogenous and endogenous reasons. Exogenous
reasons are mainly personal reasons, often driven by the own financial distress, while en-
dogenous reasons are financial factors which make it monetarily optimal to surrender the
contracts at appropriate moments. We model both exogenous and endogenous surrender in
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an intensity-based approach, where each type of surrender is modeled with a corresponding
surrender intensity. This modeling framework is also referred to as the rational expectation
framework, see e.g De Giovanni (2010). Moreover, an essential feature of (equity-linked)
life insurance products is that they usually have very long maturities. One important con-
sequence is that in the long run economic conditions typically change several times. These
changing economic conditions affect both the dynamics of the financial portfolio, in terms
of the market interest rate and its volatility, and also both the exogenous and endogenous
surrender behavior of the policyholder. To capture this important empirically observable
fact, we introduce a regime-switching model where the different regimes represent different
economic states.
In chapter 3 we develop a risk-based premium calculation model for the insurance pro-
vided by the largest pension guarantee fund, which is managed by the US Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corporation (PBGC). Although our analysis focuses on the american pension
insurance mechanism, the modeling framework can be readily applied to any government-
imposed pension guarantee fund. 5 More importantly, the qualitative results hold for any
insurance guarantee fund in general. One crucial problem most insurance guarantee funds
share is that their premium calculation is not risk-based. Specifically, most insurance guar-
antee funds charge either a flat or a volume-based premium, see chapter 3 and Schmeisser
and Wagner (2013). Such a premium calculation practice is not reasonable from the eco-
nomic perspective since it gives insurers the incentive to invest more riskily in order to
increase the market value of equity. A consequence of this adverse incentive is that less
risky insurers cross subsidize more risky ones. The most severe consequence of such an in-
effective premium calculation is that the insurance guarantee fund’s financial status might
deteriorate and become so poor that it could not provide the required payments to poli-
cyholders if some companies are in financial distress. Our calculation model for a pension
guarantee fund insurance takes account of the pension fund’s and sponsoring companie’s
investment policy and assumes that these are correlated. Moreover, it also takes account
of the fact that the pension guarantee fund has to provide payments only if both the pen-
sion fund and the plan sponsor are in financial distress, therefore we model this insurance
as a residual or secondary guarantee. In addition, our model allows for a further realistic
perspective that the pension fund can be terminated prematurely. Most importantly, this
premature termination is triggered by the poor financial status of the plan sponsor, which is
another realistic perspective since most pension fund terminations in practice are due to the
sponsoring companie’s underfunding. We study our pricing formula both theoretically and
particularly empirically by comparing the risk-based premiums for the largest American
DB plan sponsors.
In chapter 4 we study the other type of termination where an insured underfunded DB
pension plan is closed by the pension guarantee fund. This type of termination is called
5Such pension guarante funds exist for instance in Canada, the U.K., Japan, Germany, Switzerland or
Sweden
1.2. METHODOLOGY 5
involuntary termination. In this chapter we do not primarily focus on the US pension mech-
anism, although the US and Canadian pension guarantee funds serve as good examples for
our analysis. We propose a premature termination rule for a pension guarantee fund to
manage its financial guarantee and to protect policyholders. To this end we determine an
optimal termination ratio for an insured defined benefit (DB) pension plans in terms of
a critical funding ratio under which the pension fund is prematurely closed by the pen-
sion guarantee fund. In our model the guarantee fund pursues a social welfare motive and
acts in the interests of the pension beneficiaries by maximizing their expected utility. To
better manage its financial guarantee and to better protect the policyholders the pension
guarantee fund imposes two constraints for the insured DB plan: a shortfall probability
constraint (SPC) where the guarantee fund defines a maximum one-year shortfall proba-
bility and an expected shortfall constraint (ESC) where the guarantee fund predefines the
maximum one-year expected loss size of underfunded but not terminated DB plans. We
then solve this constrained one-year expected utility maximization problem and study how
the regulatory constraints and particularly the risk aversion of the beneficiaries affect the
optimal intervention rule.
In chapter 5 we compare the DB and the DC pension plan from the policyholder’s
perspective in a continuous time expected utility framework. In this framework we take the
essential tradeoff the policyholder faces when opting for one type of pension retirement plan
into account, that is the tradeoff between salary, asset price (investment risk) and portability
risk. As we described in chapter 1.1 the employee’s salary is the crucial component in
determining the benefits in either retirement plan, thus salary risk is present in both the
DB and DC plan. Moreover, the policyholder only bears investment or asset price risk
in a DC plan since in a DB plan the employee’s benefits are not directly linked to the
investment returns of the pension fund, thus only the employer participates in the surplus
of the pension fund, but also bears the entire investment risk. On the other hand portability
risk, the risk to lose parts of the benefits when changing the employer, is mainly present in
the DB plan because the benefits of the DC plan are determined as the market value of the
backing assets, which are usually transferable from one employer to another. In this chapter
we govern these main risk factors in a model with stochastic wages, stochastic job moving
and stochastic asset prices. We compare the DB and the DC plan by mainly computing
the indifference job switching intensity, that is the intensity which makes the policyholder
equally well off in expected utility terms in both pension plans. From this quantity we
infer the average number of job moves after which a DC pension plan is preferred as an
interesting statistic.
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Chapter 2
Valuation of Equity-Linked Life
Insurance Contracts with Surrender
Guarantees in a Regime-Switching
Rational Expectation Model1
2.1 Introduction
The surrender guarantee is a bonus right, which is included in most equity-linked life insur-
ance contracts. It gives the policyholder the opportunity to receive a certain cash refund
when walking away from the contract. The surrender decision of a policyholder can be
of two types. He can surrender exogenously due to personal reasons or endogenously by
observing that fluctuations in the financial environment make a surrender profitable from
a monetary point of view. Exogenous surrender is mainly explained by the emergency fund
hypothesis conjecturing that personal financial distress, especially unemployment forces the
policyholder to terminate the contract. The interest rate hypothesis, which states that pol-
icyholders lapse their contract to exploit rising market opportunities in terms of gaining
higher interest rates from alternative investments is the main hypothesis accounting for
endogenous surrender.
The valuation approaches of equity-linked life insurance products with surrender guar-
antees differ depending on which type of surrender is incorporated. The purely exogenous
surrender valuation approach by Bacinello (2003), where surrender rates are estimated
from historical lapse data, is at odds with the interest rate hypothesis and the estimated
funds needed to support the contract are too low on average. The most used approach is
the purely financial approach by Grosen and Jorgensen (2000), Bacinello (2005) and others
where the surrender option is modelled as an American style put option and its market value
is obtained by solving an optimal stopping problem. This approach completely neglects ex-
1This chapter is based on Uzelac and Szimayer (2014)
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ogenous surrender and it further relies on the unrealistic assumption that policyholders
make optimal surrender decisions. As a consequence the purely financial approach consid-
erably overestimates the funds needed to support the contract. A more realistic valuation
approach is done in the rational expectation framework allowing for both exogenous and
endogenous surrender. This was first applied by Albizzati and Geman (1994) and was more
recently studied by De Giovanni (2010) and Li and Szimayer (2014) in an intensity-based
approach. In particular, the empirical study of Kuo, Tsai and Chen (2003) supports the
rational expectation model as it shows that both the emergency fund hypothesis and the
interest rate hypothesis are significant, the first is statistically more significant while the
second is economically more significant. Consequently, these findings suggest that an accu-
rate pricing model of equity-linked products with surrender guarantees should model both
types of surrender.
Our main contribution is that we refine the rational expectation framework of De Gio-
vanni (2010) and Li and Szimayer (2014) by additionally including a regime-switching
model. In our model both the dynamics of the reference fund as well as exogenous and
endogenous surrender rates are linked to the corresponding economic state. The switch-
ing behavior of the economic states can be attributed to structural changes in the eco-
nomic conditions, changes in business conditions, changes in political situations, the impact
of economic news (financial or macroeconomic) and business cycles. The inclusion of a
regime-switching model is of practical importance as most equity-linked contracts with sur-
render guarantees are relatively long-dated compared with financial products. There can be
substantial fluctuation in economic variables, which affect as well the market value of the
reference fund as both exogenous and endogenous surrender decisions of the policyholders,
over a long period of time. In a numerical illustration, we consider 2 states and interpret
them as the business cycles recession and expansion. The example is further supposed to
show that our model can for instance incorporate both the emergency fund and the inter-
est rate hypothesis. By imposing a higher exogenous surrender rate in the recession state
we can incorporate the emergency fund hypothesis because personal financial distress is
more likely to occur in that state. Combining a procyclical endogenous surrender intensity
with a procyclical risk-free rate we can also incorporate the interest rate hypothesis since the
hypothesis states that endogenous lapse should be higher in states with higher interest rates.
Regime-switching models have become popular in actuarial science in recent years and
are particularly recommended by the American Academy of Actuaries and the Canadian
Institute of Actuaries, see Hardy (2001). The use of regime-switching models for pricing
and hedging long term guarantee products have been popularized by Hardy (2001), who
successfully fitted the model to monthly data from the Standard and Poor’s 500 and the
Toronto Stock Exchange indices using a discrete time regime-switching lognormal model.
Concerning the pricing of equity-linked life insurance products with surrender options, thus
far only Siu (2005) employed a Markov regime-switching model in a Black-Scholes Merton
economy, that is the volatility and the risk-free rate of the reference fund depend on the
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states of the economy, but are constant across states. However he also uses the less realistic
purely financial approach and provides approximate solutions for the free boundary value
problem. This chapter proposes the first valuation model for equity-linked products with
surrender guarantees, which does not only use regime-switches to model the evolution of
the market value of the reference fund, but most importantly, we also model the lapsing
dynamics more realistically by allowing the exogenous and endogenous surrender intensities
to change over time according to the evolution of the economy.
More specifically, we use a Markovian regime-switching model where the economic states
change according to the evolution of a continuous-time observable Markov chain. The refer-
ence fund is modelled as a Markov modulated diffusion process. The market incompleteness
resulting from the nontradability of the regime-switching risk is resolved by specifying a
unique martingale measure with the well-known Esscher transform. To model the surren-
der action of a representative policyholder we follow the intensity-based approach of Li and
Szimayer (2014). We also assume that the surrender intensity is bounded from below and
from above. The lower bound is given by the exogenous surrender intensity and represents
the rate of monetary suboptimal surrender. The upper bound represents the maximal sur-
render rate that is attributed when it is financially optimal to do so and is given by the sum
of the endogenous and exogenous surrender intensity. This way of modeling the surrender
intensity implies that the surrender intensity is a function of the contract value. Unlike
the model of Li and Szimayer (2014) the surrender intensity is regime-dependent in our
model, since both surrender intensities are also modulated by the continuous-time Markov
chain. Moreover, the American style surrender model is included in our setup as a special
case when the exogenous surrender intensity is set to zero and the endogenous surrender
intensity to infinity in either regime. To find the value of the insurance contract in the
corresponding state of the economy we establish a system of two coupled partial differential
equations (PDEs). This PDE system is nonlinear since the surrender intensities need to be
determined simultaneously with the contract values. The solution of this penalty problem
is obtained numerically by combining the Crank-Nicolson scheme with the penalty scheme
of Dai and You (2007) using a generalized Newton search algorithm proposed by Forsyth
and Vetzal (2002).
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next section we motivate the use
of a regime-switching model, especially for our application in the numerical analysis. In
section 2.3, we describe the model and the contract under consideration. The valuation of
the contract is carried out and theoretical comparative statics results are derived. In section
2.4 we explain the numerical methodology to compute the contract values. In section 2.5 we
study the contract closely through numerical examples. As already mentioned, we assume in
this experiment that the economic states are business cycles. We focus on the computation
of the value of the surrender guarantee and also compare our regime-switching rational
expectation model with the American style surrender model. Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 Some Empirical and Economic Motivation
In this section we empirically motivate a regime-switching model for our numerical example
where the two economic states are the business cycles recession and expansion. To this end,
we outline that stock market volatility tends to evolve countercyclically, while the risk free
rate tends to evolve procyclically. In addition, we motivate the emergency fund hypothesis
and the interest rate hypothesis.
Figure 2.1: Monthly 3-month Treasury bill secondary market rates in % from 1950-2010,
recession periods according to the NBER Business Cycle data are highlighted.
To highlight the cyclical behavior of the risk-free rate we use monthly 3-month US Trea-
sury bill data from the US financial data base. In figure 1 we compare the interest rates on a
3-month US Treasury bill with the NBER Business Cycle data. The period from 1961 until
1975 outlines that the risk-free interest rate can behave countercyclically because the high-
est interest rates were observed in the two recessions in this period, which would confirm
the results of King and Rebelo (1999). Nevertheless, in general we clearly observe that the
interest rates substantially increase during an expansion and substantially decrease during
a recession. More importantly, except the period mentioned above, the T-bill rates are on
average significantly higher in the expansion period preceding a recession. We conclude
that there is a tendency for a procyclical behavior and this tendency is especially clearly
observed in the long period from 1976-2010. A procyclical evolvement of the risk free rate is
also suggested by the majority of research studies, see for instance Blanchard and Watson
(1986), Fama and French (1988) or more recently Ang and Bekaert (2002a) and Ang and
Bekaert (2002b). A plausible argument for a procyclical risk-free rate is provided by Jouini
and Napp (2011) arguing that during bad states of the world there is a pessimistic bias in
the economy, whereas during good states of the world there is an optimistic bias.
To make some statements about the cyclical behavior of the volatility, we estimate the
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Figure 2.2: Estimated volatility of the S&P-500 daily log returns in % from 1950-2010 with
a GARCH(1,1) model, recession periods according to the NBER Business Cycle data are
highlighted.
volatility of the S&P 500 daily log returns from 1950 until 2010 with a GARCH(1,1) model,
and then again compare the volatility estimates with Business Cycle data. The estimated
volatility is depicted in figure 2. Having a closer look on the volatility and neglecting out-
liers like the stock market crash in 1987, we observe that the S&P 500 volatility has a clear
tendency to evolve countercyclically. Volatility rises significantly in longer recession peri-
ods like those from 1973-1975 or the recent financial crises from 2007-2009. On the other
hand, the volatility stays at a relatively low level during expansion periods like those from
1975-1980, 1983-1987 and especially the more recent expansion periods from 1991-1998 and
2003-2007. This observation seems to be fairly pronounced during the last 30 years. A
countercyclical stock market volatility is empirically confirmed by many researchers, see for
instance Schwert (1989) and Engle, Ghysels and Sohn (2008). One economic explanation
of this stylized fact is that monetary tightening causes both a recession and increases stock
market volatility.
We follow Dar and Dodds (1989)and Kuo et al. (2003) and consider the unemployment
rate as the main driver of the emergency fund hypothesis. We collect a data set of volun-
tary termination rates in life insurance contracts from the American Life Insurance Council
and acquire a sample of US unemployment rates from the Labour Force Statistics.2 The
evolution of both time series is shown in figure 3. The figure illustrates that the voluntary
termination rates significantly depend on the unemployment rates because both time series
have a tendency to move in the same direction. This observation, which motivates the emer-
gency fund hypothesis, is very pronounced during the long time horizon from 1977-2009.
More importantly, both time series are countercyclical as we observe that in general they are
substantially higher in recession periods preceding an expansion period and the peaks are
often reached in recession periods. Hence there is a clear tendency that the emergency fund
hypothesis is strongly related to the state of the economy suggesting to model exogenous
2As in Kuo et al. (2003) there two typical limitations in the data set. First we cannot distinguish between
pure lapse and surrender and second the lapse rates are obtained from different types of insurance products.
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Figure 2.3: US annual unemployment rates in % (dashed), US annual voluntary termination
rates in life insurance contracts in % (solid) from 1950-2010, recession periods according to
the NBER Business Cycle data are highlighted.
surrender as a function of the macroeconomic process.
Kuo et al. (2003) show within a cointegration analysis that the interest rate hypothesis
is statistically less significant than the emergency fund hypothesis. However, they point out
that the interest rate is economically more significant. In an impulse response analysis they
find shocks in the lapse rates respond substantially to shocks in the interest rate, whereas
the response to shocks of the unemployment rate is small. This result and the result of
procyclical risk-free rates gives rise to also incorporate the interest rate hypothesis into a
valuation model for an insurance product with a surrender guarantee.
2.3 Model
2.3.1 Regime-Switching, Financial and Insurance Risk
The starting point of our setup is an observable continuous-time two-state Markov chain
X = (Xt)t≥0 modelled under the real world measure P on a filtered probability space
(Ω,F ,F,P), that is used to describe the state of the economy. For the ease of exposition
we limit ourselves to the two-state case and mention that the subsequent analysis can be
readily extended to more states. The main argument for an observable Markov chain is
that the market interest rates are observable and the volatility of the reference fund can
be estimated with the quadratic variation of its logarithm, which is also observable, see
Erlwein, Mamon and Siu (2008).
The state space of this stochastic process can be conveniently described by the canonical
representation S = (e1 e2), with the two unit vectors e1 = (1 0)′ and e2 = (0 1)′, with ′
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denoting the transpose, see Buffington and Elliot (2002). The two-state Markov chain gen-
erates the filtration FX = (FXt )t≥0.
The dynamics of our economy are described by the transition matrix P(t) = (Pij(t))i,j=1,2
of X, with Pij(t) = P(Xt = ej|X0 = ei), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i and t ≥ 0. The transition dynamics
are governed by Kolmogorov’s forward equation
dP
dt
(t) = P(t)A , P(0) = I2 , (2.1)
where I2 is the identity matrix in dimension 2 and the generator A is given by
A =
( −η1 η1
η2 −η2
)
. (2.2)
The interpretation is that ηi denotes the intensity with which the economy jumps from
state i to state j, i = 1, 2 and i 6= j. In other words, during any time interval dt, there is
a time-invariant probability ηi dt that the process X changes from state i to state j. The
expected time the economy stays in state i is given by η−1i . The generator A yields the
following decomposition for the stochastic differential of X dXt = A
′Xt dt+ dMt, where M
is an FX-martingale, see Elliot, Aggoun and Moore (1994).
The financial market consists as usually of a risky non-dividend paying asset with a price
process S = (St)t≥0 and a riskless money market account with a price process B = (Bt)t≥0.
Under the real world measure P, the stochastic processes are governed by the stochastic
differential equations
dBt = r(t,Xt)B(t) dt, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,B0 = 1 , (2.3)
dSt = a(t, St, Xt)S(t) dt+ σ(t, St, Xt)S(t) dWt, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , S0 ∈ R+ , (2.4)
where r denotes the possibly regime-dependent risk-free interest rate, a is the possibly
regime-dependent local rate of return and σ is the possibly regime-dependent volatility.3
The latter can be expressed more compactly by
rt = r(t,Xt) = (r1(t) r2(t))Xt , and σt = σ(t, St, Xt) = (σ1(t, St)σ2(t, St))Xt ,
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where ri(t) and σi(t, St) refer to the risk-free interest rate and volatility in
regime i, for i = 1, 2. Note that the risk-free rate is deterministic within a regime. Moreover
W refers to the standard Brownian motion under P, that is independent of X and gener-
ates the filtration FW = (FWt )t≥0. The extended financial market filtration is then given by
FW
∨
FX , which we call Z = (Zt)t≥0.
3The model is formally written as a local volatility regime-switching model. If we make the simplifying
assumptions that a,r and σ are constant within a regime, see section 5, then we have a regime-switching
lognormal financial market model.
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The financial market is free of arbitrage and incomplete, since the inclusion of the regime-
switching risk leads to an additional source of risk that is not traded. Mathematically
speaking, there exist infinitely many equivalent martingale measures. In general, there are
two ways to resolve the market incompleteness in our model. We could either add a so called
change of state security as an additional asset to complete the market, see Guo (2001) for
details, or we have to select a specific martingale measure. We opt for a well-established
approach in regime-switching models and select the Esscher martingale measure relying
on the Esscher transform as the unique martingale measure. It can be shown that the
martingale measure specified by the Esscher transform is the one that maximizes expected
power utility, see Elliot, Chan and Siu (2005). Now, following Elliot et al. (2005) we briefly
sketch the Esscher transform. First, define the regime-switching Esscher process θ = (θt)t≥0
by θt = θ(t,Xt, St) = (θ1(t, St) θ2(t, St))Xt. Then, the regime switching Esscher transform
Qθ ∼ P on Zt is given by
dQθ
dP
∣∣∣∣
Zt
=
exp
(∫ t
0
θudWu
)
EP
[
exp
(∫ t
0
θu dWu
)∣∣∣FXt ] , t ≥ 0,
where EP denotes the expectation taken under the real world measure. The Radon-Nikodym
derivative of the Esscher transform can be expressed as
dQθ
dP
∣∣∣∣
Zt
= exp
(∫ t
0
θu dWu − 1
2
∫ t
0
θ2u du
)
, t ≥ 0. (2.5)
The risk-neutral regime-switching Esscher parameter θ˜(t,Xt, St) solves the martingale con-
dition
St = EQθ˜
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
t
ru du
)
ST
∣∣∣∣Zt] , t ≥ 0.
It can be shown that the above martingale condition implies that
θ˜(t,Xt, St) =
r(t,Xt)− a(t,Xt, St)
σ(t,Xt, St)
, t ≥ 0. (2.6)
Plugging θ˜ in (2.5) we get the Radon-Nikodym derivative of Qθ˜ with respect to P. Then,
by Girsanov’s theorem one has W θ˜ = W −∫ ·
0
θ˜t dt is a standard Brownian motion under the
martingale measure Qθ˜, which is called the Esscher martingale measure. Finally we end up
with the usual risk-neutral dynamics of the reference fund S, i.e.
dSt = r(t,Xt)Stdt+ σ(t, St, Xt)St dW
θ˜
t , t ≥ 0, (2.7)
where W θ˜ is a standard Brownian motion under Qθ˜. By construction of the change of mea-
sure X and W θ˜ are independent under Qθ˜ and the probability law of X remains unchanged
under the change of measure.
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The insurance market is modelled by the jump process H = (Ht)t≥0, with Ht = 1{τ≤t},
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where the random variable τ denotes the arrival of the death event of an
individual aged y at t = 0. The jump process H generates the filtration H = (Ht)t≥0 and
has intensity µ, which is called the mortality intensity. We follow the rationale of Li and
Szimayer (2014) and abstract from stochastic longevity since this plays a minor role for
equity-linked products with a similar payoff structure at death and survival. In addition
we make the assumption that, unlike the financial market, the insurance market is not
modulated by the Markov chain X. We do not include mortality regimes in our framework
since clear evidence that mortality risk is significantly linked to economic regimes has not
been found yet in the literature. In fact, the mortality intensity is a regime-independent
deterministic function of time and thus the mortality risk is unsystematic. This implies
that we can work under the suitably extended Esscher martingale measure on the enlarged
filtration G = Z
∨
H, where µ is the (Qθ˜,G)-intensity of the jump process H, A is the
(Qθ˜,G)-generator of the Markov chain X, and W θ˜ is a (Qθ˜,G)-standard Brownian motion,
see Ch. 6 of Bielecki and Rutkowski (2004) for details.
2.3.2 Insurance Contract and Surrender Action
The contract we consider is a stylized equity-linked life insurance contract with a simple roll
up minimum guarantee at death or survival and a surrender guarantee. The survival and
the death benefit both entitle the policyholder to additionally participate in a profitable de-
velopment of the risky asset. The surrender benefit is independent of the asset performance
and depends on time only, as in Bernard and Lemieux (2008). We further assume that
the policyholder pays a single premium P at the beginning of the contract with a maturity
date T , which is a reasonable assumption since most equity indexed annuities contain a
single premium payment, see Palmer (2006). When the policyholder survives time T and
the contract is still active, the payment to him is
Φ(ST ) = αP (1 + g)
T + αP max
((
ST
S0
)
− (1 + g)T , 0
)
, (2.8)
where α denotes the percentage the initial premium is the provided with the minimum
guaranteed rate g and the policyholder participates in the performance of the underlying
asset. For an active contract the policyholder receives the death benefit
Γ(τ, Sτ ) = αP (1 + g)
τ + αP max
((
Sτ
S0
)
− (1 + g)τ , 0
)
, (2.9)
when the individual on whom the contract is written dies at time τ < T . Specifically in case
of death or survival the policyholder is offered a minimum guarantee given by the first term
in (2.8) or (2.9) and he is offered a bonus option given by the second term. We also make
use of the standard assumption in practice that death is treated as a natural event and thus
it is reasonable to let the guaranteed rates be the same for either event. Furthermore, in
practice the surrender benefit is often independent of the reference fund return and thus
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we make the assumption that the policyholder obtains the following amount L(λ) at the
surrender time λ, see Bernard and Lemieux (2008),
L(λ) = (1− βλ)P (1 + h)λ, 0 ≤ t ≤ T . (2.10)
Here h refers to the minimum guaranteed rate at surrender and βλ is the penalty charge.
In Canada and the US regulation provides that h is not allowed to fall below g, see Bernard
and Lemieux (2008). The penalty is further assumed to be constant over one calendar year
and a decreasing function of time, see Palmer (2006).
The surrender action at a random time λ is described by the first arrival of a generalized
Markov modulated Poisson process with stochastic intensity γ, which depends on the current
state of the economy, the ratio of the surrender benefit L and the present value of the
contract V = (Vt)t≥0. We refer to γ as the (Qθ˜,G) intensity. The new crucial assumption
of our model is that exogenous and endogenous surrender depend on the current regime,
that is the current state of the Markov chain. More formally, the arrival of an exogenous
surrender is modelled with a Markov modulated Poisson process with intensity ρXt, where
the row vector ρ is given by ρ = (ρ1 ρ2). Endogenous surrender is also modeled with a
Markov modulated Poisson process with intensity ρE Xt 1{L(t)>V (t)}, where ρE = (ρE1 ρ
E
2 )
is a again a row vector. Note that by definition the endogenous surrender intensity is 0
if it is not monetary optimal to surrender. The stopping time λ is the minimum of these
two conditionally independent random times. Assuming that exogenous and endogenous
surrender do not happen at the same time almost surely, the surrender intensity, that is the
intensity of λ, is just the sum of these two intensities and it can be written more compactly
as
γt =
{
ρXt , if
L(t)
Vt
< 1 ,
(ρ+ ρE)Xt , if
L(t)
Vt
≥ 1 , (2.11)
The first case in (2.11) corresponds to the exogenous surrender bound and the second is the
endogenous surrender bound. This formulation for the surrender intensity is inspired by
Dai and You (2007) and can be traced back to Stanton (1995). In addition the European
contract values and the American style contract values are included in this setup as limiting
cases. That is, the European contract values in the two states of the economy are obtained
by setting ρi = ρ
E
i = 0, i = 1, 2, while the American style contract values are obtained by
setting ρi = 0 and sending ρ
E
i ↑ ∞, i = 1, 2.
2.3.3 Contract Valuation
In this section we follow mainly Dai and You (2007) to derive a system of two coupled
partial differential equations using the balance law of financial economics. A system of cou-
pled partial differential equations is characterized by the property that the value function
in state i satisfies a partial differential equation that depends on the value functions of all
other states j 6= i. To find the contract value V = (Vt)t≥0 for an active contract, i.e. on the
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set {t < τ, λ}, we have to solve this PDE system and to correctly identify the state of the
economy. Note that if death or surrender occur at time t, t ∈ ]0, T [, the contract value is
trivially given by the death benefit, the surrender benefit respectively.
The balance law of financial economics is based on the no-arbitrage condition
r(t,Xt)Vt dt = EQθ˜ [dVt|Gt] , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (2.12)
on the set {t < τ, λ}. On this set we can compute the following instantaneous probabilities
under the assumption that the stopping times τ and λ are conditionally independent of
each other:
(a) The conditional probability that death occurs over (t, t+ dt) and surrender does not
is µ(t)dt(1− γtdt) = µ(t)dt.
(b) The conditional probability that surrender occurs over (t, t+dt) while the death event
does not is γtdt(1− µ(t)dt) = γtdt.
(c) The conditional probability that both death and surrender occur over (t, t+ dt) is 0.
Next, suppose that the contract value at time t is of the form Vt = 1{t<λ,τ}v(t, St, Xt), on the
set {t < λ, τ}∩{t ≤ T}. Then the surrender intensity γ specified in (2.11) is a function of the
state variables t, v and x. Given that we are in state i, we can define vi(t, s) = v(t, s, ei) for a
suitably differentiable function vi : [0, T ]×R+ → R+, (t, s)→ vi(t, s), for i = 1, 2. Denoting
the row vector of contract values for an active contract as v(t, s) = (v1(t, St) v2(t, St)),
we can further write v(t, St, Xt) = v(t, St)Xt. Next, define γi depending on t and v by
γi : [0, T ]× R+ → R+, (t, v)→ γi(t, v), for i = 1, 2. Denoting the corresponding row vector
by γ(t, v) = (γ1(t, v) γ2(t, v)), we can write γt = γ(t, Vt, Xt) = γ(t, v(t, St)Xt))Xt. Now,
we compute the differential of v(t, St, Xt) by applying Ito’s product rule, using the fact
derived by Elliot et al. (1994) that Xt has the dynamics dXt = A
′Xtdt+ dMt, where Mt is
a two-dimensional martingale with respect to the filtration G. We obtain that
dv(t, St, Xt) = Lv(t, St, Xt)dt+ v(t, St, Xt)dXt + σ(t, St, Xt)St dW θ˜t
= Lv(t, St, Xt)dt+ v(t, St, Xt)A′Xt dt+ v(t, St, Xt)dMt + σ(t, St, Xt)St dW θ˜t , (2.13)
where the regime-dependent differential operator L is defined as
Lf(t, s, x) = ∂f(t, s, x)
∂t
+ r(t, x) s
∂f(t, s, x)
∂s
+
1
2
σ2(t, s, x) s2
∂2f(t, s, x)
∂s2
.
The differential operator in state i Li is then defined by
Lif(t, s) = ∂f(t, s)
∂t
+ ri(t)s
∂f(t, s)
∂s
+
1
2
σ2i (t, s) s
2∂
2f(t, s)
∂s2
, i = 1, 2.
Next, we know that if either death or surrender occurs over (t, t + dt) the jump sizes are
predictable. In particular, the change in the payment liability if death occurs and surrender
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does not is given by Γ(t, St)− v(t, St, Xt) and by L(t)− v(t, St, Xt) if surrender occurs and
death does not. This implies that we can rewrite (2.12) as
r(t,Xt)v(t, St, Xt)dt =EQθ˜ [dv(t, St, Xt)|Zt] + (Γ(t, St)− v(t, St, Xt))µ(t)dt
+ (L(t)− v(t, St, Xt))γ(t, Vt, Xt)dt. (2.14)
Plugging (2.13) into (2.14) and using the fact that W θ˜t and Mt are Qθ˜-martingales, we
obtain dt⊗ dQθ˜-a.s.
0 =Lv(t, St) + µ(t) Γ(t, St) + γ(t, Vt, Xt)L(t)
− (r(t,Xt) + µ(t) + γ(t, Vt, Xt))v(t, St, Xt) + v(t, St)A′Xt . (2.15)
Since this has to hold for any t ∈ [0, T ), St ∈ R+ and Xt ∈ S we have that
0 =Livi(t, s) + µ(t)Γ(t, s) + γi(t, vi(t, s))L(t)
− (ri(t) + µt + γi(t, vi(t, s)))vi(t, s) + v(t, s)A′ei , (2.16)
for i = 1, 2. Also, by no arbitrage we must have vi(T, s) = Φ(s), for s > 0 and i = 1, 2.
Carrying out the matrix multiplication, we derive a system of two coupled PDEs, which we
summarize in proposition 2.3.1.
Proposition 2.3.1. On the set {t ≤ τ ∧ λ ∧ T} the contract value is given by
Vt = 1{λ>t,τ>t}
(
1{Xt=e1}v1(t, St) + 1{Xt=e2}v2(t, St)
)
+ 1{λ>t,τ=t} Γ(t, St) + 1{λ=t} L(t),
where the price functions vi, i = 1, 2, satisfy the following system of partial differential
equations
0 = L1v1(t, s) + µ(t)Γ(t, s) + γ1(t, v1(t, s))L(t)− (r1(t) + µ(t) + γ1(t, v1(t, s))) v1(t, s)
+η1 (v2(t, s)− v1(t, s)), (2.17)
0 = L2v2(t, s) + µ(t)Γ(t, s) + γ2(t, v2(t, s))L(t)− (r2(t) + µ(t) + γ2(t, v2(t, s))) v2(t, s)
+η2 (v1(t, s)− v2(t, s)), (2.18)
for (t, s) ∈ [0, T )× R+ with terminal conditions v1(T, s) = v2(T, s) = Φ(s), for s ∈ R+.
Subsequently we theoretically investigate the contract values in the two regimes. In
proposition 2.3.2 we show that some technical conditions can ensure that the contract value
is always greater in one state than in the other. The proof is given in the appendix. In
particular, the first two conditions that prominently depend on the delta and the convexity
of the contract value, will in general not hold globally.
Proposition 2.3.2. Assume the functions v1 and v2 in C
1,2 are solutions to the coupled
PDE system in Proposition 2.3.1. Suppose that
(r2 − r1) (s ∂v1
∂s
− v1) ≥ 0 , (σ22 − σ21)
∂2v1
∂s2
≥ 0 , and ρ2 + ρE2 ≥ ρ1 + ρE1 ,
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then v1 ≤ v2 on [0, T ]× R+. In particular, if r1 = r2, σ1 = σ2 and ρ2 + ρE2 ≥ ρ1 + ρE1 then
v1 ≤ v2 on [0, T ] × R+, and, if ρ1 = ρ2, ρ1E = ρ2E, r1 = r2 and σ1 = σ2 then v1 = v2 on
[0, T ]× R+,
Finally we can give a very general comparative statics result for the endogenous surrender
intensities ρEi , i = 1, 2. Intuitively, a higher endogenous surrender intensity in state i
increases the likelihood of monetary optimal surrender, which increases the contract value
in either state of the economy. The following proposition states this fact precisely. The
proof is given in the appendix.
Proposition 2.3.3. Assume the functions v1 and v2 in C
1,2 are solutions to the coupled
PDE system in Proposition 2.3.1. Further, assume that the functions v˜1 and v˜2 in C
1,2
are also solutions to the coupled PDE system that is identical except for the endogenous
surrender parameters that are now given by ρ˜E1 , ρ˜
E
2 , respectively. Suppose that ρ
E
1 ≤ ρ˜E1 and
ρE2 ≤ ρ˜E2 . Then we have v˜1 ≥ v1 and v˜2 ≥ v2.
For the other regime-switching parameters we cannot give such general results, but we
study their effects closely through numerical examples in section 4.
2.4 Numerical Methodology
To solve the PDE system (2.17) and (2.18) we need to determine reasonable boundary
conditions as a first step. We approach this by specifying the surrender intensities at the
boundary and using appropriate Neumann conditions for the partial derivatives. More
formally our specifications are
γi(t, vi) =(ρi + ρ
E
i ),
∂vi(t, s)
∂s
= 0, s ↓ 0, t ∈ [0, T ), i = 1, 2, (2.19)
γi(t, vi) =ρi,
∂vi(t, s)
∂s
=
αP
S0
, s ↑ ∞, t ∈ [0, T ), i = 1, 2. (2.20)
The intuitive idea behind our assumptions above is as follows. If the reference fund value
is very small then for a realistic contract the surrender option will be almost surely in the
money until it is exercised, accordingly we assume the surrender intensity coincides with
the endogenous surrender bound. For a very small value of the reference fund changes in
s have no effect on the contract value since the bonus option is deep out of money and
the policyholder will almost surely receive the minimum guaranteed amount if he does not
surrender. If the reference fund reaches a very large value then the surrender option will
be deep out of the money, which implies that there are no incentives to surrender the
contract endogenously throughout the entire lifetime of the contract. In that case changes
in s will only affect the value of the bonus option and as this is deep in the money it will
approximately move linearly with the reference fund. Next we can plug (2.19) and (2.20)
separately in the PDE equation for state i in (2.16). Noting that by the above assumptions
the second derivative with respect to s diminishes, the determination of the boundary
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conditions reduces to solving a system of two coupled linear ordinary differential equations
(ODEs) for each boundary. Accordingly for s ↓ 0 we have the coupled ODE system
∂vi
∂t
+ µ(t)αP (1 + g)t + (ρi + ρ
E
i )L(t)− (ri(t) + µ(t) + ρi + ρEi )vi + ηi (vj − vi) =0,
(2.21)
for t ∈ [0, T ), i 6= j = 1, 2 with the terminal condition v1(T ) = v2(T ) = αP (1 + g)T . For the
upper boundary we approximate s ↑ ∞ with a sufficiently large maximum value we denote
smax, then we obtain the following coupled ODE system
∂vi
∂t
+ r smax
αP
S0
+ µ(t)αP
smax
S0
+ (ρi L(t)− (ri(t) + µ(t) + ρi)vi + ηi (vj − vi) =0, (2.22)
for t ∈ [0, T ), i 6= j = 1, 2 with the terminal condition v1(T ) = v2(T ) = αP smaxS0 . These
ODE systems can be solved straightforwardly with a simple explicit scheme.
The next step is to solve the PDE system (2.17) and (2.18) subject to the terminal and
boundary conditions. It is important to emphasize that we need to solve a nonlinear coupled
PDE system since the surrender intensities are functions of the contract values and hence
need to be determined simultaneously with the latter for each time step and each state of
the economy. In this way, we need to solve a penalty problem, see Dai and You (2007). To
do so we first show how the solution of the PDE system is approximated for fixed surrender
intensities γi(t, vi), i = 1, 2 with the well-known Crank-Nicolson scheme. Then we apply a
generalized Newton iteration procedure, see Forsyth and Vetzal (2002), to simultaneously
compute the contract values and the surrender intensities in each state of the economy.
For the reason of computational efficiency we perform the log-transformation w = ln(s)
and set ui(t, w) = vi(t, s). The transformed PDE system is then given by
0 =
∂ui(t, w)
∂t
+ (ri(t)− 1
2
σ2i (t, w))
∂ui(t, w)
∂w
+
1
2
σ2i (t, w)
∂2ui(t, w)
∂w2
+ µ(t)Γ(t, y)
+γi(t, ui(t, w))L(t)− (ri(t) + µ(t) + γi(t, ui(t, w)) + ηi)ui(t, w) + ηiuj(t, w),(2.23)
(t, w) ∈ [0, T )× R, i 6= j = 1, 2 and terminal conditions u1(T,w) = u2(T,w) = Φ(ew).
To approximate (2.23) with we truncate the time domain [0, T ] in N equally spaced
time intervals ∆t and the log-price domain [wmin, wmax] into M subintervals of length ∆w,
where wmin denotes the minimum log-price and wmax the maximum log-price the reference
fund can attain. For each i = 1, 2, n = 0, ..N , m = 0, ...M let u
(n,m)
i denote the discretized
version of the contract value at node (n,m), where n is the time-point and m the log-price
step. In the sequel this definition applies to all parameters depending on (n,m). Applying
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the Crank-Nicolson scheme to approximate the coupled PDE system (2.23) we have
− biu(n+1,m−1)i − a˜i(n+1,m)u(n+1,m)i − b˜iu(n+1,m+1)i − ηju(n+1,m)j
= biu
(n,m−1)
i + a
(n,m)
i u
(n,m)
i + b˜iu
(n,m+1)
i + ηju
(n,m)
j + c
(n,m)
i + c
(n+1,m)
i , (2.24)
where
bi =− (r(n)i −
1
2
σ2i
(n,m)
)
1
2∆w
+
1
2
σ2i
(n,m)
(∆w)2
,
b˜i =
(
r
(n)
i −
1
2
σ2i
(n,m)
)
1
2∆w
+
1
2
σ2i
(n,m)
(∆w)2
,
a
(n,m)
i =−
(
2
∆t
+
σ2i
(n,m)
(∆w)2
+ r
(n)
i + µ
(n) + γ
(n,m)
i + ηi
)
,
a˜i
(n+1,m) =−
(
− 2
∆t
+
σ2i
(n+1,m)
(∆w)2
+ r
(n+1)
i + µ
(n+1) + γ
(n+1,m)
i + ηi
)
,
c
(n,m)
i =µ
(n)Γ(n,m) + γ
(n,m)
i L
(n),
c
(n+1,m)
i =µ
(n+1)Γ(n+1,m) + γ
(n+1,m)
i L
(n+1).
In order to obtain the contract value at time point n in each state we have to solve a system
of 2(M − 1) linear equations in 2(M − 1) unknowns. We define
u(n) = (u
(n,M−1)
1 , u
(n,M−1)
2 , u
(n,M−2)
1 , u
(n,M−2)
2 , ..., u
(n,1)
1 , u
(n,1)
2 )
′ , (2.25)
as the vector of contract values, which is first ordered by the regime number and then in
descending order of log-price steps. This enables us to write (2.24) compactly in matrix
notation as
D˜(n+1)u(n+1) = D(n)u(n) + d(n,n+1), (2.26)
where the 2(M − 1)× 2(M − 1) matrix D(n) is given by
D(n) =

a
(n,M−1)
1 η1 b1 0 0 0 0 . . .
η2 a
(n,M−1)
2 0 b2 0 0 0 . . .
b˜1 0 a
(n,M−2)
1 η1 b1 0 0 . . .
0 b˜2 η2 a
(n,M−2)
2 0 b2 0 . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
...
0 0 . . . b˜2 η2 a
(n,2)
2 0 b2
0 0 0 . . . b˜1 0 a
(n,1)
1 η1
0 0 0 . . . 0 b˜2 η2 a
(n,1)
2

.
D˜(n+1) is simply obtained by replacing each diagonal entry a
(n,m)
i in D
(n) by a˜i
(n+1,m) and
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multiplying each by −1, and d(n,n+1) is given by
d(n,n+1) =

c
(n,M−1)
1 + c
(n+1,M−1)
1 + b˜1(u
(n,M)
1 + u
(n+1,M)
1 )
c
(n,M−1)
2 + c
(n+1,M−1)
2 + b˜2(u
(n,M)
2 + u
(n+1,M)
2 )
c
(n,M−2)
1 + c
(n+1,M−2)
1
c
(n,M−2)
2 + c
(n+1,M−2)
2
...
c
(n,1)
1 + c
(n+1,1)
1 + b1(u
(n,0)
1 + u
(n+1,0)
1 )
c
(n,1)
2 + c
(n+1,1)
2 + b2(u
(n,0)
2 + u
(n+1,0)
2 )

.
Note that d(n,n+1) depends via c(n,m) on γ
(n,m)
i , i = 1, 2, and that needs yet to be determined.
We solve the matrix equation (2.26) for u(n) and destack this vector into the two vectors
u
(n)
i = (u
(n,M−1)
i ...u
(n,1)
i )
′, i = 1, 2, to obtain the contract values in state i at time point n.
The algorithm to determine γ(n,m) and u(n,m) works backwards starting at n = N − 1.
First we specify a starting value for the contract value in the corresponding state of the
economy at time point n. A natural candidate for the starting value at time point n is the
contract value in the corresponding state of the economy at the time point n+ 1. The next
step is to specify the surrender intensities γ
(n,m)
i , i = 1, 2 according to (2.11). Then we solve
the PDE system (2.23) with the Crank-Nicolson scheme as described above to determine
the new contract values. For each time step this procedure is repeated until the maximum
relative deviation of the contract values after the next iteration falls below a prespecified
tolerance level.
Specifically, denote uk˜i (n,m), the contract value in state i, i = 1, 2, at node (n,m) after
the k˜-th iteration run and γk˜i (n,m) is the surrender intensity in state i at node (n,m) after
the k˜-th iteration. Next define
εk˜i = max
m
|uk˜+1i (n,m)− uk˜i (n,m)|
max(1, uk˜+1i (n,m))
,
for i = 1, 2 and define εk˜ = max(ε1, ε2). That is, ε is the maximum relative deviation the
contract values can have in any of the two states after the k˜+1-th iteration run compared to
the k˜-th iteration. Finally, let ξ be the error tolerance in the iteration. Using this notation
the algorithm to determine simultaneously ui and γi, i = 1, 2 at time n = 0, 1, ...N − 1 for
each m = 1, ...M − 1 can be summarized as follows:
(a) take u0i (n,m) = ui(n + 1,m) as a starting value, compare u
0
i (n,m) with L(n), get
γ0i (n,m)
compute u1i (n,m) by solving the PDE system (2.23) with Crank-Nicolson
and compute ε0,
for k˜ = 1, ...k˜∗
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(b) compare uk˜i (n,m) with L(n) and get γ
k˜
i (n,m)
(c) take each γk˜i (n,m) and solve PDE system (2.23) numerically to obtain u
k˜+1
i (n,m)
(d) compute εk˜
(e) repeat steps 2 until 4 until εk˜ < ξ,
where k˜∗ is the last but one iteration.
2.5 Numerical Results
In this section we study the life insurance contract closely through numerical examples. We
assume that the two economic states represent the business cycles recession and expansion.
The recession state is denoted as state 1 and the expansion state as state 2, respectively. We
focus on the surrender option values in the two economic states and compare those for the
two surrender models, our regime switching rational expectation model and the American
style surrender model.4
The benchmark parametrization is as follows. The Standard and Poor’s 500 index is
the underlying with S0 = $1000. The single premium is P = $100 and the contract life
time is T = 10 years. We assume that the percentage the minimum guarantee is provided
with and the participation coefficient is α = 0.875, and the minimum guaranteed rates
are all equal and given by g = h = 0.02. The penalty rates are constant each calender
year with β1 = 0.05, β2 = 0.04, β3 = 0.02, β4 = 0.01 and βt = 0 for t ≥ 5. Next the
mortality intensity is assumed to follow the Makeham model µ(y) = A+Bcy for an y-aged
policyholder with A = 5.0758× 10−4, B = 3.9342× 10−5, c = 1.1029, see Li and Szimayer
(2014). The representative policyholder is assumed to be 40-aged at the moment he enters
into the contract. The switching intensities are estimated from the NBER business cycle
data from 2000 until 2010. We obtain the estimates ηˆ1 = 0.8889 and ηˆ2 = 0.2215. This
implies that the expected time the economy will stay in a expansion is about 4.5 years,
while the economy is expected to stay about 1.125 years in a recession state. For the
regime-switching parameters we make the following assumptions throughout this section:
ρ1 ≥ ρ2, ρE1 ≤ ρE2 , r1 ≤ r2, σ1 ≥ σ2. The first three assumptions are made such that
both the emergency fund hypothesis and the interst rate hypothesis hold. The procyclcial
risk-free rate and the countercyclical volatility are in line with empirical studies, see for
instance Engle et al. (2008) for a countercyclical volatility and Ang and Bekaert (2002 a,b)
for a procyclical risk-free rate. Note that we also assume for simplicity that the reference
fund volatility and the risk-free rate are constant within a regime, i.e σi(t, s) = σi and
ri(t) = ri for i = 1, 2, (t, s) ∈ [0, T ] × R+. Specifically, we set the exogenous surrender
intensities as ρ = (0.05 0.02). The endogenous surrender intensities in the two states are
ρE = (0.25 0.28) such that the endogenous surrender bound is the same in either state
4European and American option values are understood here in the presence of mortality risk.
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and equal to 0.3. This specification of the surrender intensities implies a monetary more
optimal surrender behavior in the expansion state. The volatilities are estimated by con-
structing a recession subsample and a expansion subsample for the Standard and Poor’s
500 daily log returns from 2000 until 2010. We have σˆ1 = 0.3397 and σˆ2 = 0.1728, which
are the annualized historical volatilities of the corresponding subsamples. For the risk-free
rate we assume r1 = 0.025 and r2 = 0.04. Finally the following values for the parameters
in the numerical approximation are used: ∆t = 1/50, N = T/∆t, M = 250, wmin = 0,
wmax = ln(5000), ∆w = (wmax − wmin)/M and ξ = 0.0001.
To better understand the contract intuitively we decompose it into its different com-
ponents in table 2.1. The European contract value is given by the value of the minimum
guarantee and the bonus option. The value of the surrender option is obtained as the differ-
ence between the contract value with surrender and the European contract value. Table 2.1
shows that the contract value in the recession state is about 2.31% higher than that in the
expansion state. This is primarily the result of the higher minimum guarantee value due to
the lower risk-free rate and a higher value for the bonus option due to the higher volatility
in the recession state. Moreover we notice that the value of the surrender option is about
11 % higher in the recession state for both our regime-switching rational expectation model
and the American style surrender model. This is the result of the countercyclical volatility
and the procyclical risk-free rate effect, which will be studied more closely in table 2.5 and
table 2.6 below. Note that in the regime switching rational expectation model the latter ef-
fects dominate the effect of monetary less optimal surrender behavior in the recession state.
Most importantly we clearly observe that the American surrender option values in either
regime are substantially, about 5 times larger than those in the regime switching rational
expectation model.
Minimum Bonus Surrender American
Guarantee (1) Option (2) Option (3) Surrender Option (4)
74.738 29.652 1.951 9.366
73.724 28.461 1.756 8.473
European Contract American
Contract Value Value Contract Value
(1)+(2) (1)+(2)+(3) (1)+(2)+(4)
104.390 106.341 113.756
102.185 103.941 110.658
Table 2.1: Decomposition of the contract values (in $) for the benchmark parameters in the
two economic states, the upper value corresponds to the value in the recession state and
the lower to that in the expansion state, respectively.
In table 2.2 we see how changes of the insurance parameters, the percentage the mini-
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mum guaranteed amount is provided with and the policyholder participates in the perfor-
mance of the reference fund α, the minimum guaranteed interest rate g and the interest
rate the surrender value grows with h, affect the value of the surrender option. A significant
decrease in α makes the holding of the contract less attractive and hence it substantially
increases the value of the surrender option in either state. On the other hand an increase
of g = h decreases the value of the surrender option in both states since the higher value of
the minimum guarantee dominates the increase in the cash surrender value L.
Surrender Option American Surrender Option
α = 0.8
7.097 14.053
6.635 12.997
g = h = 0.025
1.604 8.996
1.618 8.295
Table 2.2: Surrender Option values in the two economic states for different insurance pa-
rameters, the upper value corresponds to the value in the recession state and the lower to
that in the expansion state, respectively.
Now we study more closely the effect of the regime-dependent parameters on the sur-
render option values. In tables 2.3 and 2.4 we see how changes in the regime-dependent
surrender intensities affect the surrender option values in our rational expectation model,
while the American style option remains unaffected by assumption. In table 2.3 we observe
that increasing the endogenous surrender intensity ρEi increases the surrender option value
in either state. This is an immediate consequence of proposition 2.3.3. We see that the
endogenous surrender intensity in the expansion state ρE2 has a substantial effect on the
surrender option values, while the impact of the endogenous surrender intensity in the re-
cession state ρE1 is low. It is interesting to observe that when the policyholder surrenders
only exogenously in the recession state, i.e ρE1 = 0 and the endogenous surrender intensity
in the expansion state is low, i.e ρE2 ≤ 0.1, then the value of the surrender option can get
negative. This at first glance surprising result is explained by the fact that the surrender
option is exercised with a sufficient likelihood when it is out of the money, especially in the
recession state, while it is exercised with a too low likelihood when it is in the money.
In table 2.4 we see that both exogenous surrender intensities ρ1 and ρ2 have a very
strong impact on the values of the surrender option. In comparison to the previous table
we clearly observe that the surrender option values vary more with shifts of the exogenous
surrender intensities than with the endogenous surrender intensities. Moreover there is a
clear symmetric regime-impact of the exogenous surrender intensities on the option values.
More precisely, the exogenous surrender intensity in state 1 has a stronger impact on the
option value in state 1 than in state 2 and vice versa. This fact is fairly pronounced for the
exogenous surrender intensity in the recession state ρ1. We see that the surrender option
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ρE1 \ ρE2 0 0.1 0.2 0.5
0
-2.992 -0.551 0.814 2.514
-2.625 -0.472 0.742 2.143
0.2
1.330 2.719
1.373 2.535
0.5
2.816
2.658
Table 2.3: Surrender option values in the two economic states for various endogenous sur-
render intensities ρE2 in the first row and ρ
E
1 in the first column, the upper value corresponds
to the value in the recession state and the lower to that in the expansion state, respectively.
values in either state substantially decrease with increasing exogenous surrender intensities.
This is not a general result but is explained by the fact that for this contract the surrender
option is on average out of the money and hence a higher exogenous surrender intensity
results in a more monetary suboptimal surrender behavior. This point further accounts
for considerably negative surrender option values if the exogenous surrender intensities are
high, that is ρ2 ≥ 0.03 and ρ1 ≥ 0.1.
ρ2 \ ρ1 0 0.03 0.1 0.3
0
6.210 4.758 1.947 -2.939
5.354 4.395 2.520 -1.135
0.03
1.690 -0.636 -4.538
1.284 -0.258 -3.137
0.1
-4.700 -7.157
-4.390 -6.089
Table 2.4: Surrender option values in the two economic states for various values of the
exogenous surrender intensities ρ1 in the first row and ρ2 in the first column, the upper
value corresponds to the option value in the recession state and the lower to that in the
expansion state, respectively.
Table 2.5 confirms that both volatilities σ1 and σ2 have a significant effect on the sur-
render option values, where we identify a stronger effect in the regime-switching rational
expectation model. For the latter there is an asymmetric regime impact on the surrender
option values, which is slight for shifts of σ1 and moderate for shifts of σ2. The asymmetric
regime impact means that the volatility in state i has a stronger effect on the option value
in state j than in state i. For the American option we identify a strong symmetric regime
impact for both volatilities σ1 and σ2. Besides the opposing regime impacts, it is interesting
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to see that the overall effect of the volatility also completely differs in the two surrender
models. While the surrender option values decrease with σi in the rational expectation
model, they increase with σi in the American style surrender model. The first result can be
explained by the effect that an increasing volatility increases the likelihood that the option
goes out of the money and hence increases the likelihood of monetary suboptimal surren-
der, which here dominates the opposing effect that an increasing volatility can also make
monetary optimal surrender more likely. For the American style surrender option only the
effect that an increasing volatility increases the likelihood for the surrender option to be
in the money plays a role since by assumption the policyholder behaves monetary optimal,
hence the American style surrender option values are increasing with the volatilities.
σ2\ σ1 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40
0.10
4.463 3.891 3.139 2.344
(8.063) (8.572) (9.002) (9.415)
4.085 3.415 2.648 1.838
(7.603) (7.640) (7.695) (7.802)
0.20
2.227 1.728 1.283
(8.813) (9.276) (9.738)
2.183 1.682 1.145
(8.535) (8.659) (8.795)
0.30
0.476 0.135
(9.668) (10.189)
0.694 0.324
(9.430) (9.671)
Table 2.5: Surrender options values for the regime-switching rational expectation model
and the American style surrender model in the two economic states for various volatilities
σ1 in the first row and σ2 in the first column, the upper value corresponds to the value in
the recession state and the lower to that in the expansion state, respectively, the values in
brackets denote the American style surrender option values.
We learn from table 2.6 that the risk-free rate in the expansion regime has a stronger
impact on the surrender option values in both states and for both surrender models than
the risk-free rate in the recession state. Interestingly, for both surrender models we observe
an asymmetric regime impact of the risk-free rate, which is slight for shifts of r1 and very
pronounced for shifts of r2. For both surrender models the option values increase with the
risk-free rates. This is intuitive and in line with the interest rate hypothesis because a
higher risk-free rate increases the incentive to surrender the contract endogenously in order
to exploit profitable alternative investments.
Comparing table 2.3 through table 2.6 we notice that for this contract the surren-
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r1\ r2 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
0.02
0.432 1.143 1.932 2.602
(8.167) (8.629) (9.396) (10.260)
1.070 1.421 1.691 1.870
(8.071) (8.146) (8.442) (8.746)
0.03
1.177 1.934 2.622
(8.665) (9.402) (10.284)
1.571 1.826 1.968
(8.218) (8.514) (8.805)
0.04
1.937 2.663
(9.451) (10.305)
1.958 2.092
(8.619) (8.892)
Table 2.6: Surrender options values for the regime-switching rational expectation model
and the American style surrender model in the two economic states for various risk-free
rates r2 in the first row and r1 in the first column, the upper value corresponds to the value
in the recession state and the lower to that in the expansion state, respectively, the values
in brackets denote the American style surrender option values.
η2\ η1 0.20 0.50 1.50
0.10
-0.444 1.935 3.182
(9.815) (9.817) (9.253)
0.894 2.009 2.883
(8.126) (8.342) (8.455)
0.20
-1.498 0.898 2.664
(9.511) (9.545) (9.185)
-0.567 1.007 2.444
(8.175) (8.384) (8.493)
0.50
-3.147 -1.011 1.443
(9.167) (9.223) (9.081)
-2.637 -0.827 1.363
(8.465) (8.573) (8.609)
Table 2.7: Surrender options values for the regime-switching rational expectation model
and the American style surrender model in the two economic states for various switching
intensities η1 in the first row and η2 in the first column, the upper value corresponds to the
value in the recession state and the lower to that in the expansion state, respectively, the
values in brackets denote the American style surrender option values.
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der option values are always greater in the recession state in the American style surrender
model. This is the result of the symmetric regime impact of the countercyclical volatility
and the asymmetric regime impact of the procyclical risk-free rate. From table 2.5 and
2.6 we know that both effects are relatively value increasing, hence the surrender option
value is greater in the recession state. For the regime-switching rational expectation model
this result does not hold since the effect of monetary less optimal surrender in the recession
state and the slight asymmetric regime impact of the volatility, see also table 2.5, produce
a countereffect to the asymmetric risk-free rate effect. If the latter effects dominate, which
is for instance the case when the exogenous surrender intensity in the recession state is suf-
ficiently large or the risk-free rates coincide, see table 2.4 and table 2.6, then the surrender
option value is greater in the expansion state.
Finally we study the effect of the switching intensities η1 and η2 on the option values
in both surrender models in table 2.7. The surrender option values in the two states are
fairly sensitive with respect to changes in the switching intensities in the regime-switching
rational expectation model, while they are clearly less sensitive for the American style
surrender model. This can be explained by the property that the switching intensities
have a substantial effect on the average surrender behavior in the regime-switching rational
expectation model in the sense that they improve or deteriorate the average surrender
behavior. In particular, the surrender option values in the two states are increasing in η1
because the economy is expected to spend less time in the recession state, which on average
results in a monetary better surrender behavior of the policyholder. The line of reasoning
reverts for increases in η2. On the other hand for the American style surrender model the
degree of monetary optimal surrender is unaffected by the switching intensities since by
assumption the policyholder behaves monetary optimal. This explains the lower sensitivity
of the American option values. Unlike the regime-switching rational expectation model we
do not observe a clear monotonic effect of the switching intensities on the surrender option
values. However, for both surrender models higher values of ηi are leading to a more instable
economy coupling the option values while lower values of ηi are corresponding to a more
persistent economy decoupling the option values.
2.6 Conclusion
We propose a regime-switching rational expectation model, where both the market value
of a reference fund and the surrender intensity of a policyholder change randomly over
time according to the evolution of a continuous-time Markov Chain with a finite number
of states. The main contribution of this chapter is that it extends the rational expecta-
tion model of De Giovanni (2010) and Li and Szimayer (2014) by allowing both exogenous
and endogenous surrender to depend on the economic regime. Such economic regimes, can
represent for example financial market regimes with high or low volatility, macroeconomic
regimes with high or low interest rates or business cycles. More formally, we derive a cou-
pled system of two partial differential equations whose solutions characterize the contract
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values in the two economic states and establishe comparative statistics. This PDE system is
nonlinear since the surrender intensities are a function of the contract values and hence need
to be determined simultaneously with the latter. The solution of this penalty problem is
obtained numerically by combining the Crank-Nicolson scheme with a generalized Newton
search algorithm.
We performe extensive numerical experiments, where the economic states are consid-
ered as business cycles and the model parameters are set such that the emergency fund
and the interest rate hypothesis hold. Based on this experiment, we have the following
main results. First, the state of the economy has a significant impact on the contract
value and the surrender option value for both surrender models. The state impact is the
more pronounced the more persistent the economy is in the two economic states. It fur-
ther strongly depends on the difference between the regime-dependent paramter values and
how pronounced the symmetric or asymmetric regime impacts are. Second, the surren-
der option value is greater in the recession state in the regime-switching American style
surrender model, while in the regime-switching rational expectation model the surrender
option value can also be greater in the expansion state. Third, the surrender option val-
ues are substantially lower in our regime-switching rational expectation model than those
in the American style regime-switching surrender model in either state of the economy.
We further found that the exogenous surrender intensities have the strongest impact on
the surrender option values in our regime-switching rational expectation model. Finally,
if the exogenous surrender intensities are sufficiently high, especially that in the recession
state, the surrender guarantee can become negative in our model. In particular, the last
three results underline that an incorporation of the emergency fund hypothesis into a valua-
tion model is important in order to avoid a dramatic overpricing of the surrender guarantee.
The model presented in this chapter can be extended in several ways. A first possible
extension could be to allow the regime-dependent surrender intensities to be additionally
time-dependent. For example, one could assume that the surrender intensities are a de-
creasing function of time, that is policyholders are more likely to surrender when they are
younger. A second extension that arises is to model the reference fund dynamics more
realistically, e.g by including jumps when the state of the economy switches. From the the-
oretical perspective, it would be interesting to address the hedging problem in our setup.
Though we obtain an adequate risk premium for the macroeconomic risk the latter is only
justified by diversification arguments. A reasonable theoretical approach would be to follow
the rationale of Guo (2001) and to include regime-switching bonds in order to first com-
plete the extended financial market and then to derive hedging strategies for hedging the
regime-switching risk.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2.3.2
Proof 2.7.1 (Proof of Proposition 2.3.2). The value functions v1 and v2 are the solutions of
the coupled PDE system in proposition 2.3.1 with terminal condition v1(T, s) = v2(T, s) =
Φ(s). Define the function z as their difference, i.e.: z = v2 − v1. It follows directly that
z(T, s) = v2(T, s) − v1(T, s) = Φ(s) − Φ(s) = 0. To obtain the dynamics of z take the
difference of the PDEs describing v2 and v1:
0 = L2v2 + µΨ + γ2L− (r2 + µ+ γ2) v2 + η2 (v1 − v2)
− (L1v1 + µΨ + γ1L− (r1 + µ+ γ1) v1 + η1 (v2 − v1))
= L2z − (r2 + µ+ γ1 + η1 + η2)z + (γ2 − γ1)(L− v2) + (L2 − L1)v1 + (r1 − r2)v1
= L2z − (r2 + µ+ γ1 + η1 + η2)z
+(γ2 − γ1)(L− v2) + (r2 − r1)
(
s
∂v1
∂s
− v1
)
+ (σ22 − σ21)
∂2v1
∂s2
.
In fact, we want to show that z ≥ 0 in turn implying v2 ≥ v1. For doing so, the last line of
the previous equation is of importance. Using, e.g., Feynman-Kac, the following sufficient
condition for z ≥ 0 can be obtained
0 ≤ (γ2(t, v2(t, s))− γ1(t, v1(t, s)))(L(t)− v2(t, s))
+(r2(t)− r1(t))
(
s
∂v1
∂s
(t, s)− v1(t, s)
)
+ (σ22(t, s)− σ21(t, s))
∂2v1
∂s2
(t, s) .
Now, we verify that all three summands are nonnegative. Addressing the first term consider
the case L ≥ v2. Then by specification of the exercise behaviour in (2.11) we see that
γ2 = ρ2 + ρ
E
2 . By assumption γ1 ≤ ρ1 + ρE1 ≤ ρ2 + ρE2 , and thus the first summand is
nonnegative, i.e.: (γ2−γ1)(L−v2) ≥ 0. Consider the alternative case L < v2, then γ2 = ρ2.
By assumption ρ2 ≤ ρ1 and accordingly γ2 ≤ γ1. Also for this case we conclude that the first
summand is nonnegative, i.e.: (γ2 − γ1)(L − v2) ≥ 0. The second and the third summand
are nonnegative by assumption finishing the proof of the first assertion. The special case
r1 = r2, σ1 = σ2 and ρ2 + ρ
E
2 ≥ ρ1 + ρE1 follows immediately. For ρ1 = ρ2, ρ1E = ρ2E,
r1 = r2, and σ1 = σ2 we obtain by the special case just discussed that v1 ≤ v2 and v2 ≤ v1
(after switching indices) implying the identity, i.e. v1 = v2.
2.7.2 Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2.3.3
Proof 2.7.2 (Proof of Proposition 2.3.3). Define ρ¯ = (ρ + ρE)Xt and analogously ˜¯ρ. The
specification of the surrender intensity γ in (2.11) indicates that it is the maximal point of
the optimization problem
sup
g∈G
EQθ˜
[
e−
∫ T
0 r(t,Xt)+µ(t)+gtdt Φ(ST ) +
∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(u,Xu)+µ(u)+gudt
(
Γ(t, St)µ(t) + L(t) gt
)
dt
]
,
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where G = {g is Z-adapted : ρXt ≤ gt ≤ ρ¯ Xt}. Further, v(t, s, x) = (v1(t, s) v2(t, s))x as
given in proposition 2.3.1 is the value function of the optimization problem. Now, define the
set of admissible controls by G˜ = {g is Z-adapted : ρ˜ Xt ≤ gt ≤ ˜¯ρXt}. The solution of the
corresponding optimization problem is γ˜ with value function v˜(t, s, x) = (v˜1(t, s) v˜2(t, s))x.
By assumption ˜¯ρ ≥ ρ¯ pointwise and thus G ⊆ G˜. Consequently, we have that the value
functions satisfy v(t, s, x) ≤ v˜(t, s, x),
Chapter 3
A Risk-Based Premium: What does
it mean for DB Plan Sponsors?1
3.1 Introduction
In chapter 2 we have dealt with the market consistent valuation of a stylized equity-linked
life insurance contract in a regime-switching model. Specifically, we were concerned with
the pricing of some embedded options under mortality risk, that is a bonus option, which
is a call option, and especially a surrender option which represents an American stlye put
option. In the present chapter we also work in a contingent claim framework and derive
the market consistent value for the insurance provided by the Pension Benefit Guarantee
Corporation (PBGC). This market consistent value of the insurance is interpreted as the
fair risk-based premium a sponsoring company should pay to the PBGC. To determine this
risk-based premium we have to again price an embedded option, which in our application
turns out to be a down-out put option with rebate payments. Although the corresponding
insurance contract is also long dated and thus it would be realistic to incorporate mortality
and economic risk into the model as in the previous chapter, we neglect these sources of risk
and rather model the pension fund’s and the plan sponsor’s investment policy in a Black
Scholes setup. Unlike chapter 2 we are now able to derive a closed-form solution for the
corresponding embedded option. It is important to emphasize that although this chapter
focuses on the PBGC insurance, the subsequent model holds for any pension guarantee
fund, while the qualitative results carry over to any insurance guarantee fund in general.
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is a federal US corporation that
was created by Congress in the 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
to provide pension insurance for participants in private defined benefit (DB) pension plans.
By law any sponsoring firm of a qualified DB plan is required to get into an insurance
contract with the PBGC. Broadly speaking, the PBGC can be considered as an insurance
guarantee fund with the main difference that its clients are not solely insurance compa-
1This chapter is based on Chen and Uzelac (2014)
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nies. The long-term financial viability of the PBGC has recently triggered hot discussion
after the termination of several severely underfunded pension plans. Some prominent cases
are Delphi, Lehman Brothers, Circuit City, GM and Chrysler, and some earlier cases like
Anchor Glass Container Corporation Service Retirement Plan, the Pension Plan of Bethle-
hem Steel Corporation and Subsidiary Companies, and the Polaroid Pension Plan. These
terminations have worsened the financial position of the PBGC dramatically. The PBGC
reported a year-end deficit of $21.9 billion and $23 billion in its 2009 and 2010 Annual
Report, although the PBGC still had a surplus of $9.7 billion in 2000. In fact, 2010 marked
the eighth straight year that the PBGC had been on the Government Accountability Of-
fice’s “high-risk” watch list. Experts warned that if the PBGC were forced to take over
the pension plans of massive companies, its deficit could be even more substantial and the
financial condition of the PBGC could be even worse.
There are a variety of drivers which have caused the severe deterioration of the PBGC’s
financial condition. One very important driver is the ineffective premium calculation. In
2010, about 70% of the PBGC premiums were flat 2 and 30% were variable rate premiums.
3 The flat part currently consists of a 42$ premium per participant while the variable rate
premium is solely based on the pension funds’ underfunding, i.e. the sponsoring companies
pay 0.9% of the underfunding of their pension funds. It is important to emphasize that
both the flat and variable premium fail to account for the overfunding of a pension fund,
the credit risk of the firm, asset allocation risk in the pension fund, and the correlation
between the assets of the firm and its pension fund. As already pointed out by Josh Got-
baum (director of the agency) in an interview in February 2011: “it is not fair to say to
businesses that are financially sound and have plans in good shape that they should pay
the same premiums as guys who are not.” In the academic literature, Bodie (2006) and
Wilcox (2006), Brown (2008) and Love, Smith and Wilcox (2009) point out a flat premium
implies that the PBGC insurance is mispriced and mispriced pension insurance gives firms
adverse incentives.4 The economic rationale is that the charge of a flat premium leads to
gains in market value of equity for more risky firms and thus gives sponsors the incentive
to invest more riskily and to underfund their pension funds. A further consequence is that
less risky sponsors and pension funds will subsidize more risky ones and therefore have an
incentive to withdraw from the pension system,5 see Stewart (2007).
A risk-based premium has been considered a possible solution to the adverse incen-
tive and cross subsidization problem. President George W. Bush advocated a risk-based
premium in his 2006 and 2007 government budget plan and in February 2011, President
2A flat premium charge is the practice in most of the existing insurance guarantee funds, see Schmeisser
and Wagner (2013).
3Since 2007 there exists a third premium component called annual termination premium, but thus far
this premium part is negligible, see pbgc.gov.
4Cummins (1988) applies the same argument to insurance guarantee funds in general.
5A pension fund could voluntarily drop out of PBGC when some specific criteria are fulfilled. See
pbgc.gov for details.
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Obama backed up the risked-based premium endorsed by Bush. The Obama’s budget does
not mention how to take into account the risks that different sponsors pose to their retirees
and to the PBGC. This authority to adjust premiums is given to the PBGC board. Josh
Gotbaum says “they would be based on the company and the plan. For example, company
risk might be determined by the company’s credit rating or the value of its debt securities.
Plan risk could be based on the nature of its asset base”. In the current stage, it is unclear
for the PBGC how to enforce a risk-based premium.
In this chapter, we extend Chen’s (2011) model to determine a risk-based premium for
the insurance provided by the PBGC by modeling the conventional way of a premature
termination, distress termination, instead of the less common involuntary termination. In
an involuntary termination, when the pension fund’s asset falls below or hits a pre-specified
regulatory threshold before or at the maturity date T , the underfunded pension fund will
be trusted by the PBGC. In a distress termination, the premature termination is triggered
by the underfunding of the sponsoring company. The distress termination mechanism is
motivated since 99% of all plan terminations until 1995 were distress terminations (see e.g.
Kalra and Jain (1997)) and the more recent OECD paper by Blome, Fachinger, Franzen,
Scheunstuhl and Yermo (2007) confirms that still the most part of terminations are of dis-
tress type. In addition, we consider a further realistic perspective by allowing for a capped
PBGC insurance payoff.
We are able to obtain an analytical valuation formula for the premium. More impor-
tantly, this is the first study using recent data that empirically illustrates which sponsors
could be charged a higher and which sponsors a lower premium. In particular, we acquired
the relevant data of the 100 largest American DB sponsors. Our analysis shows that the
premiums paid to the PBGC differ significantly according to the differences in the sponsor
and pension fund risks. The empirical results nicely illustrate that our risk-based premium
calculation does not give sponsors adverse incentives as an increase in pension fund or spon-
sor specific risks comes at the cost of paying a considerably higher premium to the PBGC.
The new practice of the PBGC to also charge a variable rate premium, which is solely based
on the underfunding of the pension funds, goes partly in the right direction to eliminate
adverse incentives and cross subsidization as our results show that the funding ratio is the
most significant driver of the risk-based premium. However, the variable rate premium
does not take into account that overfunded pension funds should be charged a significantly
lower premium than underfunded ones, a point which is an important implication of our
model. Moreover, our results suggest that other financial risk factors need to be taken
into account, in particular it is very important to also incorporate sponsor specific risks like
the leverage of the sponsoring companies in order to obtain an adequate risk-based premium.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews
the literature about insurance guarantee funds in general and about the PBGC insurance.
In the sections 3.3 and 3.4 we first model the insurance guarantee provided by the PBGC
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under distress termination and then derive the valuation formula for the risk-based premium
by using the contingent claim approach. In the following section some comparative statistics
based on the analytical formula in the previous section are exhibited. In the sections 3.6.1
and 3.6.2 we use the real data to determine and compare the risk-based premiums for the
100 largest DB pension funds in the US. The section 3.7 discusses a more general distress
termination procedure in which the premature termination of the pension fund is modeled
as the event that the pension fund assets and the assets of the sponsoring company fall
below the pension liabilities and the corporate debt. This model is used as a robustness
check for our proposed distress termination model. Finally, we present our conclusions in
section 3.8 and the detailed derivation of the risk-based premium calculation in section 3.9.
3.2 Literature Review
The academic literature about insurance guarantee funds in general is extensive. Cummins
(1988) employs an option pricing approach to determine risk-based premia for the insurance
guarantee fund under three different model assumptions. This model is extended by Duan
and Yu (2005) to a multi-period setting taking risk-based capital allocations into account.
Rymaszewski, Schmeisser and Wagner (2012) introduce the concept of utility-based premi-
ums. Moreover, Han, Lai and Witt (1997) address the problem of a system with ex post
charges 6 not being able to be organized in a truly risk-based way due to the fact that the
insolvent company, which may have been the most at risk, is typically not charged at all.
Yasui (2001) points out that ex ante levies have the advantage of enabling relatively quick
handling of insolvency cases, as funds for policyholder compensation are always available,
which is particularly important if large (insurance) companies go bankrupt.
Considering specifically the PBGC insurance, three strands of academic literature have
been developed. A recent strand is built by Romaniuk (2011), who studies the investment
problem of the PBGC. Another direction is to determine an optimal intervention policy
for the PBGC in terms of finding critical funding ratios such that the PBGC prematurely
terminates these underfunded DB pension plans. This was first studied by Kalra and Jain
(1997) and is also studied in this dissertation in chapter 4. Since Sharpe (1976) the eco-
nomically fair pricing problem of the PBGC insurance has also been widely analyzed in
the literature. The realistic but in practice less common involuntary termination case is
studied in a variety of papers. Most studies assume the term to maturity of the PBGC
insurance is known and also ignore that the pension fund can be closed prematurely due to
its underfunding, thus they model the PBGC insurance as a plain vanilla put option, see
Treynor (1977), Chen, Ferris and Hsieh (1994) and others. The premature termination is
first considered in Kalra and Jain (1997) and extended by Chen (2011) by modeling the
PBGC insurance as a secondary guarantee. This chapter studies the fair pricing problem
of the PBGC in the most relevant distress termination framework and can be seen as an
6In the context of the PBGC’s premium practice the variable rate premium is an ex post charge, while
the flat rate premium is as an ex ante charge.
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extension to the influential papers of Marcus (1987) and mainly of Lewis and Pennacchi
(1994). Marcus (1987) models the PBGC’s liability as a contingent forward, which allows
the PBGC to gain the surpluses from overfunded terminated plans. It is not very realistic
because the PBGC’s liability can even become negative in this model, but law does not
allow the PBGC’s liability to be negative. Lewis and Pennacchi (1994) extend the previous
literature by considering the PBGC liability as a contingent put option.
Our modeling framework clearly differs from the above authors. That is, we consider
the PBGC insurance from the perspective of a representative beneficiary who retires at a
specific nonrandom time in the future. Accordingly the PBGC liability becomes a down
and out put option in our model. In addition we incorporate the two realistic perspectives
of a secondary guarantee and of the capped PBGC insurance payoff, which are not covered
in Marcus (1987) or Lewis and Pennacchi (1994). Notwithstanding these differences with
Lewis and Pennacchi (1994) the economic implications of our models are similar. First, in
contrast to Marcus (1987), our models rule out a negative value for the PBGC liability.
Second, our models suggest that sponsors with better funded pension funds should pay less
premiums to the PBGC. Third, we also obtain the intuitive result that a sponsor with a
higher firm net worth should pay less premiums to the PBGC.
3.3 Model Setup
The basic model setup is based on Chen (2011) and most of the notation is drawn from
that paper. However, Chen (2011) models an involuntary distress termination while this
chapter considers distress termination.
We consider the pension insurance for a single-employer’s defined benefits pension plan.
Let us assume that the pension plan is issued at time t0 = 0 to a representative beneficiary
and that the benefits are paid out as a lump-sum payment BT at the beneficiary’s retire-
ment date T . In order to focus on the effect of the investment policy of the pension fund, of
the plan sponsor, and their possible default on the insurance of the PBGC, we assume that
the pension liability BT is deterministic. In other words, we assume that the plan sponsor
is obliged to pay a fixed pension benefit T years from now on. In chapter 5 we will model
BT stochastically, as a function of the beneficiary’s salary and years of service, and also
show how the usual life annuity payments can be converted into a lump-sum.
There is a risk free asset F and a traded risky asset A in the economy. The risk free
asset evolves according to
dFt = rFtdt, F0 = 1 (3.1)
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for a deterministic risk free rate r. The traded risky asset A evolves according to
dAt = rAtdt+ σAAtdW
Q1
t , A0 = a, (3.2)
where σA is the constant volatility σA > 0 andW
Q1 is a standard Brownian motion under the
risk neutral probability measure Q. As the main focus of the paper is the determination of
the PBGC insurance premium, the asset processes have been expressed immediately under
the risk-neutral instead of the real-world probability measure, see also remark 3.3.1 for
a justification. Pension funds typically follow a rebalancing strategy in which the actual
asset allocation fluctuates closely around a given strategic asset allocation. To analyze
rebalancing and to take account of the plan’s investment portfolio, we assume that the
pension fund trades only in the risk free asset F and the risky asset A in a self-financing
way starting with initial wealth X0. Using pi to denote the fraction of wealth invested in
the risky asset A and the remaining (1−pi) fraction invested in the risk free asset F , we can
write down the following assets process of the pension fund under the risk neutral measure
Q:
dXt =rXtdt+ pi σAXt dW
Q1
t . (3.3)
Compared to (3.2), the volatility of the pension fund’s assets becomes piσA. For pi = 0, the
pension fund invests in the risk-free assets only; and for pi = 1, the pension fund invests in
the risky assets only.
We assume that the plan sponsor’s market value of assets also follow Black-Scholes dynamics
with a volatility σc > 0. Under the risk neutral probability measure Q, the market value of
assets evolves over time according to
dCt =rCtdt+ σcCt(ρdW
Q1
t +
√
1− ρ2dWQ2t ), C0 = c, (3.4)
where WQ2 is again a standard Brownian motion under the risk-neutral probability measure
Q, independent of WQ1 , and C0 is the initial value of the sponsoring company’s assets.
Note that the sponsoring corporation’s and the pension fund’s assets are correlated with a
correlation coefficient ρ ∈ (−1, 1).7 For ρ = 0, these two assets are uncorrelated.
Remark 3.3.1. We are going to use an option pricing approach to determine a risk-based
premium for the PBGC insurance. It is important to emphasize that this approach crucially
depends on the assumption that all cash flows in our model can be replicated. If we deviate
from this implicit assumption the only alternative to derive a risk-based premium would be
to rely on actuarial valuation techniques, which would require the specification of time and
state preferences. However, as in our context it is not really clear whose preferences should
be modeled we opt for the option pricing approach.
7We exclude the perfect correlation cases: ρ = 1 and ρ = −1. In these extreme cases, the pension fund
either invests directly in the stock of the sponsoring company or in a portfolio which is perfectly negatively
correlated with the sponsor’s assets. In both cases, the sponsor’s and the pension fund’s assets are fully
driven the randomness WQ1 . The valuation becomes simpler and differs from what we will present in the
remaining texts.
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3.4 The Distress Termination Framework
Distress termination is initiated by the plan sponsor by proving that it is unable to pay its
liabilities and to remain in business.8 In this simple distress termination model, we assume
that the plan sponsor defaults if the threshold φC0e
gt,  ≥ 1 and  φ < 1, is hit. That
is, the sponsoring company initiates default if it is unable to pay its outstanding corporate
debt φC0 e
gt plus an additional buffer (− 1) C0 φ egt. The product φC0 is the initial debt
value and g the constant growth rate at which the debt level increases. The additional
buffer (−1)φC0 egt serves to partly or fully cover the possible underfunding of the pension
fund. Note that including the regulatory parameter  > 1 can be interpreted economically.
The additional buffer can be understood as the moral obligation of the plan sponsor to
always be able to cover at least partly the deficits of the pension fund. From the economic
perspective only a small value for  is reasonable since a firm that performs well and has a
sufficiently high net worth has no incentive to terminate its business. The inequality φ < 1
is a technical condition which makes sure that the sponsoring company is not yet defaulted
at the contract-issuing time t = 0. As in Chen (2011) we formulate the termination event
in a standard barrier option framework and the termination time τ is constructed as the
first hitting time that the plan sponsor’s assets fall below or cross the threshold  φC0 e
gt:9
τ = inf{t|Ct ≤  C0 φ egt}. (3.5)
If τ ≤ T , there is a permature/mature termination enforced by the regulator. If τ > T ,
the pension plan is naturally closed at the maturity date T .
We need to impose the constraint  ≥ 1 to incorporate the realistic perspective that the
sponsoring company provides the primal support and the PBGC insurance is considered as
a secondary guarantee. Specifically, the sponsoring company will not provide the financial
support at all cost and its support depends on its own funding situation and the funding
situation of the pension fund:
• when the sponsoring company defaults, but the pension fund is sufficiently funded,
then the sponsoring company does not have to balance any deficits of the pension
fund;
• when the sponsor defaults and the pension fund is underfunded, then the sponsoring
company will fully cover the deficit if the buffer is sufficient or it will only partly cover
it if the deficits exceed the buffer.
The residual deficits that the sponsor cannot cover will become a financial burden on the
PBGC. This way of modeling distress termination is simplifying and it has two weaknesses.
8In practice, the plan sponsor has to meet one or more of four distress tests specified by ERISA. Our
framework mostly corresponds to the business continuation distress test, which is the most commonly used
one.
9Strictly speaking, the premature termination is not triggered by the sponsor’s underfunding, but due
to its poor financial condition.
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First, we could have inefficient termination, i.e. the pension fund is terminated though it
performs sufficiently well to cover the entire pension liabilities. It is important to note that
this scenario is possible as long as we do not jointly incorporate the distress and involuntary
termination case.10 Second, there could arise a scenario where the pension fund performs
very poorly, but the sponsoring company’s assets do not hit the threshold such that neither
the sponsor nor the PBGC covers the deficit in the pension liabilities. However these two
scenarios occur rarely in practice. First, as Bodie, Light, Morck and Taggart Jr. (1987) show
the DB plan’s funding degree is considerably positively related to the sponsoring company’s
long run profitability, therefore it is unlikely that the the DB plan is very well funded while
the plan sponsor is in financial distress. Second, if the sponsoring company is sufficiently
solvent while the DB plan is fairly underfunded, then the sponsoring company is required
to make considerable contributions to improve the pension fund’s funding status. More
importantly, this simple distress termination model has the advantage that we will obtain
closed-form solutions for the PBGC premium.
If the plan sponsor initiates distress termination prematurely or at maturity (τ ≤ T ), the
sponsor support and the insurance payoff of the PBGC occur already at τ . If the pension
plan is naturally terminated at maturity (τ > T ), both of the supports follow at time T .
Based on the above assumptions, we discuss the possible deficits the plan sponsor and the
PBGC need to cover for both cases: τ ≤ T ; and τ > T . In the former case, the assets of the
pension fund will be examined right at τ ≤ T . If we observe Xτ < BT e−r(T−τ), 11 i.e. the
assets of the pension fund fall below the discounted promised pension payment, the pension
fund is underfunded and the deficits of the fund are (BT e
−r(T−τ) − Xτ ). In this scenario,
the sponsoring company is obliged to provide a primal support to the underfunded pension
fund. Whether the sponsor provides a partial or full support depends on the magnitude of
the underfunding. The size of this primal support is given by
SP (τ) =(BT e
−r(T−τ) −Xτ )1{Xτ<BT e−r(T−τ)}1{(BT e−r(T−τ)−Xτ )<(−1)φC0egτ}
+ (− 1)φC0egτ1{Xτ<BT e−r(T−τ)}1{(BT e−r(T−τ)−Xτ )>(−1)φC0egτ}, (3.6)
where 1{A} is the indicator which is 1 when event A occurs and 0 otherwise. The first term
on the right-hand side of (3.6) corresponds to the case in which the buffer is sufficient to
cover all the deficits of the pension fund. In this case, the covered deficit is the difference
between the discounted liability BT e
−r(T−τ) and the asset value of the pension fund Xτ .
The second term corresponds to the case in which the buffer is insufficient to cover all the
deficits of the pension fund. After paying back to its own debt holders, the corporate can
provide what still remains, i.e. (− 1)φC0egτ , to the beneficiary.
For τ > T , the sponsor guarantee at T is almost the same as that in Chen (2011) with
10By modeling the first hitting time as the minimum of the stopping time in Chen’s (2011) model and
our above specified stopping time we would eliminate inefficient termination.
11Since the payment follows at τ , we have adjusted the pension benefits to the discounted value accord-
ingly.
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the only difference that the value of CT is unknown and we know that the sponsors assets
have never hit the treshold  φC0 e
gT . That is, the sponsoring company needs to provide
the guarantee
SP (T ) =(BT −XT )1{CT>φC0egT+(BT−XT )}1{XT<BT }
+ (CT − φC0egT )1{φC0egT<CT<φC0egT+(BT−XT )}1{XT<BT }. (3.7)
We can express the entire support provided by the plan sponsor in the following compact
form:
SP = SP (τ)1{τ≤T} + SP (T )1{τ>T}. (3.8)
In addition to the sponsor support, the PBGC provides a secondary security to the
pension plans, i.e. it covers the residual deficits that the sponsoring company is unable to
cover. However, in practice the amount of residual deficits the PBGC covers is capped.
The inclusion of a cap is important since if a pension fund is terminated that is highly
underfunded the PBGC can only provide a not-too-high fraction of the retirement income.
A good example is Delphi where the retirees typically received pension payments ranging
from $3000 to $4000 a month, but a 55-year old retiree can receive at most $2025 from the
PBGC. Hence, we include an additional important perspective by allowing for a capped
payoff G¯, where we assume G¯ < BT . We assume that G¯ is the capped payoff binding for
the retirement date T . If there is a premature termination at τ < T , the capped amount is
correspondingly adjusted to G¯e−r(T−τ). Denote the difference between the present value of
the pension liabilities and the buffer by BC(t) = BT e
−r(T−t) − ( − 1)φC0 egt, t ∈ [0, T ],
then we can express the insurance of the PBGC at τ ≤ T as the minimum of the difference
between the residual deficit BC(τ)−Xτ and the capped amount G¯e−r(T−τ). Formally the
insurance of the PBGC is then given by
G(τ) = min(BC(τ)−Xτ , G¯e−r(T−τ)) 1{Xτ<BC(τ)}
=(BC(τ)−Xτ ) 1{max(0,BC(τ)−G¯e−r(T−τ))<Xτ<max(0,BC(τ))}
+G¯e−r(T−τ)1{Xτ<max(0,BC(τ)−G¯e−r(T−τ))}, (3.9)
where in the second step we just split the min function in the 2 possible cases.
If τ > T , the insurance payoff of the PBGC is once again described by the minimum
between the residual deficit and the capped amount. In this case, the residual deficit differs,
since now CT is unknown. We have
G(T ) =1{XT<BT }min
(
G¯,max(BT −XT − Φc(T ), 0)
)
= max
{
0, BT −XT − (CT − φC0egT )
}
1{φC0egT<CT<φC0egT+BT−XT }
· 1{XT<BT }1{BT−XT−(CT−φC0egT )<G¯}
+ G¯1{φC0egT<CT<φC0egT+BT−XT }1{XT<BT }1{BT−XT−(CT−φC0egT )>G¯}. (3.10)
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The PGBC balances the deficits of the pension fund only when the sponsoring company is
unable to cover the entire deficits, i.e. when φC0e
gT < CT < φC0e
gT + BT − XT . The
size of the PBGC’s payoff depends on whether the capped amount G¯ is binding. More
compactly, the insurance of the PBGC can be expressed as follows:
G = G(τ)1{τ≤T} +G(T )1{τ>T}. (3.11)
That is, the insurance payoff provided by the PBGC is a package of exotic put options.
3.4.1 A Risk-Based Premium
Usually periodic (yearly) premiums are charged by the PBGC for providing the insurance.
For simplicity, we assume that the PBGC receives an upfront premium for providing the
security to the beneficiary. The upfront premium corresponds to the today’s price of the
insurance claim (3.11) on pension fund’s and sponsoring company’s assets. In our context,
the risk-based premium of the PBGC insurance can be derived by computing the expected
discounted payment under the risk-neutral measure Q.
Proposition 3.4.1. The risk-based premium paid by the plan sponsor to the PBGC is the
expected discounted insurance payoff under the risk neutral probability measure:
G0 =EQ
[
e−rTG(T )1{τ>T}
]
+ EQ
[
e−rτG(τ)1{τ≤T}
]
, (3.12)
where EQ denotes the expected value under the risk-neutral measure Q. The closed-form
solution is given in the appendix.
Proof 3.4.2. A detailed derivation is provided in the appendix in section 3.9.
3.5 Comparative Statistics
Before we move to empirically illustrate our risk-based premium calculation for the 100
biggest DB pension funds in the US, we exhibit some comparative statistics. The purpose
of the analysis is to demonstrate the impact of several main parameters on the PBGC
premium. The premium is expressed as the percentage of the promised pension payment
BT . By changing only one parameter each time, we can better understand what role each
parameter plays in the PBGC premium. For this numerical calculation, we fix the relevant
parameters as follows:
 =1.05, r = 0.05, σc = 0.25, φ = 0.6, g = r, pi = 0.6,
X0 =100, BT = 240, σA = 0.20, C0 = 100, T = 15, ρ = 0.2, G¯ = 120. (3.13)
Figure 3.1 plots the PBGC premium as a function of the promised pension payment BT
for diverse correlation coefficient ρ. As we have fixed the initial asset value of the pension
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Figure 3.1: Fair premium G0 as a function of BT for different ρ levels.
fund to 100, an increase in BT implies a deterioration of the funding situation of the pension
fund, see the next section. As a result, it becomes more likely that the pension fund’s ter-
minal asset XT is insufficient to provide the promised pension payment. Hence, the chance
that the PBGC needs to cover the possible deficits of the pension fund rises, which leads to
a higher PBGC premium. So underfunded pension funds are supposed to be charged with
a higher risk-based PBGC insurance premium. Furthermore, it can be read from Figure 3.1
that the premium increases in the correlation ρ between the pension fund’s and sponsor’s
assets. When the sponsor’s and the pension fund’s assets are strongly positively correlated,
the likelihood is high that the sponsoring company is unable to provide full/partial guar-
antee when the pension fund is already at default. These results imply that the sponsoring
company can free ride the PBGC much when the correlation coefficient is high.
How the volatility σc of the sponsor’s asset influences the premium is exhibited in Figure
3.2. The volatility σc might show a non-monotone effect on the premium, depending on
the regulatory parameter . However for a realistic scenario, say  = 1.05, we obtain the
economically intuitive upward sloping curve for the premium as a function of σc, i.e. plan
sponsors who invest in more risky investment portfolios should be charged with a higher
premium for the PBGC insurance. A higher σc is more likely to cause the default of the
sponsoring company. Hence, the premium part upon premature termination increases in
σc. But it causes a simultaneous decrease of the premium part upon natural termination.
For a low regulatory parameter, the former effect seems to dominate. For a higher and less
realistic  level (e.g.  = 1.1 or  = 1.15), an increase in σc could lead to a hump-shaped
curve for the premium. The impact of the sponsor’s assets volatility is most pronounced
for the more realistic  level,  = 1.05. In the same figure, we observe the negative relation
between the premium and the regulatory parameter . This parameter influences the prob-
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Figure 3.2: Fair premium G0 as a function of the volatility of the sponsor’s assets σc for different
 levels.
ability of premature termination and how high the buffer owned by the sponsoring company
is to cover the deficits of the pension funds. The main effect is: the higher the  level, the
more deficits the sponsor company can balance. Hence, an increase in  leads to a smaller
insurance payoff of the PBGC, and consequently to a smaller PBGC premium.
In Figure 3.3, we observe the effect of φ on the PBGC premium for different σ values,
where φ is the initial leverage ratio of the the plan sponsor and σA drives the volatility of
the pension fund’s assets. It is observed that the PBGC premium is (weakly) hump-shaped
in the leverage ratio φ. The mainly increasing premium is primarily the result of an intu-
itive economic effect: the higher the leverage ratio, the more the sponsoring company needs
to serve the outstanding liability and therefore the more likely it is that the sponsoring
company will initiate distress termination before the retirement date, which increases the
premature premium part. The (weak) decrease for higher leverage ratios is due to two
effects. First there is a counter-effect that in our simple distress termination model a higher
leverage ratio means that the sponsoring company uses a higher buffer in absolute terms to
provide the primal guarantee. Second a higher φ also decreases the probability of natural
termination, which might decrease the premium in charge of natural termination. In the
same figure, we observe that the PBGC premium goes up in the volatility of the pension
fund. The more risky the pension fund’s portfolio, the more probably the pension fund
becomes underfunded. Therefore, it is of high likelihood that the PBGC needs to balance
the residual deficits of the pension fund. The PBGC premium rises.
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Figure 3.3: Fair premium G0 as a function of φ for different σ levels.
Finally in Figure 3.4 two apparent effects on the PBGC premium are demonstrated: the
increasing effect of the capped amount and the rising effect of the equity-holding (pi) of the
pension fund. When the PBGC promises a higher capped amount G¯, it means a higher cost
for the PBGC. A higher equity holding has a similar effect as holding a more risky portfolio
for the pension fund. Therefore, the PBGC premium rises.
3.6 Empirical Example
In the following section we present an empirical example where we compute risk-based
premiums for a representative subsample of the 100 largest US corporates and their defined
benefit plans.The corresponding data set is obtained from P&I Investments. Representative
means that we include sponsors from all industry sectors in this subsample. It is important
to emphasize that the risk-based premiums we estimate can hardly be interpreted as real
risk premiums since as well our theoretical model relies on some simplifying assumptions as
does the estimation of the relevant parameters at hand. Nonetheless the major objective
of this empirical exercise is to illustrate how premiums sponsoring companies had to pay
would diverge if the premium calculation were risk-based.
3.6.1 Data and Estimation Methodology
Our data set contains the fair value of the pension plan assets, the benefit obligation, the
funding ratio, the total corporate asset value and the equity value of the sponsor and the
asset allocation of the pension fund for each sponsor.
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First of all, we have to resolve the heterogeneity in our sample. This is necessary because
the different firms have a different number of policyholders with different characteristics as
age, income etc., but our model yields a theoretical premium for a single representative
policyholder. This implies that we cannot readily infer the initial wealth of the pension
fund X0, the initial value of the firm C0 and the present value of the pension obligations
BT from the data set. That is why we normalize the initial wealth level X0 to 100 $ and
the initial asset value C0 to 300 $ for each sponsor in the sample.
12 Then, to obtain an
adequate estimate for the lump sum payment to the beneficiary in T years BT in our model
we can use the observed funding ratio as the main input. First, we know that the funding
ratio is defined as the ratio of the initial asset value and the initial outstanding accrued
liability.13 More precisely, let R0 be the funding ratio and B0 the initial pension liability,
then R0 =
X0
B0
⇔ B0 = R−10 X0. In addition, we know that the initial outstanding liability
in our model is simply given by the discounted pension liability BT , that is B0 = e
−r TBT .
Equating the latter two equations we estimate BT as
BˆiT =e
rT X0 (R
i
0)
−1,
where the superscript i denotes the pension liabilities of sponsor i. Put differently, our
simplifications imply that the pension liabilities are a riskless asset under the risk-neutral
probability measure with initial value X0R
−1
0 .
12The sponsor’s initial asset value is set higher since in practice sponsors assets usually take significantly
higher values than those of pension funds.
13In chapter4 we model the funding ratio dynamically.
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To estimate the fraction invested in the risky asset we use the asset allocation data in
our sample. Our sample contains investment shares in equity, fixed income, alternatives,
real estate, private equity, hedge funds, cash and other investments. As the investments
within the different types of assets are not further characterized in the data set we classify
the asset classes as risky or riskless by relying on long-term empirical evidence. Specifically,
we classify investments in equity, private equity, hedge funds and real estate as investments
in the risky asset, while we characterize cash and fixed income investments as riskless,
since except hedge funds 14 the former have been significantly more volatile in the long
run, see for instance Eychenne, Martinetti and Roncalli (2011). For the other assets and
alternatives category in the sample, containing instruments like derivatives, commodities,
balanced funds etc., in most cases we cannot infer from the data if these are rather equity
or fixed income type investments. Nonetheless we cannot omit these categories because
they are not negligible for a significant number of companies, i.e because their pension
funds invest more than 10% in these categories. We decide to classify the half of them as
risky and the other half as riskless as we think that this produces the smallest bias. The
classification is summarized in table 1.
Risky Asset Class Riskless Asset Class
Equity Cash
Private equity Fixed income
Hedge funds Alternatives
Real Estate Other investments
Alternatives e.g Balanced Funds
Other investments
e.g Derivatives
Table 3.1: Classification of the assets into the risky and riskless asset class.
Then the fraction invested in the risky asset is estimated as
pˆii = piiE + pi
i
PE + pi
i
HF + pi
i
RE +
1
2
(piiA + pi
i
O),
where piiE denotes the observed percentage pension fund i invested in equity, analogously
piiPE is the share invested in private equity, pi
i
HF the share in hedge funds, pi
i
RE in real estate,
piiA the share in alternatives and pi
i
O the share sponsor i invested in other assets.
To estimate the sponsor specific parameters as the leverage φ and the volatility of the
sponsor’s assets σc we generally need to estimate the market value of assets, which is defined
as the sum of the market value of liabilities and the market value of equity. The market
value of equity is easily determined because all sponsors in our sample are listed companies
14Hedge funds have on average a lower volatility than fixed income investments. However we consider
them still as more risky, particularly because they have a substantially higher loss potential, see for instance
Gaurav and Kat (2003).
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and thus equity data is readily available. However it is hard to observe the market value
of liabilities. That is why we follow the standard approach in the literature and consider
the book value of liabilities, which is given in the balance sheet data of a company, as a
proxy for the latter. Then we simply estimate the leverage as the ratio of the book value
of liabilities and the approximated market value of assets, that is
φˆi =
LiB
LiB + E
i
M
,
where LiB denotes the observed book value of liabilities of sponsor i and E
i
M the observed
market value of equity, respectively.
For the estimation of the sponsor’s asset volatility σc we use a historical data approach.
The asset value is calculated as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of
liabilities. The book value of liabilities is available quarterly from the balance sheet data,
so we construct a historical time series with quarterly data. For each data point and each
sponsor we observe the market value of equity and infer the book value of liabilities. Then
we compute the corresponding log returns for the estimated market value of assets. Even-
tually we estimate σic as the annualized volatility of these quarterly log return time series.
Finally we specify those parameters, which are not pension fund or sponsor specific.
Parameters as the regulatory parameter , the maximum amount the PBGC provides G¯
and the risk-free rate r are naturally not sponsor specific. The growth rate g of the sponsor
liabilities is not sponsor specific here since it is a drift coefficient, which has to coincide
with the risk-free rate under the risk-neutral probability measure. Other parameters like
the correlation ρ of the sponsor’s and pension fund assets and the volatility σ of the risky
asset A in our model are sponsor and pension fund specific, but it is very hard to obtain
adequate data to estimate them. Accordingly we keep these parameters constant across
sponsors and pension funds.
We approximate σ by the S&P-500 volatility. Note that the estimated volatility of the
pension fund i, which is given by pˆii σˆA, still varies across pension funds because of the
different share invested in risky assets.
We specify G¯ such that the PBGC can provide a significant fraction c of the maximum
pension liabilities in the sample, specifically we estimate
ˆ¯G = max
i
c BˆT
i
.
This ensures that the PBGC covers a large part of the deficits in case of termination for
any sponsor, which is in line with its legal obligation.
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The other parameters are specified in the next section.
3.6.2 Estimation Results
First we have the following nonspecific parameter estimates and specifications:
r = g = 0.0413; σˆ = 0.2022; ρ = 0.5; T = 15;
 = 1.05; ˆ¯G = 0.4 ∗ 282.371 = 112.948.
The risk-free rate is approximated by the T-bill yield of a 20-year bond on 12/31/2010, σA
is estimated as the annualized volatility of the S&P 500 daily log returns from 01/01/1996
until 12/31/2010. T = 15 is chosen because this is the average duration of pension liabil-
ities. ρ = 0.5 is taken from Lewis and Pennacchi (1994).  is set as in the comparative
statics section. Note that this value satisfies the technical condition that no sponsor in our
subsample defaults at t = 0. G¯ is specified such as described in the previous section, where
the maximum pension liabilities BT are those of the sponsor Goodyear Tire & Rubber and
the fraction of the maximum liabilities the PBGC can provide is set c = 0.4.
In table 3.2 below we present the sponsor and pension fund specific estimates for the
representative subsample. The leverages are estimated with the corresponding market and
balance sheet data on 12/31/2010 and the sponsors asset volatilities are estimated as de-
scribed in the previous section for a period ranging from 01/01/2001 until 31/12/2010 15
including 40 observation points for the approximated market value of assets. We normalize
the premium sponsors paid to the PBGC by considering the percentage premium per pen-
sion liability, that is G˜ = G0
BT
. Due to the different levels of BT , this ratio provides a better
statistic for the premium instead of the absolute premium G0.
First our estimation results illustrate that the percentage premiums per pension liability
differ significantly across sponsors and their pension funds. The message of this important
result is that if sponsor and pension fund risk are adequately taken into account then a
mainly flat premium, which is still the current practice at the PBGC, is not justifiable at
all.
More specifically, we see that the sponsor Bank of America pays the smallest percentage
premium per liability though it has at the same time the highest leverage. Due to the hump
shape of the premium as a function of leverage, the extremely high leverage dampens the
magnitude of the premium slightly, so does the very low asset volatility. More importantly
the very low premium is mainly justified because Bank of America has a very well funded
pension fund, which ensures that even if it goes bankrupt in the near future it will be very
likely that the corresponding pension liabilities can be met. The same justification also
15We cannot use a 15-year period for the historical estimation as some sponsors in our subsample were
not listed prior to 2000.
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applies to JP Morgan who pays the second smallest percentage premium per pension lia-
bility. On the other hand, Goodyear Tire&Rubber is clearly the sponsor carrying the most
sponsor and pension fund risk because it has the worst funded pension fund, a very high
leverage and a high investment share in risky assets. From the previous comparative statics
section and these two examples we see that the funding ratio α, which accounts for the
different sizes of the pension liabilities BT , seems to be the most significant factor deciding
the difference in the percentage premiums.
However our estimation results also confirm that other factors play a significant role
in explaining differences in the premiums. To see this we can for instance compare spon-
sors having the same funding ratio as Ashland and Coca Cola. We observe that Ashland
pays a percentage premium which is almost 3 times larger than that of Coca Cola. Here
the substantial difference is clearly explained by the relatively high leverage of Ashland,
which is about 2.7 times as large as that of Coca Cola and clearly dominates the effect of
the more risky pension fund of Coca Cola due to the higher investment share in risky assets.
Another striking example illustrating the significant effect of the leverage is the compari-
son between the sponsors Wells Fargo and Coca Cola. Though the former has a considerably
larger funding ratio, a substantially lower asset volatility and investment share in risky as-
sets, it pays a 0.2% greater percentage premium per liability. This is purely explained by the
very high leverage, which is more than 3 times larger than that of Coca Cola. Accordingly,
we identify the leverage as the second major risk factor, in particular the major sponsor spe-
cific risk factor, that accounts for differences in the premiums per unit liability in our model.
Although their effect is smaller in magnitude, the investment share in risky assets and
the sponsor’s asset volatility together can produce a considerable effect on the PBGC pre-
mium. To illustrate this point we compare the sponsors Eli Lilly and Exxon Mobil. Eli
Lilly has a moderately larger funding ratio and a slightly larger leverage than Exxon Mobil,
but pays a about 2.6 times greater percentage premium per liability. As these two opposite
effects nearly offset the significantly greater premium is mainly the result of the substan-
tially greater asset volatility and the considerably greater investment share in risky assets.
3.7 Extension: A More General Distress Termination
Model
A more realistic way to model distress termination is to model the default of the sponsoring
company as the event that the pension fund assets and the assets of the sponsoring company
fall below the pension liabilities and the corporate debt. More precisely, we could model
the first hitting time as
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Sponsor
ˆ˜ i
G
ˆ˜ i
G1 φˆ
i σˆc
i Ri0 Bˆ
i
T pˆi
i
3M 1.648 1.570 0.186 0.174 0.940 197.660 0.678
Aetna 6.372 10.470 0.696 0.146 0.901 206.215 0.755
American Electric 8.704 11.250 0.680 0.159 0.803 231.382 0.693
Ashland 8.704 9.992 0.578 0.186 0.754 246.419 0.470
AT&T 5.996 8.370 0.475 0.229 0.883 210.419 0.527
Bank of America 0.040 7.330 0.938 0.086 1.123 165.450 0.632
Baxter International 5.451 5.370 0.266 0.213 0.784 236.990 0.630
Boeing 7.016 7.800 0.579 0.166 0.833 223.049 0.459
Caterpillar 5.928 6.210 0.472 0.140 0.826 224.939 0.736
Coca-Cola 3.120 3.010 0.215 0.178 0.754 246.419 0.697
Consolidated Edison 5.878 5.910 0.634 0.075 0.749 248.064 0.763
Dominion Resources 2.863 5.160 0.551 0.147 1.137 166.831 0.656
Dow Chemical 7.773 8.140 0.542 0.147 0.749 248.064 0.593
Eli Lilly 5.890 5.970 0.315 0.197 0.861 215.795 0.808
Exxon Mobil 2.287 2.240 0.288 0.144 0.822 226.034 0.609
FedEx 3.027 3.150 0.287 0.186 0.918 202.396 0.500
General Dynamics 7.972 8.210 0.418 0.180 0.677 274.446 0.722
Goodyear Tire & Rubber 13.529 13.960 0.836 0.139 0.658 282.371 0.667
Hewlett-Packard 5.261 7.150 0.468 0.227 0.865 214.800 0.392
Honey International 7.068 7.370 0.396 0.189 0.813 228.536 0.732
IBM 4.007 5.170 0.331 0.230 0.980 189.592 0.528
JP Morgan 0.099 7.580 0.922 0.078 1.301 142.813 0.814
United Technology 3.690 3.810 0.332 0.170 0.916 202.838 0.614
Walt-Disney 4.731 4.750 0.305 0.174 0.703 264.296 0.600
Wells-Fargo 3.307 8.430 0.875 0.060 0.932 199.356 0.641
Table 3.2: The premiums are expressed as the percentage ratio of the estimated promised
benefit BˆiT . The first column denotes the premium in the simple distress termination model
and the second column the one in the extended distress termination model. φˆi and σˆc
i are
estimated the debt ratio and asset volatility of sponsor i. pˆii is the estimated equity holding
of the pension fund i.
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τ = inf{t|Ct +Xt ≤ η(C0 φ egt +BT e−r(T−t))}, (3.14)
where η ∈ (0, 1) is assumed.
Observe that unlike our simple distress termiantion model in this extended model the
sponsoring company can at most provide a partial support if distress is initiated through the
underfunding of the pension fund. The main advantage of this setup is that by construction
of the hitting time the scenario where the pension fund performs very poorly but neither the
sponsor nor the PBGC covers its deficits cannot arise. The price we have to pay for this more
realistic setup is that we can no longer obtain analytic solutions for the PBGC premium.
The problem is that we cannot derive the density and the distribution of the first hitting
time in closed form, since the distribution of the minimum of the sum of two log-normal
processes is unknown. Then the premium needs to be computed by Monte Carlo simulation.
We use the more realistic distress termination model as a robustness check for our sim-
ple distress termination model. The payoff functions, which we need for the simulation are
given in the appendix in section 3.9.2.
The second column in 3.2 displays the percentage premiums per pension liability for the
representative subsample. We observe that for most of the DB sponsors these premiums
are very similar to the ones in our simple distress termination model and more importantly
the extended distress termination model also confirms that the premiums differ significantly
across sponsors. However there are some significant deviations.
Firstly, one can see that sponsors with a very high leverage, especially those from the
banking industry, pay a substantially higher percentage premium in this extended distress
termination model. For example, the sponsors Bank of America and JP Morgan do no
longer have the smallest percentage premium, but they belong to the sponsors who would
pay a higher percentage premium in this extended distress termination model. The reason
for this deviation is that in our simple distress termination model the premium can be hump-
shaped in the leverage, see figure 3.3. Accordingly a very high leverage might dampen the
premium in this model, whereas the premiums increase in the leverage in the extended
distress termination model. This is because here only the effect that a higher leverage
increases the likelihood of premature termination is present. Secondly, we can observe that
the sponsor’s asset volatility has a stronger impact in the extended distress termination
model, for instance sponsors with a fairly high asset volatility like IBM or Hewlett Packard
pay a significantly higher percentage premium per pension liability. More generally, one can
further notice that the percentage premiums are higher in the extended distress termination
model, accordingly there is a tendency that the premiums in our simple distress termination
model are downward biased.
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3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we model the PBGC insurance taking account of distress termination, the
most common type of termination in practice: the premature termination of the pension
fund is caused by the underfunding of the sponsoring company. A risk-based premium is
determined for the valuation of the PBGC insurance. Assuming both the pension fund’s
and the plan sponsor’s assets follow Black-Scholes dynamics and are correlated, we obtain a
analytic pricing formula for the risk-based premium. We extend the literature dealing with
the fair pricing of the PBGC insurance in the distress termination framework by incorpo-
rating two realistic perspectives. First, the PBGC insurance is modeled as a secondary
guarantee and second we allow for a capped insurance payoff.
This chapter also provides an important empirical contribution since this is the first
study using recent data that empirically illustrates which sponsors could be charged a
higher and which sponsors a lower premium. Specifically, using a data set for the 100
largest American DB sponsors, we show that the premiums paid to the PBGC should differ
significantly according to the differences in the sponsor’s and pension fund’s risks. Most
importantly, our results illustrate that our risk-based premium calculation does not give
sponsors adverse incentives to introduce risk into the pension promises as an increase in
pension fund or sponsor specific risks comes at the cost of paying a higher premium to
the PBGC. The use of a variable rate premium which solely considers the underfunding
(and ignores the overfunding) of the pension funds in the premium calculation is partly
consistent with our results that the funding ratio is the most significant driver of the risk-
based premium. An important implication of our model is that overfunded pension funds
should be charged with a significantly lower premium than underfunded ones. Moreover
our results suggest that sponsor specific risks play a very important role in the risk-based
premium, where the leverage of the sponsoring company is the most pronounced sponsor
specific risk factor in our model.
3.9 Appendix
3.9.1 Derivation of the fair premium PBGC receives
The risk-based premium of the PBGC insurance can be decomposed into two parts:
(a) EQ
[
e−rTG(T )1{τ>T}
]
(b) EQ
[
e−rτG(τ)1{τ≤T}
]
.
In order to further calculate Part (a), we first rewrite
GT =G¯1{XT<BT }1{φC0egT<CT<φC0egT+BT−XT−G¯}
+ max
{
0, (BT −XT − (CT − φC0egT ))1{XT<BT }
}
1{max{φC0egT ,φC0egT+BT−XT−G¯}<CT<φC0egT+BT−XT }.
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We proceed to determine Part (a) as follows
EQ
[
e−rTG(T )1{τ>T}
]
=EQ
[
e−rTG(T )
]− EQ [e−rTG(T )1{τ≤T}]
=
∫ dx1
−∞
∫ dy2(x)
dy1
e−rT G¯
1
2pi
√
1− ρ2 exp
{
−x
2 + y2 − 2ρxy
2(1− ρ2)
}
dydx
+
∫ dx1
−∞
∫ dy3(x)
dy2(x)
e−rT max
{
0, BT −X0e(r− 12pi2σ2)T+piσ
√
Tx − (C0e(r− 12σ2c )T+σc
√
Ty − φC0egT )
}
· 1
2pi
√
1− ρ2 exp
{
−x
2 + y2 − 2ρxy
2(1− ρ2)
}
dydx−
∫ T
0
EQ[e−rTG(T )|τ = t]Q(τ ∈ dt)
where
dx1 =
ln BT
X0
− (r − 1
2
σ2Api
2)T
piσA
√
T
dy1 =
ln φC0e
gT
C0
− (r − 1
2
σ2c )T
σc
√
T
dy2(x) =
ln max{φC0e
gT ,φC0egT+BT−X0e(r−
1
2pi
2σ2A)T+piσA
√
Tx−G¯}
C0
− (r − 1
2
σ2c )T
σc
√
T
dy3(x) =
ln φC0e
gT+BT−X0e(r−
1
2pi
2σ2A)T+piσA
√
Tx
C0
− (r − 1
2
σ2c )T
σc
√
T
.
Hereby we have used the fact that
lnXt−(r− 12σ2Api2)t
σApi
√
t
and
lnCt−(r− 12σ2c )t
σc
√
t
follow the cumulative
bivariate normal distribution with correlation coefficient ρ. Further note the difference
between the real number pi within the normal distribution function and the investment
strategy.
To compute
∫ T
0
EQ[e−rTG(T )|τ = t]Q(τ ∈ dt) we need to specify the stochastic processes
(XT , CT ) given τ = t and to use the density of the first hitting time τ . First, given τ , we
have:
Cτ = φC0e
gτ =C0 exp
{(
r − 1
2
σ2c
)
τ + σcW
Q
τ
}
⇒ WQτ =
ln(φ)− (r − g − 1
2
σ2c )τ
σc
.
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Next, we can write Xτ as
Xτ =X0 exp
{
(r − 1
2
σ2A pi
2)τ + σA piW
Q1
τ
}
=X0(φ)
σApiρ
σc exp
{
(r − 1
2
σ2Api
2)τ − σApiρ
σc
(r − g − 1
2
σ2c )τ + σApi
√
1− ρ2√τz
}
,
where in the second line we have used that WQτ is correlated with W
Q1
τ with a correlation
coefficient ρ and z is a standard normally distributed random variable under Q independent
of WQτ and W
Q1
τ . At time T , we have
CT =φC0e
gτ exp
{(
r − 1
2
σ2c
)
(T − τ) + σc(WQT −WQτ )
}
:=φC0e
gτ exp
{(
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2
σ2c
)
(T − τ) + σc
√
T − τy
}
:=κ(τ) exp{σc
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with k(τ) := φC0e
gτ exp
{(
r − 1
2
σ2c
)
(T − τ)} and
XT =Xτ exp
{(
r − 1
2
pi2σ2A
)
(T − τ) + piσA(WQ1T −WQ1τ )
}
=:Xτ exp
{(
r − 1
2
pi2σ2A
)
(T − τ) + piσA
√
T − τx
}
=:h(τ) exp
{
σθ
√
1− ρ2√τz
}
exp
{
θσ
√
T − τx
}
with h(τ) = X0(φ)
σθρ
σc exp
{
(r − 1
2
σ2Api
2)τ − σθρ
σc
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2
σ2c )τ
}
exp
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2
pi2σ2A
)
(T − τ)}.
x and y are bivariate normally distributed with a constant correlation coefficient ρ. Both
x and y are independent of z, which implies that the joint density of (x, y, z), f(x, y, z) =
f(x, y) f(z).
Finally we compute the integral as∫ T
0
EQ[e−rTG(T )|τ = t]Q(τ ∈ dt)
=
∫ T
0
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2pi
e−z
2/2
∫ dx5(z,t)
−∞
∫ dy6(x,z,t)
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+
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where
dx5(z, t) =
ln BT
h(t) exp
{
σApi
√
1−ρ2√tz
}
piσA
√
T − t
dy5(t) =
ln φC0e
gT
κ(t)
σc
√
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dy6(x, z, t) =
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exp{piσA√T−tx}}
κ(t)
σc
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φC0egT+BT−h(t) exp
{
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√
1−ρ2√tz
}
exp{piσA√T−tx}
κ(t)
σc
√
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The density of the first hitting time τ under Q is given by, see for instance Haug (2007)
f(t) =− ln(φ)
σct
3
2
n
(
ln(φ)− (r − 1
2
σ2c − g)t
σc
√
t
)
, (3.15)
where n(t) = 1√
2pi
e−t
2/2.
In order to compute Term (b), define first d1(τ) and d2(τ) by lettingXτ = max(0, BC(τ))
and Xτ = max(0, BC(τ)− G¯e−r(T−τ)): Hence
d1(τ) =
ln
(
max(0,BC(τ))
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)
− σθρ
σc
(
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2
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Finally we obtain Term (b):
EQ
[
e−rτG(τ)1{τ≤T}
]
=EQ
[
e−rτ
(
(BC(τ)−Xτ ) 1{max(0,BC(τ)−G¯e−r(T−τ))<Xτ<max(0,BC(τ))}
+G¯e−r(T−τ) 1{Xτ<max(0,BC(τ)−G¯e−r(T−τ))}
)
1{τ≤T}
]
=
∫ T
0
e−rsBC(s) (Φ(d1(s))− Φ(d2(s))) f(s)ds
−
∫ T
0
e−rsX0(φ)
ρσApi
σc exp
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2
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2
)
s− σApiρ
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2
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s
}
·
(∫ d1(s)
d2(s)
exp{σApi
√
1− ρ2√sz} 1√
2pi
e−z
2/2dz
)
f(s)ds
+
∫ T
0
e−rT G¯Φ(d2(s))f(s)ds
where Φ(s) :=
∫ s
−∞
1√
2pi
e−x
2/2dx.
3.9.2 PBGC insurance payoff in the extended distress termina-
tion model
Define Ut = Ct+Xt, t ∈ [0, T ], as the total value of the sponsor’s and pension fund’s assets.
If distress is initiated prematurely then the insurance of the PBGC is given by
G(τ) =(1− η) (BT e−r(T−τ) + φC0 eg τ ) 1{φC0 eg τ≤Cτ} 1{(1−η)Uτ≤G¯ e−r(T−τ)}
+G¯ e−r(T−τ) 1{φC0 eg τ≤Cτ} 1{(1−η)Uτ>G¯ e−r(T−τ)}
+(BT e
−r(T−τ) −Xτ ) 1{φC0 eg τ>Cτ} 1{BT e−r(T−τ)>Xτ} 1{BT e−r(T−τ)−Xτ≤G¯ e−r(T−τ)}
+G¯ e−r(T−τ) 1{φC0 eg τ>Cτ} 1{BT e−r(T−τ)>Xτ} 1{BT e−r(T−τ)−Xτ>G¯ e−r(T−τ)}.
In the first term we have used that at t = τ , Uτ = η (BT e
−r(T−τ)+φC0 eg τ ). Further note
that the triggering of distress termiantion without sponsor default, i.e φC0 e
g τ < Cτ , imme-
diately implies that the pension fund must have defaulted, i.e the condition BT e
−r(T−τ) >
Xτ is then always satisfied. The first two terms correspond to the case where the sponsor
can provide a partial support, while the last two terms represent the case where both the
sponsor and the pension fund default, therefore the PBGC carries the entire burden of the
pension benefits.
Finally if τ > T the payoff of the PBGC insurance in the extended distress termination
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model can be written as
G(T ) = max
{
0, BT −XT − (CT − φC0egT )
}
1{φC0egT<CT } 1{XT<BT } 1{max{0,BT−XT−(CT−φC0egT )}<G¯}
+G¯ 1{φC0egT<CT } 1{XT<BT } 1{max{0,BT−XT−(CT−φC0egT )}>G¯}
+(BT −XT )1{φC0egT>CT } 1{XT<BT } 1{BT−XT<G¯}
+G¯ 1{φC0egT>CT } 1{XT<BT } 1{BT−XT>G¯},
where the interpretation of the different components is the same as in the case of premature
termination.
Chapter 4
An Optimal Termination Rule for a
DB Pension Guarantee 1
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we have presented a risk-based premium calculation model for a
pension guarantee fund and we have argued that such a risk-based premium calculation
is an appealing approach to resolve some problems in the pension sector and thus to bet-
ter protect employees in DB pension plans. In that chapter we have closely studied the
distress termination mechanism, that is the termination of the pension fund is triggered
by the sponsoring companie’s poor financial status. This chapter is now devoted to the
involuntary termination mechanism where an underfunded pension fund is terminated by
the corresponding pension guarantee fund. The objective we pursue is to find an optimal
involuntary termination, that is an optimal timing of intervention for the guarantee fund.
Such an optmial intervention policy is a further protection mechanism for DB plan policy-
holders. It has the advantage that it is more applicable under current law in many countries.
Kalra and Jain (1997) argue that by law pension guarantee funds have no opportunity
to control the investment riskiness of the pension plans and they are not allowed to ad-
just premiums according to their changing financial status. Therefore the only means of
intervention a pension guarantee fund has to control its financial guarantee and to protect
policyholders is to prematurely terminate an insured underfunded DB pension plan. 2 The
pension guarantee fund can terminate and take over insured underfunded DB pension plans
prematurely instead of waiting until the plans become severely underfunded and are then
closed by their sponsoring companies, which would lead to even larger costs for the pension
guarantee fund.
1This chapter is based on Cheng and Uzelac (2014)
2The PBGC states that initiating a premature termination helps to protect the interests of plan ben-
eficiaries or of the PBGC insurance program, see pbgc.gov. However, there is no specified premature
termination rule stated by PBGC to follow.
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From the economic point of view two main arguments support an intervention policy.
Firstly, as already suggested in the previous chapter, there is a moral hazard problem be-
tween the sponsors and the pension guarantee funds. Cooper and Ross (2003) find that
introducing a pension guarantee fund creates a further incentive for the sponsors to under-
fund their DB pension plans and excessively increase pension fund investment risk while
taking advantage of the pension guarantee fund. A possible premature termination can
mitigate these adverse incentives of DB plan sponsors. Secondly, financially troubled spon-
sors contribute the minimum possible to DB pension plans, particularly by setting higher
interest rates for discounting pension liabilities, see Bodie et al. (1987). As we mentioned
in chapter 3, these authors also find that the DB pension plan’s funding degree and the
companie’s long-run profitability are considerably positively correlated. This implies that
financially troubled sponsoring companies are likely to not be able to meet their pension
obligations. Accordingly, a premature termination of such insured DB pension plans can
substantially reduce the liabilities of the pension guarantee funds.
The important question which needs to be addressed here is what the proper timing of
intervention is. Or in other words how underfunded should pension funds be in order to
be prematurely terminated? It is important to find the proper intervention timing since
on the one hand, terminating insured underfunded DB pension funds too early takes the
opportunity away from the funds to recover and the guarantee fund also loses potential fu-
ture premiums; on the other hand, a too late intervention is likely to result in considerably
larger liabilities for the pension guarantee fund. The latter is particularly the case since
largely underfunded pension funds mainly belong to financially troubled companies which
are likely to go bankrupt anyway, see Kalra and Jain (1997).
This chapter gives insights into the question above by first proposing a specified ter-
mination rule based on the funding status of the insured DB pension plan and finding an
optimal termination ratio for the insured DB pension fund. In particular, we take the risk
aversion of pension beneficiaries into account and we incorporate two regulatory constraints,
a shortfall probability constraint (SPC) and an expected shortfall constraint, (ESC) into
an expected utility maximization problem. The pension guarantee fund uses the regulatory
constraints to control its current and ongoing liabilities. The SPC puts a restriction on
the premature termination probability of the insured DB plan within a time horizon and
reflects some current solvency regulations, see e.g. Solvency II. The solvency risk of the
insured DB pension plan faced by the pension guarantee fund is controlled via adjusting
the acceptable shortfall probability. Besides, the pension beneficiaries are protected under
the SPC, which actually works as a security mechanism for protecting pension benefits,
see Broeders and Chen (2013). We further include the ESC constraint into the expected
utility maximization problem, which has the advantage that it can assess the size of the
expected losses of underfunded but not terminated pension plans and therefore it can better
identify DB pension funds with the highest cost of insolvencies, see Doff (2008). Although
this constraint is not used in the current regulatory practice, it reflects for instance the law
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imposed on the PBGC-initiated termination, which says that the PBGC may terminate
the pension plan in case the expected losses the PBGC incurs increase unreasonably if the
pension plan is not closed.
More specifically, our specified termination rule states that the insured DB pension plan
will be terminated and taken over by the pension guarantee fund once its funding ratio
goes down a critical funding ratio. To obtain the optimal critical threshold, we set up a
one-period model and maximize a power type utility function with the funding ratio as an
independent variable to capture the interests of pension beneficiaries. Actually we assume
the objective function of the pension guarantee fund is to maximize the beneficiaries ex-
pected utility. This is in so far reasonable as the fundamental goal of a pension guarantee
fund is to protect pension beneficiaries. The use of the funding ratio as the argument in the
utility function can on the one hand be motivated since this is a commonly used quantity in
industry and particularly regulatory practice. More importantly, this quantity recognizes
that what really matters in pension fund management is not the value of the assets on its
own, but how the assets value compares to the liabilities value in each point in time, see
Martellini and Milhau (2008).
We find that by considering the one-period expected utility maximization problem solely
with the SPC, the specified termination rule is only applicable to more risk averse pension
beneficiaries, but not to risk neutral and less risk averse ones. This result is to some extent
in line with the passive behavior of the PBGC, as Kalra and Jain (1997) mention that until
1995 only 1% of the pension plan terminations were initiated by the PBGC. After adding
the ESC into the maximization problem, the intervention policy is applied regardless of the
risk aversion of the pension beneficiaries. Moreover, in the case where the two constraints
are satisfied simultaneously, we obtain an optimal termination ratio which depends on the
risk aversion of the pension beneficiaries. For instance, in the benchmark case the optimal
termination ratio is 0.68 for risk neutral and less risk averse and 0.71 for more risk averse
pension beneficiaries. In the case where the two constraints are inconsistent, we propose a
suboptimal termination ratio, which does not depend on the risk preferences of the pension
beneficiaries.
Related studies are Archarya and Dreyfus (1989) and particularly Kalra and Jain (1997).
The former compute simultaneously premium policies and optimal dynamic termination
policies for banks in terms of a threshold assets-to-deposits ratio by minimizing the in-
surer’s net liabilities, below which an ailing bank should be closed. Kalra and Jain (1997)
recommend that the PBGC follows an intervention policy where the PBGC insurance is
considered as a down-and-out put option and the PBGC takes over a plan if the losses
from terminating it are smaller than the losses from continuing it. Unlike our model the ex-
ercise boundary, which is also based on a critical funding ratio, is endogenous in their model.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 models the termination
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rule and describes the expected one-period utility and the regulatory constraints considered.
Section 4.3 simplifies the utility maximization problem by deriving closed-form expressions
for the one-period expected utility and the two regulatory constraints. In addition, it is
shown that the constraints have monotonic properties. Section 4.4 provides a numerical
analysis where we first numerically solve the utility maximisation problem solely with re-
spect to the SPC and then add the ESC. Section 4.5 concludes the chapter and section 4.6
provides detailed calculations and proofs of the main results in the chapter.
4.2 Model Setup
As in the previous chapter we consider a DB pension plan for a single representative ben-
eficiary, which is insured by a pension guarantee fund at time t0 = 0. In this chapter we
do not model the pension fund’s assets and liabilities separately, but we directly model the
funding ratio of the insured DB pension plan, which is the ratio of the plan’s assets to its
accrued liabilities. We denote the funding ratio at time t by Rt. If Rt takes a value less than
1 then pension fund is underfunded. We assume the funding ratio Rt follows a geometric
Brownian motion (GBM) 3 under the market probability measure P, i.e., it is governed by
the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dRt = µRRt dt+ σRRt dWt , R0 > 0 , (4.1)
where W is a standard 1-dimensional Brownian motion under P and µR > 0 and σR > 0
denote the drift and the volatility coefficients, respectively.
The pension guarantee fund uses a premature termination rule to intervene. Unlike
chapter 3, we exclude distress termination and solely consider involuntary termination as
the relevant premature termination mechanism. We further abstract from the financial
status of the sponsoring company and also from contributions the plan sponsor makes to its
DB pension fund. Accordingly, the premature termination solely depends on the funding
ratio of the corresponding pension plan. We consider a specific premature termination rule
which states that once the funding ratio of the insured DB pension plan Rt touches or falls
bellow a predefined termination ratio η, the insured DB pension plan is closed and taken
over by the pension guarantee fund. More precisely, the termination time τ is defined as
the first hitting time the funding ratio reaches the predefined termination ratio
τ := inf {t |Rt 6 η} . (4.2)
In our model, since we are not interested in the case where the premature termination
can never happen, i.e., τ = +∞, the termination ratio is naturally required to be strictly
larger than 0. In addition, we assume η < R0. It is a technical condition which makes sure
3We mention that if we would model the pension assets and pension liabilities separately as geometric
Brownian motions (GBMs), the dynamics of the funding ratio would still follow a GBM and our qualitative
analysis and results would carry over.
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that the pension plan is not terminated at the contract-issuing time t0 = 0. Finally we
require the termination ratio to be strictly smaller than 1, that is only underfunded pension
plans can be prematurely terminated. This assumption is economically reasonable since
employees involved in a fully funded DB pension plan can expect to receive full promised
benefits on their retirement and therefore there is no reason to terminate such a pension
fund. To summarize, the predefined termination ratio η is restricted to be chosen from the
set (0,min{R0, 1}).
The pension guarantee fund pursues a social welfare motive, since its primary goal is
that the employees get their promised pension benefits. 4 Accordingly, as the interests of
the pension guarantee fund and the representative beneficiary are strongly connected, we
assume in this chapter that the pension guarantee fund acts as an agent of the pension
beneficiary by maximizing the beneficiary’s expected utility. We use a power type utility
function with the funding ratio of the insured DB pension plan as the argument to capture
the interests of the representative beneficiary with a risk aversion parameter δ. The larger
the funding ratio is, the more confidence the pension beneficiary has to get the promised
pension benefits on his retirement date. So the beneficiary feels safer and his utility in-
creases in the funding ratio of the insured DB plan. The line of reasoning reverts for a
decreasing funding ratio.
In order to be consistent with the regulatory constraints that we will incorporate into
the model, e.g. the SPC restricts the probability of the insured DB pension plan to be
terminated within one period (i.e., one year), we set up a one-year utility maximization
problem and calculate the one-year expected utility of the representative beneficiary. 5 If
the premature termination is triggered within one year, we use the funding ratio at the
premature termination time τ in the power utility function, i.e., Rτ . Since the funding
ratio is assumed to be a continuous stochastic process, the latter exactly coincides with
the predefined termination ratio η, i.e., the expected utility in this case is then given by
E[U(Rτ )] = E
[
η(1−δ)
(1−δ)
]
if 0 < τ 6 1 . Otherwise, we use the funding ratio at year one as the
independent variable, which yields the expected utility E[U(R1)] = E
[
R
(1−δ)
1
(1−δ)
]
if τ > 1 . To
sum up, the one-year expected utility 6 consisting of two parts conditional on whether the
premature termination occurs within one year, can be written compactly as
E[U(Rτ∧{t=1})] = E
[
1{0<τ61}η(1−δ)
1− δ
]
+ E
[
1{τ>1}R
(1−δ)
1
1− δ
]
, δ > 0 and δ 6= 1 , (4.3)
where ∧ denotes the minimum of τ and t = 1 and 1X is an indicator which is 1 when event
4Salisbury’s (1996) argument of viewing the pension guarantee fund as a social insurance program with
intentional subsidies to the defined benefit system supports our point of view.
5The results remain qualitatively the same if we would consider a period which is longer than one year.
6Our model can also be understood in a multiperiod framework as a repeating one period model where
the pension guarantee fund renews the insurance contract and sets up the termination ratio η annually.
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X occurs and 0 otherwise.
As we mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the premature termination is a way
used by the pension guarantee fund to manage its financial guarantee, in terms of lessening
potential insolvencies of ailing DB plans and consequently protecting the pension benefits in
the long run. The financial guarantee is further protected by regulatory constraints, which
put restrictions on the insolvency risk of the insured DB pension plan. In this chapter we
consider two regulatory constraints.The first constraint is the shortfall probability constraint
(SPC), which imposes a restriction on the one-year shortfall probability of the insured DB
pension plan. The probability that the premature termination is triggered within one year
is required to be less than a certain percentage, i.e.  ∈ (0, 1], which is set up by the pension
guarantee fund. Formally, the constraint is written as
P (0 < τ 6 1) 6 , 0 <  6 1 . (4.4)
By fixing the maximum allowable shortfall probability the pension guarantee fund protects
its current financial status by controlling the probability it has to step in and cover the
pension deficits of an insured and underfunded pension fund within one year.
The SPC helps to reduce the number of current insolvencies the pension guarantee fund
would have to manage. However, the SPC does not measure the size of the potential losses
which can arise from underfunded but not terminated pension plans. We refer to these
pension plans as ongoing pension plans. As the deficits of such ongoing pension plans can
become large, the financial guarantee of the pension guarantee fund is exposed to a great
risk in the future.
To mitigate this drawback of the SPC, we incorporate an expected shortfall type con-
straint (ESC) as the second constraint. This constraint puts a restriction on the size of
expected deficits of the ongoing pension plan at year one. For simplicity, we assume that
the insured DB pension plan’s liabilities are constant within one year. With this assump-
tion the maximum expected deficits can be written as the pension liabilities multiplied by
a certain percentage q > 0, that is set up by the pension guarantee fund. Then the ESC
has the following expression
E
[
(1−R1)1{τ>1}1{R161}
]
6 q , (4.5)
The same type of ESC is considered in Shi and Werker (2012).7 By fixing the maximum
tolerable expected deficits, the pension guarantee fund protects its future financial status.
7However, they considered the restriction on the induced expected shortfall subject to the VaR constraint.
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4.3 Simplifying the Utility Maximization Problem
In this section we derive closed-form expressions for the one-year expected utility and the
two regulatory constraints.
Lemma 4.3.1. The one-year expected utility is calculated as follows:
E[U(Rτ∧{t=1})] = E
[
1{0<τ61}η(1−δ)
1− δ
]
+ E
[
1{τ>1}R
(1−δ)
1
1− δ
]
=
1
1− δ
[
η(1−δ)
(
Φ(A−B) + exp{2AB}Φ(A+B))
+R
(1−δ)
0 exp
{(
1− δ)(µR − 1
2
δσ2R
)}
Φ
(− A+B + σR(1− δ))
−R(1−δ)0 exp
{
2AB + 2AσR(1− δ) + (1− δ)
(
µR − 1
2
δσ2R
)}
Φ (A+B + σR(1− δ))
]
= u(η) , (4.6)
where A = 1
σR
ln
(
η
R0
)
, B =
µR− 12σ2R
σR
and Φ(·) denotes the standard normal cdf. The one-year
expected utility is a function of the termination ratio η ∈ (0,min{R0, 1}), denoted by u(η).
Appendix 4.6.1 provides a detailed derivation of u(η).
Lemma 4.3.2. The one-year shortfall probability is calculated as follows, see e.g. Haug
(2007),
P (0 < τ 6 1) = Φ(A−B) + exp {2AB}Φ(A+B)
= Φ
(
1
σR
(
ln
(
η
R0
)
− µR + 1
2
σ2R
))
+
(
η
R0
)( 2µR
σ2
R
−1
)
Φ
(
1
σR
(
ln
(
η
R0
)
+ µR − 1
2
σ2R
))
= P (η) (4.7)
which is a function of the termination ratio η ∈ (0,min{R0, 1}), denoted by P (η).
The one-year expected utility maximization problem with only the SPC can be written
as follows:
max
η∈(0,min{R0,1})
E
[
1{0<τ61}η(1−δ)
1− δ
]
+ E
[
1{τ>1}R
(1−δ)
1
1− δ
]
, δ > 0 and δ 6= 1 ,
subject toP (η) 6  , (4.8)
where 0 <  6 1 is set up by the pension guarantee fund.
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Lemma 4.3.3. The expected shortfall of the ongoing DB pension plan at year one is cal-
culated as follows:
E
[
(1−R1)1{τ>1}1{R161}
]
=Φ
(
− 1
σR
ln(R0)−B
)
− Φ (A−B)
− exp {2AB}
[
Φ(A+B)− Φ
(
2A+B +
1
σR
ln(R0)
)]
−R0 exp {µR}Φ
(
− 1
σR
ln(R0)−B − σR
)
+R0 exp {µR}Φ (A−B − σR)
+R0 exp {µR + 2AB + 2AσR} [Φ(A+B + σR)
−Φ
(
2A+B +
1
σR
ln(R0) + σR
)]
= S(η), (4.9)
which is a function of the termination ratio η on the interval (0,min{R0, 1}), denoted by
S(η).
Appendix 4.6.2 provides a detailed derivation of S(η).
Then the one-year expected utility maximization problem with the two regulatory con-
straints can be written as follows:
max
η∈min{R0,1}
E
[
1{0<τ61}η(1−δ)
1− δ
]
+ E
[
1{τ>1}R
(1−δ)
1
1− δ
]
, δ > 0 and δ 6= 1 ,
subject to P (η) 6  and S(η) 6 q , (4.10)
where 0 <  6 1 and q > 0 are set up by the pension guarantee fund.
Next, we formally state the monotonic properties of the two regulatory constraints.
Proposition 4.3.4. The one-year shortfall probability is a continuous and monotonically
increasing function of the termination ratio η on the interval (0,min{R0, 1}), i.e. P (η),
with lim
η→0
P (η) = 0 and lim
η→min{R0,1}
P (η) = 1. Admissible termination ratios η˜ chosen from
the set (0,min{R0, 1}) which satisfy the SPC, i.e. P (η˜) 6  ,  ∈ (0, 1], are:
(1) in the case where  = 1, η˜ ∈ (0,min{R0, 1});
(2) in the case where  ∈ (0, 1), there exists a unique upper bound termination ratio η¯ ∈
(0,min{R0, 1}) such that P (η¯) =  and η˜ ∈ (0, η¯].
Proof 4.3.5. A Proof is given in appendix 4.6.3.
Proposition 4.3.6. The expected shortfall of the underfunded ongoing DB pension plan at
the end of year one is a continuous and monotonically decreasing function of the termination
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ratio η on the interval (0,min{R0, 1}), i.e. S(η), with lim
η→min{R0,1}
= 0 and lim
η→0
S(η) =
Φ
(
− 1
σR
ln(R0)−B
)
− R0 exp {µR}Φ
(
− 1
σR
ln(R0)−B − σR
)
. Admissible termination
ratios ηˆ chosen from the set (0,min{R0, 1}) which satisfy the ESC, i.e. S(ηˆ) 6 q, q > 0,
are:
(1) in the case where q > Φ
(
− 1
σR
ln(R0)−B
)
−R0 exp {µR}Φ
(
− 1
σR
ln(R0)−B − σR
)
,
ηˆ ∈ (0,min{R0, 1});
(2) in the case where 0 < q < Φ
(
− 1
σR
ln(R0)−B
)
−R0 exp {µR}Φ
(
− 1
σR
ln(R0)−B − σR
)
,
there exists a unique lower bound termination ratio η ∈ (0,min{R0, 1}) such that
S
(
η
)
= q and ηˆ ∈ [η, (0,min{R0, 1})).
Proof 4.3.7. The Proof is given in appendix 4.6.4.
It is important to learn from proposition 4.3.4 and proposition 4.3.6 that adjustments of
the termination ratio η have an opposite impact on the two regulatory constraints. That is,
setting a lower termination ratio decreases the shortfall probability, while at the same time
this increases the expected shortfall. Technically these properties imply that the sets of
admissible termination ratios for the two constraints may not overlap. From an economic
point view this raises the question of finding a suboptimal solution in the case the two
constraints are not satisfied simultaneously.
If for the given values of  and q, the two sets of admissible termination ratios overlap, a
termination ratio in the overlap region which maximizes the one-year expected utility is an
optimal solution to the constrained utility maximization problem. In the case, where there
is no intersection between the two sets, the pension guarantee fund faces a tradeoff between
alleviating its current and future insolvencies. We introduce a suboptimal solution where
we define the best suboptimal termination ratio as the one which satisfies the SPC but
violates the ESC to the least extent. Accordingly, we give priority to the SPC since it has
been applied in the regulatory practice for pension plans and alleviating current financial
insolvencies of the pension guarantee fund is more urgent.
4.4 Numerical Analysis
The constrained optimization problems (4.8) and (4.10) cannot be solved in closed-form
and therefore we solve them numerically. To do so we first compute the constraint set,
which is available in closed-form, and then perform a numerical search algorithm to find
the maximum of the one-year expected utility given the constraint set. For the numerical
analysis at hand we fix the relevant parameters as follows:
µR = 0.03, σR = 0.2, R0 = 1.1,  = 0.025, q = 0.03. (4.11)
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Figure 4.1: One-year expected utility as a function of the termination ratio η ∈ (0, 0.71] for
different risk aversion parameters δ.
In addition we choose the following risk aversion parameters:
δ1 = 0, δ2 = 0.6, δ3 = 2, δ4 = 5. (4.12)
The parameters serve for illustration purposes.
4.4.1 Utility Maximization with only the SPC
We start with the solution of the one-year expected utility maximization problem when only
the SPC is considered. With the given benchmark parameters the upper bound termination
ratio η¯ is equal to 0.71. Figure 4.1 plots the one-year expected utility for different risk
aversion parameters over the constraint set, i.e. η ∈ (0, 0.71]. We see that for a risk neutral
and less risk averse pension beneficiary, i.e. δ1 = 0, δ2 = 0.6, the utility value is not sensitive
to changes of the termination ratio when the ratio is relatively small and as the termination
ratio approaches η¯, the one-year expected utility value decreases. In these cases, setting
the termination ratio relatively small is beneficial for the pension beneficiary, which gives
basically the same utility value to the beneficiary as if the termination ratio is set up
extremely close to 0 such that the premature termination is hardly triggered. If we take
termination costs into account, which exist in reality, e.g. administrative costs, setting the
termination ratio extremely close to 0 with nearly no premature termination control from
the pension guarantee fund is beneficial for both the pension beneficiary and the pension
guarantee fund. Hence if only the SPC is considered, a premature termination rule is not
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Figure 4.2: One-year expected utility as a function of the termination ratio η ∈ (0, 0.49] for
different risk aversion parameters δ when σR = 0.3.
applicable to risk neutral and less risk averse pension beneficiaries. Intuitively, since the
pension benefits paid out by the guarantee fund are subject to a limit set by law, risk neutral
and less risk averse pension beneficiaries prefer more the possibility that an underfunded
DB pension fund can recover and therefore they will receive full promised pension benefits
instead of being involved in a regulated DB pension plan with the possibility of losing
benefits when the pension fund is prematurely terminated and the pension deficits exceed
the legal guarantee limit. For the cases where the risk aversion parameters are relatively
large, i.e., δ3 = 2 , δ4 = 5, the one-year expected utility value remains nearly constant
when the termination ratio is relatively small, which is the same as in the cases where
δ = 0 and δ = 0.6, but it starts to increase as the termination ratio approaches the upper
bound. In such cases the one-year expected utility is maximized at η¯ where the SPC is
binding. Intuitively, more risk averse beneficiaries prefer to have the premature termination
control from the pension guarantee fund since they are concerned about potential benefit
losses they might incur when an unregulated DB pension fund is terminated under distress
termination with severe pension deficits which are much beyond the guarantee limit. The
larger the termination ratio is set up, the safer the beneficiaries may feel since they are
more likely to receive full promised pension benefits under the premature termination.
In figure 4.2, we show how the volatility of the funding ratio process affects the chosen
optimal termination ratio. We increase σR from 0.2 to 0.35 and draw the one-year expected
utility for the same chosen risk aversion parameters. First, we see that the constraint set
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narrows as the volatility increases, i.e. η ∈ (0, 0.49]. Moreover, we observe that in the plot
of δ = 0.6 the one-year expected utility now increases as η approaches the upper bound
termination ratio, i.e. η¯ = 0.49. Therefore setting the termination ratio at 0.49 instead
of extremely close to 0 maximizes the pension beneficiary’s one-year expected utility. It is
consistent with economic intuition. As volatility increases the probability that the financial
status of the pension fund deteriorates and the beneficiary loses benefits increases. This now
implies that even a less risk averse pension beneficiary looks for a premature termination
control from the pension guarantee fund to benefit from protection against potential losses in
their pension benefits. Accordingly, a larger volatility (uncertainty) of the DB pension plan’s
funding ratio can induce the premature termination rule used by the pension guarantee fund
to be applicable in more cases.
4.4.2 Adding the ESC
In this section, we add the ESC and consider the one-year expected utility maximization
problem (4.10). We calculate the lower bound termination ratio η, which is equal to 0.68,
so termination ratios which satisfy the ESC form the set [0.68, 1). We have already found
out the set of termination ratios which satisfy the SPC in section 4.1, i.e. (0, 0.71]. Figure
4.3 plots the one-year expected utility as a function of the termination ratio η over the
interval (0, 0.71] for different risk aversion parameters. The left and right vertical lines refer
to the lower bound η and the upper bound termination ratio η¯, respectively. The area in
between refers to the set of termination ratios which satisfy both constraints. Accordingly,
the constraint set turns out to be [0.68, 0.71] and the optimal termination ratio for risk
neutral and less risk averse pension beneficiaries changes to be the lower bound termination
ratio η. Although a risk neutral or less risk averse beneficiary would prefer to have no
premature termination control on the insured DB pension plan, the pension guarantee fund
sets up the lower bound termination ratio to better control its future financial guarantee.
It is important to note that this result always holds when the ESC constraint is binding
regardless of the SPC constraint. In other words, when the ESC constraint is satisfied a
premature termination rule always exists. For more risk averse beneficiaries, the optimal
termination ratio is still set at η¯.
Figure 4.4 plots the one-year expected utility over the interval of termination ratios
(0, 1) for different risk aversion parameters when q is set to be 0.015. Now with q = 0.015,
the lower bound termination ratio is calculated to be 0.8. The corresponding two sets of
termination ratios, which satisfy the SPC and the ESC are (0, 0.71] and [0.80, 1), respec-
tively. Hence, there is no termination ratio which satisfies the two regulatory constraints
simultaneously and therefore we need to rely on a suboptimal solution. As introduced in
section 4.3, a suboptimal termination ratio is defined to be the one which satisfies the SPC
but violates the ESC to the least extent. By relying on this suboptimal solution, we say that
protecting the guarantee fund’s current financial guarantee has priority so that the pension
guarantee fund pays more attention to the insolvency risk of the insured DB pension plan
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Figure 4.3: One-year expected utility as a function of the termination ratio η ∈ (0, 0.71] for
different risk aversion parameters δ when two admissible termination ratio sets overlap.
Figure 4.4: One-year expected utility as a function of the termination ratio η ∈ (0, 1)
for different risk aversion parameters δ when two admissible termination ratio sets do not
overlap.
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it faces currently. Moreover, violating the ESC to the least extent encourages the pension
guarantee fund to search for new funding or adjust its investment strategy in order to cover
unexpected pension deficits after one year. Therefore in this case where two admissible
termination ratio sets do not overlap, the suboptimal termination ratio is η¯ = 0.71, which
does not depend on the risk aversion of the pension beneficiaries any more.
To summarize, the main result we learn from figure 4.3 and figure 4.4 is that by adding
the ESC a premature termination rule is applicable independent of the preferences of the
pension beneficiaries, thus even to risk neutral and less risk averse pension beneficiaries.
4.4.3 Utility Losses
Finally we briefly discuss the question what type of beneficiary is (most) affected by impos-
ing the additional regulation on the expected shortfall. To do so we compute the annualized
lose rate in utility, which is brought by the ESC constraint. Formally we compute this loss
rate lt0+1 as
lt0+1 = ln
(
u (η∗SPC&ESC)
u (η∗SPC)
)
, (4.13)
where u (η∗SPC&ESC) is the maximum value of the expected utility if both the SPC and the
ESC constraints are considered, while u (η∗SPC) denotes the value of the expected utility
evaluated at the optimal termination ratio under the SPC only8.
δ lt0+1 (SPC and ESC overlap) lt0+1 (SPC and ESC do not overlap)
0 -0.48 -1.07
0.6 -0.16 -0.34
2 0 0
5 0 0
Table 4.1: Annualized loss rates in basis points (bp) when the ESC constraint is added for
different risk aversion parameters. The second column gives the annualized loss rate if both
constraints are satisfied, i.e., q = 0.03, while the third column gives the annualized loss rate
for the case where both constraints are not satisfied, i.e., q = 0.015.
Table 4.1 shows that risk neutral and less risk averse beneficiaries suffer a loss in utility
from the additional regulation, while more risk averse beneficiaries are not affected by the
additional regulation. More specifically, we notice that the utility loss is largest for the risk
neutral beneficiaries and that it is larger for a suboptimal regulation where both constraints
are not satisfied simultaneously. The economic intuition behind this result is that the more
regulation a risk neutral and less risk averse beneficiary faces, the more disutility he obtains.
8Since we have discussed in subsection 4.1 that setting the termination ratio extremely close to 0 is
optimal for risk neutral and less risk averse beneficiaries, the corresponding utility is given by the limit as
the termination ratio η approaches 0, i.e., lim
η→0
u(η).
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In particular, these beneficiaries would prefer a fully unregulated DB plan since this has
the highest likelihood to pay out full pension benefits. More risk averse beneficiaries on
the other hand are more concerned about potential pension losses than the full pension
payment and therefore they are not harmed by additional regulation.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we study when a pension guarantee fund should prematurely close an un-
derfunded DB pension plan in a one-year expected utility maximization model. We assume
that the pension guarantee fund (perfectly) acts in the interests of the pension beneficiaries
and maximizes a power type utility function of the beneficiaries, whose argument is the
funding ratio of the insured DB pension plan. In addition, we incorporate two regulatory
constraints into the maximization problem, the SPC, which reflects the current regulatory
practice, and the ESC, which better assesses the expected losses of ongoing DB pension
plans. The SPC and the ESC restrict current and ongoing-concern liabilities of the pension
guarantee fund, respectively. We find that the power type utility maximization problem
with the SPC solely cannot account for an intervention policy for risk neutral and less risk
averse pension beneficiaries. The inclusion of the ESC induces the premature termination
rule to be applicable to any pension beneficiary independent of his risk preferences. More
specifically, in our benchmark case where the two constraints overlap, we obtain an optimal
termination ratio of 0.68 for risk neutral and less risk averse beneficiaries and 0.71 for more
risk averse ones. In the end, in a utility loss analysis we show that adding the additional
ESC constraint worsens risk neutral and less risk averse beneficiaries’ utility, whereas more
risk averse beneficiaries are not harmed by this additional regulation.
As a possible extension of this chapter one could also consider a utility function which has
the loss aversion property, see Siegmann (2011) and the next chapter. A second extension
could be to provide a model which distinguishes between the short-term regulatory practice,
usually performed on an annual basis, and the long-term pension obligation horizon T and
derives an optimal dynamic intervention policy. More specifically, it would be interesting
to consider m = T regulatory annual tests of the shortfall probability and the expected
shortfall and to evaluate the expected utility at the long-term pension obligation horizon
time T . A similar modeling framework is considered in Shi and Werker (2012) for long-term
investors.
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4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Derivation of Lemma 4.3.1
The one-year expected utility can be decomposed into two parts:
(a) E
[
1{0<τ61}η(1−δ)
1−δ
]
(b) E
[
1{τ>1}R
(1−δ)
1
1−δ
]
Part (a) can be calculated as follows:
E
[
1{0<τ61}η(1−δ)
1− δ
]
=
η(1−δ)
1− δ P (0 < τ 6 1)
=
η(1−δ)
1− δ (Φ(A−B) + exp {2AB}Φ(A+B)) ,
where A = 1
σR
ln
(
η
R0
)
, B =
µR− 12σ2R
σR
and Φ(·) is the cdf of a standard normal distribution.
The second equality uses the result of the one-year shortfall probability , i.e. P (0 < τ 6
1) = (Φ(A−B) + exp {2AB}Φ(A+B)), for η ∈ (0, R0). (See Lemma 4.3.2)
Part (b) can be calculated as follows:
E
[
1{τ>1}R
(1−δ)
1
1− δ
]
=
1
1− δE
[(
1− 1{0<τ61}
)
R
(1−δ)
1
]
=
1
1− δ
[
E
(
R
(1−δ)
1
)
− E
(
1{0<τ61}R
(1−δ)
1
)]
.
In the first equality, we use 1{τ>1} = 1 − 1{0<τ61}. Now the right hand side of the above
equation consists of two parts. The first one can be directly calculated by using the fact
that ln(R1) follows a normal distribution. So we have
E
(
R
(1−δ)
1
)
= R
(1−δ)
0 exp
{
(1− δ)(µR − 1
2
δσ2R)
}
.
The second one can be split into two parts by using 1{0<τ61} = 1{inft∈[0,1]Rt6η} = 1{inft∈[0,1]Rt6η,R16η}+
1{inft∈[0,1]Rt6η,R1>η}:
E
[
1{0<τ61}R
(1−δ)
1
]
=E
[
1{inft∈[0,1]Rt6η,R16η}R
(1−δ)
1
]
+ E
[
1{inft∈[0,1]Rt6η,R1>η}R
(1−δ)
1
]
=E
[
1{R16η}R
(1−δ)
1
]
+ E
[
1{inft∈[0,1]Rt6η,R1>η}R
(1−δ)
1
]
=R
(1−δ)
0 exp
{
(1− δ)(µR − 1
2
δσ2R)
}
Φ (A−B − (1− δ)σR)
+ E
[
1{inft∈[0,1]Rt6η,R1>η}R
(1−δ)
1
]
.
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In the last equality, we use the fact that ln(R1) follows a normal distribution.
The second part E
[
1{inft∈[0,1]Rt6η,R1>η}R
(1−δ)
1
]
can be calculated by using the Girsanov
theorem and the reflection principle:
E
[
1{inft∈[0,1]Rt6η,R1>η}R
(1−δ)
1
]
=E
[
1{inft∈[0,1]Bt+Wt≤A,B+W1>A}
R
(1−δ)
0 exp
{
(1− δ)(µR − 1
2
σ2R) + (1− δ)σRW1
}]
=EP˜
[
exp {BW P˜1 −
1
2
B2}1{inft∈[0,1]W P˜t ≤A,W P˜1 >A}
R
(1−δ)
0 exp
{
(1− δ)σRW P˜1
}]
=R
(1−δ)
0 exp
{
2AB − 1
2
B2 + 2σRA(1− δ)
}
EP˜
[
1{W P˜1 ≤A}
exp
{
−BW P˜1 − σR(1− δ)W P˜1
}]
=R
(1−δ)
0 exp
{
2AB + 2AσR(1− δ) + (1− δ)
(
µR − 1
2
δσ2R
)}
Φ (A+B + σR(1− δ)) ,
where W P˜t is a standard Brownian motion under the probability measure P˜.
Finally, summing up all the parts gives the one-year expected utility function as a function
of the termination ratio η ∈ (0,min{R0, 1}), denoted as u(η), as follows:
u(η) =E
[
1{τ61}η(1−δ)
1− δ
]
+ E
[
1{τ>1}R
(1−δ)
1
1− δ
]
=
1
1− δ
[
η(1−δ)
(
Φ(A−B) + exp{2AB}Φ(A+B)
)
+R
(1−δ)
0 exp
{
(1− δ)
(
µR − 1
2
δσ2R
)}
Φ (−A+B + (1− δ)σR)
−R(1−δ)0 exp
{
2AB + 2AσR(1− δ) + (1− δ)
(
µR − 1
2
δσ2R
)}
Φ (A+B + σR(1− δ))
]
,
δ 6 0 and δ 6= 1.
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4.6.2 Derivation of Lemma 4.3.3
The expected shortfall of the underfunded ongoing pension plan at year one can be calcu-
lated as follows:
E
[
(1−R1)1{τ>1}1{R161}
]
= E
[
1{τ>1}1{R161}
]− E [R11{τ>1}1{R161}]
= E
[
1{R161}
]− E [1{inft∈[0,1]Rt6η}1{R161}]− E [R11{τ>1}1{R161}] .
In the second equality, we use 1{τ>1} = 1− 1{0<τ61}.
The first term E
[
1{R161}
]
can be easily calculated by using the fact that ln(R1) follows a
normal distribution
E
[
1{R161}
]
= Φ
(
− 1
σR
ln(R0)−B
)
.
The second term E
[
1{inft∈[0,1]Rt6η}1{R161}
]
can be decomposed into two parts by using
1{inft∈[0,1]Rt6η} = 1{R16η} + 1{inft∈[0,1]Rt6η,R1>η} as follows:
(a) E
[
1{R16η}1{R161}
]
,
(b) E
[
1{inft∈[0,1]Rt6η,R1>η}1{R161}
]
.
Since the termination ratio η is chosen from the set (0,min {1, R0}), it is strictly smaller
than 1, so we have
E
[
1{R16η}1{R161}
]
= E[1{R16η}] = Φ(A−B),
where the second equality uses the fact that ln(R1) follows a normal distribution.
Part (b) can be calculated by using the Girsanov theorem and the reflection principle as
follows:
E
[
1{inft∈[0,1]Rt6η,R1>η}1{R161}
]
=E
[
1{inft∈[0,1]Wt+Bt6A,W1+B>A}1{W1+B6− 1σR lnR0}
]
=EP˜
[
exp
{
BW P˜1 −
1
2
B2
}
1{inft∈[0,1]W P˜t 6A,W P˜1 >A}1
{
W P˜1 6− 1σR lnR0
}]
=EP˜
[
exp
{
2AB −BW P˜1 −
1
2
B2
}
1{W P˜1 6A}1
{
W P˜1 >2A+ 1σR ln(R0)
}]
= exp {2AB}
[
Φ(A+B)− Φ
(
2A+B +
1
σR
ln(R0)
)]
.
The third term E
[
R11{τ>1}1{R161}
]
can be split into two parts by using 1{τ>1} = 1−1{0<τ61}
E
[
R11{τ>1}1{R161}
]
= E
[
R11{R161}
]− E [R11{inft∈[0,1]Rt6η}1{R161}] .
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E
[
R11{R161}
]
is easily calculated by using the fact that ln(R1) follows a normal distribution
E
[
R11{R161}
]
= R0 exp {µR}Φ
(
− 1
σR
ln(R0)−B − σR
)
.
E
[
R11{inft∈[0,1]Rt6η}1{R161}
]
can be further decomposed into two parts by using 1{inft∈[0,1]Rt6η} =
1{R16η} + 1{inft∈[0,1]Rt6η,R1>η} as follows:
(c) E
[
R11{R16η}1{R161}
]
,
(d) E
[
R11{inft∈[0,1]Rt6η,R1>η}]1{R161}
]
.
Since η chosen from the set (0,min {R0, 1}) is strictly smaller than 1 and ln(R1) follows a
normal distribution, part (c) can be easily calculated
E
[
R11{R16η}1{R161}
]
= E
[
R11{R16η}
]
= R0 exp {µR}Φ (A−B − σR) .
Part (d) can be calculated by using the Girsanov theorem and the reflection principle as
follows:
E
[
R11{inft∈[0,1]Rt6η,R1>η}]1{R161}
]
=E
[
R0 exp
{(
µR − 1
2
σ2R
)
+ σRW1
}
1{inft∈[0,1]Wt+Bt6A,W1+B>A}
1{
W1+B6− 1σR ln(R0)
}]
=EP˜
[
R0 exp
{
µR −BσR − 1
2
σ2R −
1
2
B2
}
exp
{
(B + σR)W
P˜
1
}
1{inft∈[0,1]W P˜t 6A,W P˜1 >A}1
{
W P˜1 6− 1σR ln(R0)
}]
=EP˜
[
R0 exp
{
µR −BσR − 1
2
σ2R −
1
2
B2 + 2A(B + σR)
}
exp
{
−(B + σR)W P˜1
}
1{W P˜1 6A}1
{
W P˜1 >2A+ 1σR lnR0
}]
=R0 exp
{
µR + 2AB + 2AσR
}[
Φ(A+B + σR)
− Φ
(
2A+B +
1
σR
ln(R0) + σR
)]
.
Finally, summing up all the parts yields the closed-form expression for the ESC with for a
certain value q > 0 as a function of the termination ratio η ∈ (0,min {R0, 1}), denoted by
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S(η):
E
[
(1−R1)1{τ>1}1{R161}
]
=Φ
(
− 1
σR
ln(R0)−B
)
− Φ (A−B)
− exp {2AB}
[
Φ(A+B)− Φ
(
2A+B +
1
σR
ln(R0)
)]
−R0 exp {µR}Φ
(
− 1
σR
ln(R0)−B − σR
)
+R0 exp {µR}Φ (A−B − σR)
+R0 exp {µR + 2AB + 2AσR}
[
Φ(A+B + σR)
− Φ
(
2A+B +
1
σR
ln(R0) + σR
)]
= S(η) 6 q.
4.6.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3.4
We have the following one-year shortfall probability as a function of the termination ratio
η ∈ (0,min{R0, 1})
P (η) = Φ (A−B) + exp {2AB}Φ (A+B)
= Φ
(
1
σR
(
ln
( η
R0
)− µR + 1
2
σ2R
))
+
(
η
R0
)( 2µR
σ2
R
−1
)
Φ
(
1
σR
(
ln
( η
R0
)
+ µR − 1
2
σ2R
))
.
Since Φ(·) is a cdf P (η) is trivially continuous. The first derivative of P (η) with respect
to η is given as follows:
∂P (η)
∂η
=
2
ησR
exp {2AB} [n(A+B) + (A+B)Φ(A+B)]− 2
ησR
exp {2AB}AΦ(A+B),
(4.14)
where n(·) is the pdf of a standard normal distribution.
n(A + B) + (A + B)Φ(A + B) is a function of the termination ratio η ∈ (0,min{R0, 1})
which has the following properties
∂(n(A+B) + (A+B)Φ(A+B))
∂η
=
1
ησR
Φ(A+B) > 0 and
lim
η→0
(n(A+B) + (A+B)Φ(A+B)) = 0 .
Thus, n(A+B) + (A+B)Φ(A+B) is positive for η ∈ (0,min{R0, 1}), hence the first term
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in (4.14) is positive. Since A < 0 for the termination ratio η ∈ (0,min{R0, 1}), the second
term in (4.14) is negative. As a result we have ∂P (η)
∂η
> 0.
Next it is easy to see that as the termination ratio η approaches 0, the function has a
limit which is 0, i.e., lim
η→0
P (η) = 0, and as the termination ratio η approaches min{R0, 1}
we have
lim
η→min{R0,1}
P (η) = Φ
(
−µR −
1
2
σ2R
σR
)
+ Φ
(
µR − 12σ2R
σR
)
= 1 .
In the end, it is trivial to see that when the acceptable shortfall probability  is 1, any
termination ratio from the set (0,min {R0, 1}) satisfies the SPC. The more interesting case
is when  ∈ (0, 1). In this case the upper bound termination ratio is the solution of the
equation
P (η¯)−  =0.
Bolzano’s theorem proves that there exist a solution η¯. The above proved monotonic-
ity property of P (η) implies that η¯ is the unique solution. Since P (η) is monotonically
increasing, only termination ratios from the set (0, η¯] satisfy the SPC.
4.6.4 Proof of Proposition 4.3.6
We have the following expected deficits of the ongoing pension plan at year one
S(η) = E
[
(1−R1)1{τ>1}1{R161}
]
= Φ
(
− 1
σR
ln(R0)−B
)
− Φ (A−B)
− exp {2AB}
[
Φ(A+B)− Φ
(
2A+B +
1
σR
ln(R0)
)]
−R0 exp {µR}Φ
(
− 1
σR
ln(R0)−B − σR
)
+R0 exp {µR}Φ (A−B − σR)
+R0 exp {µR + 2AB + 2AσR}
[
Φ(A+B + σR)
− Φ
(
2A+B +
1
σR
ln(R0) + σR
)]
,
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which is a continuous function of the termination ratio η ∈ (0,min {R0, 1}).
The expected deficit function S(η) can also be calculated as follows:
S(η) = E
[
(1−R1)1{τ>1}1{R161}
]
= E
[
(1−R1)1{inft∈[0,1]Rt>η}1{R161}
]
= E
[
(1−R1)1{inft∈[0,1]Rt>η}1{η<R161}
]
= E
[
E
[
(1−R1) 1{η<R161} 1{inft∈[0,1]Rt>η}|R1
]]
=
∫ 1
η
(1−R1)P (inft∈[0,1)Rt > η|R1)f˜R1dR1,
where f˜R1 denotes the pdf of the lognormal distribution of R1. The main step we have used
in this calculation is the law of iterated expectations. For each given funding ratio of the
insured DB pension plan at year one R1, the conditional probability of the pension plan
not to be terminated before year one P (inft∈[0,1)Rt > η|R1) decreases as η increases, hence
the integrand (1−R1)P (inft∈[0,1)Rt > η|R1) is nonnegative. Accordingly, ∂S(η)∂η < 0.
Next, as the termination ratio approaches min {R0, 1}, the limit of S(η) is 0 and as the
termination ratio approaches 0 we have
lim
η→0
S(η) = Φ
(
− 1
σR
ln(R0)−B
)
−R0 exp {µR}Φ
(
− 1
σR
ln(R0)−B − σR
)
.
If q > Φ
(
− 1
σR
ln(R0)−B
)
−R0 exp {µR}Φ
(
− 1
σR
ln(R0)−B − σR
)
, the ESC is trivially
satisfied for any termination ratio η ∈ (0,min {R0, 1}). If 0 < q < Φ
(
− 1
σR
ln(R0)−B
)
−
R0 exp {µR}Φ
(
− 1
σR
ln(R0)−B − σR
)
, one can show analogously to the previous proof that
there exists a unique lower bound termination ratio η ∈ (0,min {R0, 1}) such that S(η) = q
and admissible termination ratios, which satisfy the ESC, form the set [η,min {R0, 1}).
Chapter 5
Portability, Salary and Asset Price
Risk: A Continuous-Time Expected
Utility Comparison of DB and DC
Pension Plans1
5.1 Introduction
In the last two chapters we have analysed the insurance provided by the PBGC to defined
benefit plan sponsors and we have studied how a pension guarantee fund can optimally
intervene and terminate underfunded DB pension plans. In chapter 3 we have taken the
benefits of the DB policyholder as given and in chapter 4 we have abstracted from the bene-
fits and solely considered the funding ratio of the DB plan. In the present chapter we model
the underlying DB plan stochastically and compare it to its main counterpart, the Defined
Contribution (DC) plan, from the employee’s perspective. Unlike chapter 2 and chapter 3
we do not study the pricing of the insurance contracts, but we work in an expected utility
framework as in the last chapter and focus on the expected utility the employee can achieve
at his retirement date in either of the two pension contracts.
Defined Benefit (DB) and Defined Contribution (DC) plans are two important types
of private retirement plans in developed countries. In a DB plan, the employee’s pension
benefit is determined by a formula which takes years of service for the employer and wages
or salary into account. In a DC plan, sponsoring companies (and often also their employees)
pay a promised contribution to an external pension fund, which invests the contributions
in financial assets. The pension payment is then simply determined as the market value of
the backing assets. The DB plan was the dominant form of plan, but in the last decade the
number of DC plans has a steady upward-moving trend. For instance, according to the US
Flow of Funds Accounts, the division between assets held in private DB plans and private
1This chapter is based on Uzelac and Chen (2014)
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DC plans was 60% versus 40% in 1987, and in 2007 this division was reversed. In the UK,
Government Actuary’s Department observed that final salary DB plans constituted 92% of
all pension funds in 1979 and this number was reduced to 41% in 2005.
There are quite some significant tradeoffs between DB and DC plans, particularly when
it comes to what risks the employees bear. Bodie et. al. (1985) and Blake (2000) provide a
very extensive review on the tradeoffs. In this place, we want to emphasize three tradeoffs
with respect to investment, portability and salary risk. In a DB plan, the sponsoring com-
pany is responsible for providing promised (future) pension benefits to the employees. In
other words, the sponsoring company decides about investment policies in a pension fund
and consequently also bears the entire investment risks in a DB plan. In a DC plan, the
company does not ensure a promised pension payment to the employees. The employees
bear the entire investment risks. From the employees perspective, salary risk is present
in both the DB plan and the DC plan. In the former the employee bears the salary risk
because the defined benefits are usually directly linked to his salary, while in the latter the
amount of contributions the employee can make mainly depends on the development of his
salary. Portability risk is the risk, not to have the ability to transfer years of credited ser-
vice or accumulated benefits from one employer to another. It is widely accepted knowledge
that portability risk plays a minor role in DC plans, while it is considered as the driving
source of risk in single employer DB pension plans. Since the pension payment of a DC
plan mainly depends on the value of the backing assets, a DC plan can be easily ported
between job switchings. On the contrary, DB plan holders lose mostly part of their benefits
after changing jobs since most DB plans lack portability provisions.
In a DC plan the asset price risk is the most important risk factor since the accumulated
pension benefit of the employee is the market value of the contributions made while working
and the investment returns earned on the plan balances. Blake, Cairns and Wood (2001)
measure risk in the DC plan by computing VaR estimates during the accumulation phase.
They find that the asset allocation strategy mainly drives the asset price risk since the VaR
estimates are considerably more sensitive to the asset allocation strategy than to the choice
of the asset return model.
Portability risk is considered the main risk factor in DB plans, especially because of the
huge and increasing workforce mobility and the fact that only few single employer DB pro-
grams contain portability provisions2. Hall (1982) reports that workers in the US hold 10
or 11 jobs during their working lives. Blake (2000) mentions that fewer than 5% of workers
remain with the same employer and that the average worker in the UK changes jobs about
six times in a life time. Schrager (2009) further points out that job turnover has increased
substantially in the 1990’s compared to earlier decades. Blake and Orszag (1997) provide
2According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics Employee Benefits Survey in 1991 only 13% of full time
workers were covered by portability provisions (see Foster (1994) for the different categories of portability
provisions).
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a detailed analysis of portability risk. In particular, they quantify different types of porta-
bility losses like the cash equivalent loss and the backloading loss for different deterministic
wage paths and numbers of job moves in the UK. Specifically they report that even a low
number of job moves can cause huge portability losses, for instance someone changing jobs
once in a mid-career can lose up to 16% of the full service pension. A typical UK worker
moving six times in a career could end up with a pension of only 70 − 75% of a pension
of a worker with the same salary experience who remains in the same job for his whole career.
The main contribution of this chapter to the literature about the comparison of DB and
DC pension plans is that we provide a formal model for comparing the two major types of
private retirement plans by explicitly taking account of their most important risk factors
in the presence of stochastic wages, job moving and asset prices. We compare the DB
with the DC plan in an expected utility-based framework. Three frequently used utility
functions in the pension insurance literature are considered: power utility, mean-shortfall
and mean-downside deviation. The latter two utility functions penalize realizations of the
terminal pension payment below a threshold – demonstrating the loss-aversion property.
Under mean-shortfall, the penalty has a linear form. Mean-downside deviation punishes
the loss more severely and the loss takes a quadratic form. Our main means of comparison
is to compute the critical job switching intensity (from the DB plan) such that the benefi-
ciary is indifferent between the DB and the DC plan.
Our methodology to compare the two pension retirement plans is similar to that of
Siegmann (2011) who computes minimum funding ratios for the DB plan for the above
mentioned utility functions. In particular, we also make the pension outcomes comparable
by matching contributions in the two retirement plans. The main difference is that the
latter focuses on the time diversification effects in a DB plan and models a static pension
fund, while we model the DB plan from the perspective of a representative employee and
focus on the portability risk.
We confirm some results in the existing literature (e.g. Coco and Lopes (2011), Samwick
and Skinner (2004), Poterba, Rauh, Venti and Wise (2007) and Siegmann (2011)). First,
a rise in the salary growth rate increases the attractiveness of the DB plan, while a higher
salary volatility decreases its attractiveness. This reveals that the salary risk is more pro-
nounced in the (final) salary DB plan. Second, the DB plan is preferred by an older
beneficiary. It is mainly due to the fact that the overall portability loss becomes less severe
due to the shorter contract duration. Third, adjusting the contribution of the beneficiary
to a higher level makes the DC plan more attractive. Fourth, equity holding in a DC plan
plays a substantial role in the relative attractiveness of the retirement plans, but there does
not exist a clear dominating strategy for all the preferences.
Moreover, our model shows that portability losses substantially decrease the attractive-
ness of DB plans. In addition, by comparing the plans across utility functions we find that
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a mean-downside deviation beneficiary prefers the DB plan in most cases relatively more
than the mean-shortfall beneficiary. Our model further yields one striking result which is
inconsistent with the existing literature: the attractiveness of the DB plan can decrease in
the level of risk aversion and the DC plan can become most attractive for the most risk-
averse power-beneficiary. The rationale behind this most striking result is twofold. On the
one hand, portability risk is modeled as a jump risk which generates much disutility for
very risk-averse beneficiaries. On the other hand, the DC plan can offer better diversifi-
cation because it is not purely driven by the income risk (asset risk plays a decisive role too).
The remainder of the present chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 models the
pension payment in a DB and a DC pension plan. Additionally, we show how the contribu-
tions from these two plans can be matched. Section 5.3 determines analytically the expected
utility of the beneficiary in a DB plan (for DC plan we rely on a simulation technique).
Three utility functions are addressed: power utility, mean-shortfall and mean-downside de-
viation utility. In the subsequent section 5.4, the DB and DC plans are compared by mainly
determining the indifference job switching intensity. Section 5.5 concludes the chapter and
section 5.6 provides a detailed calculation for the propositions in the main text.
5.2 Model Setup
As in the last two chapters we consider a representative employee. The representative em-
ployee decides at t = 0 which pension plan he enters and he earns a pension benefit in T
years from now. For simplicity we assume that the employee keeps this retirement plan
until the retirement date.3 For the DC pension plan we assume that the pension benefits
are paid out as a lump sum, while the DB plan pays pension benefits as a life annuity, which
is also usually the case in practice. Moreover, we abstract from mortality risk during the
accumulation phase, inflation risk and sponsor bankruptcy.
The employee receives a salary which in our model is a continuous stochastic process
(St)t≥0. Furthermore, the employee is allowed to change jobs during his career. To simplify
the model setup, we assume that the employee changes a job only for exogenous reasons.
More precisely, we consider job changes due to personal reasons and exclude unemployment
and any kind of endogenous or strategic job moves. In other words, we assume that whenever
the employee changes a job, he is capable of finding a comparable job and his salary is not
affected by the job move. This rationale justifies the continuous salary process assumption
in the presence of job moving. The number of job moves is modeled as an (in)homogenous
Poisson process N(t)t≥0 with intensity λt ≥ 0.4 The expected or average number of job
moves between [0, t] is given by
∫ t
0
λu du. The salary process is assumed to follow a diffusion
process with a possibly time-varying drift coefficient, which allows to better capture some
3Our framework excludes the case in which the employee can switch between the DB and DC plan.
4That is, we allow for a possibly time-varying but deterministic intensity.
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empirically observed salary patterns, see the numerical analysis section. Accordingly,
dSt = µS(t)Stdt+ σSStdW
S
t , S0 = s (5.1)
where µS(t) ≥ 0 denotes the deterministic and possibly time-varying drift (trend in the
salary), σS > 0 is the constant volatility and W
S is a standard Brownian motion, which is
assumed to be independent of N(t)t≥0 under the real world probability measure P.
Next, as in chapter 3 we assume that there are two assets in our economy, a riskless asset
F with price process (Ft)t≥0 and a risky non-dividend-paying asset A with price process
(At)t≥0, i.e
dFt = rFtdt, F0 = 1 (5.2)
dAt = µAAtdt+ σAAtdWt, A0 = a. (5.3)
The risky asset is modeled as a geometric Brownian motion where the standard Brownian
motion W is assumed to be possibly correlated with the standard Brownian motion of salary
process with the correlation coefficient ρ. Furthermore, it is independent of the number of
job moves, hence we have d[W,W S]t = ρ dt and d[W,N ]t = 0.
In the next subsections we model the pension income processes for the DB and DC
pension plan.
5.2.1 DB Pension Plan
The main goal of our modeling framework is to incorporate portability risk into a DB pen-
sion plan of a representative employee in the presence of stochastic salaries and stochastic
job moving. In practice, portability losses can be of two types. The major type is the cash
equivalent loss. DB payments usually depend positively on the product of earnings and
tenure. Since each of these tends to increase each year, much of the benefits are accrued
in the last years prior to retirement. However, if a worker leaves a firm the final pay used
to calculate the retirement benefits is the salary when he left the firm. As this salary is
usually lower than the salary prior to retirement, a so-called cash equivalent loss occurs.
5 The second type of portability loss is called the backloading loss. This is an additional
portability loss a worker switching jobs may suffer because contributions are backloaded in
one scheme but not in another, see Blake and Orszag (1997) for a detailed discussion about
the two types of portability losses.
The main factors determining the size of a portability loss are the ages at separation
and the estimated real growth rate of wages, see Blake and Orszag (1997). These authors
further illustrate that the portability losses are a hump shaped (inverse U shaped) function
in the age of the beneficiary. That is, portability losses are increasing in the early career,
5Accordingly, this shows that the salary risk and the portability risk are interconnected in practice.
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reach a maximum in the mid-career, decrease at the end of the career and are 0 at the re-
tirement date. We provide a simple model at hand which takes the ages at separation into
account and thus can capture the inverse U shaped structure of portability losses. However,
to keep our model simple we do not link the real growth rate of wages to the size of a
portability loss, therefore we do not quantify the size of each portability loss and neither
do we exactly distinguish between the two types of portability losses. In other words, the
simplifying assumption means that we treat the portability and the salary risk separately.
Nevertheless, we can capture average portability losses in different stages of a career and we
can also take the feature that portability losses increase with an increasing labor mobility
into account.
To do so, we introduce the pension adjusted salary process (S˜t)t≥0 and model this as
the jump diffusion
dS˜t = µS(t)S˜tdt+ σSS˜tdW
S
t + S˜t−dQt, S˜0 = S0, (5.4)
t− denotes the time immediately before a job move and Qt =
∑Nt
i=1 Yi is a compound
Poisson process. Yi, i = 1, ...Nt are i.i.d. random variables, independent of Nt and the
Brownian motions W and W S. The Yi’s are used to model the percentage changes in the
pension adjusted salary process when the employee changes his job. Intuitively, the pension
adjusted salary is the salary which is eligible for retirement benefits at time t after taking
the accumulated portability losses up to time t into account. More specifically, it contains
a continuous part given by the first two terms in (5.4), which describe the changes in the
pension income due to changes in the salary. The compound Poisson process captures the
portability risk, that is the loss in the pension income due to a job change. Accordingly,
we formally need to assume Yi < 0, i = 1, ...Nt. In addition, we assume that whenever the
employee changes a job, he loses a deterministic percentage 1 − βi, of his pension income,
i.e Yi = βi − 1 with 0 < βi < 1.
More specifically, to link the percentage loss to the ages at separation, we allow β to
be a deterministic function of time.6 In particular, we will assume that β is a piecewise
constant but time-varying function. Formally we define β as
β =
{
βj, tj ≤ t ≤ tj+1, j = 1...J
}
, (5.5)
where J denotes the number of career periods considered. In addition t0 = 0 and tJ = T .
Next, the stochastic differential equation (5.4) has the unique solution at time t = 0,
6In a more realistic setup, as suggested above the Yi’s would be stochastic and also directly depend
on the salary process S, particularly the trend of the salary µS(t). We could also include the trend in a
deterministic way to the Yi’s, but in order to keep the impact of the model parameters clear we stick to
our simple assumption.
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see e.g. Shreve (2004),
S˜T =s exp
{(∫ T
0
µS(u) du− 1
2
σ2S T
)
+ σSW
S
T
} NT∏
i=1
βi
=s exp
{(∫ T
0
µS(u) du− 1
2
σ2ST
)
+ σSW
S
T
}
exp
{
J∑
j=1
(N(tj)−N(tj−1)) ln (βj)
}
,
(5.6)
where in the second equation we have used the piecewise constant property of the jump size
β.
The DB plan we consider is a final salary DB plan. That is, we assume that the employee
receives a continuous annuity b(T ) which is the product of a pre-specified replacement rate
α, where 0 < α ≤ 1, and the terminal value of the pension adjusted salary, i.e b(T ) = α S˜T .
The crucial point is that in order to incorporate portability losses the retirement benefit
formula is based on the pension adjusted salary process instead of the salary process. To
make the DB plan and the DC plan comparable we are first going to convert the life annuity
of the DB plan into a lump sum. Formally the lump sum the beneficiary receives, which
we denote B(T ), can be determined as
B(T ) =
∫ ∞
T
b(T ) e−r (τ−T ) pτ dτ , (5.7)
where pτ is a continuous survival distribution function and τ is the time of death. We assume
that the annuity is paid up to maximum age T 1 and also use the simplifying assumption of
a constant mortality intensity µ. Then the lump sum can be computed as
B(T ) =
∫ T 1
T
b(T ) e−r (τ−T ) e−µ(τ−T )dτ
=
b(T )
r + µ
[
1− e−(r+µ) (T 1−T )
]
:= b(T ) a(T ), (5.8)
where a(T ) can be interpreted as the annuity factor.
5.2.2 DC Pension Plan
Unlike the DB pension plan, portability risk plays a minor role in DC plans as for the latter
the value of pension benefits is simply determined as the market value of the backing as-
sets. Therefore, benefits are easily transferable between jobs, see Zhang (2008). Moreover,
portability losses are unlikely to occur since DC plans are not backloaded and the contri-
bution rates are not tied to tenure and age of the workers (see Bodie, Marcus and Merton
(1986)). More importantly, the main economic argument for including portability risk into
a DC plan is that many moving workers may use their lump sum distributions for spending
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instead of reinvesting them in another retirement account (see e.g. Schultz (1995)). How-
ever, this argument has not been confirmed empirically, see Samwick and Skinner (2004).
Accordingly, for the DC plan we assume that job moving will not affect the pension income
of the representative employee. Instead as emphasized in the introduction, the employee in
a DC pension plan bears mainly the asset price risk which in a DB plan is mainly born by
the employer.
As we abstract from portability risk for the DC plan, the DC account value can be
modeled as a continuous stochastic process (Xt)t≥0. We model asset price risk as in chapter
3 and assume that the employee’s investment follows a rebalancing strategy. More specifi-
cally, the employee chooses at t = 0 a constant fraction pi, 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 which will be invested
in the risky asset A and the remaining fraction (1 − pi) is invested in the riskless asset F .
Then the DC account value is continuously rebalanced by a DC fund manager, that is at
any time 0 < t < T the amount piXt is invested in the risky asset and the remaining amount
in the riskless asset.
In order to capture the nature of the DC plan, we need to allow for contributions into
the employee’s account. We assume that the contributions are made by both the employee
and the employer, see section 5.4 for more details. These contributions represent cash
inflows into the DC account value. More specifically, we model a stylized DC plan where
the employee and the employer contribute continuously the amount c St dt, 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, to
the employee’s pension account and these contributions are also invested continuously over
time. In other words the employee and the employer contribute in each time period dt a
predetermined constant percentage c of the current employee’s salary to his DC account.
This implies that the DC account value evolves according to
dXt = Xt [(r + pi σA θ) dt+ pi σA dWt] + c St dt, X0 = c S0, (5.9)
where θ = (µA−r)
σA
denotes the market price of risk.
As the beneficiary in the DC plan receives a lump sum at the retirement date, the
pension benefit simply coincides with the terminal value of the DC account XT .
5.2.3 Matching the Employee’s contributions
In order to make the pension outcomes comparable we need to ensure that the employee
bears effectively the same costs in the two pension retirement plans.7 8 A way to achieve
this requirement is to assume that the employee contributes continuously the amount q St dt,
7We do not require the employers costs to be necessarily the same in the two retirement plans, since the
pension plans are compared from the employees perspective and in practice the costs the employer bears
in the two plans also differ.
8Of course this is just a theoretical assumption here. In reality employees in DC often bear higher costs
since they need to contribute periodically a fixed rate to the DC account, while the employees in a DB plan
often bear less costs as most of the contributions in the DB plan are variable deficit contributions and are
mainly covered by the employer.
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where q ≤ c denotes a constant percentage of the salary, in either retirement plan. In other
words, we assume that there is a one-to-one contribution match, i.e the employee makes
the same contributions in both retirement plans. The condition q ≤ c is needed because in
our modeling of the DC plan, c is used to denote the entire contribution rate provided by
the employer and the employee.
Then we determine the employee’s contribution rate q and the total contribution rate c
in the DC plan in two steps. In the first step, q is determined in the DB plan by linking
the employee’s contribution rate to the replacement rate α. This link is important since
the terminal payment in the DB plan crucially depends on the replacement rate. We
implicitly assume that all the contributions (employee and employer) in the DB plan are
incorporated in the replacement rate. This replacement rate is split into a replacement rate
αER, 0 ≤ αER ≤ 1, coming from the employer’s contribution and a replacement rate αEE,
0 ≤ αEE ≤ 1, coming from the employee’s contributions. That is, α = αER +αEE(q). More
specifically, we assume that the employer first sets the replacement rate αEE by fixing values
for the total replacement rate α and the replacement rate coming from his contributions αER.
Then he determines the employee’s contribution rate q such that on average the accumulated
employee contributions q
∫ T
0
Su du coincide with the self-financed pension income if the
employee stays with the employer, which is given by a(T )αEE ST . In particular, we assume
that the employer does not take any potential portability losses into account when setting
the employee’s contribution rate and therefore it is only the employee who bears the entire
costs of the portability losses. Formally, we link the employee’s contribution rate to his
replacement rate by requiring that
E
[
q
∫ T
0
Su du
]
= a(T )αEE E
[
ST
]
, (5.10)
which can be interpreted as the fair contribution condition in the DB plan.
In the following, we will assume that the salary trend is also a piecewise constant but
time-varying function, i.e µS =
{
µS,j tj ≤ t ≤ tj+1, j = 1...J
}
. Then the right hand
side of (5.10) becomes αEE a(T ) s exp{∑Jj=1 µS,j (tj − tj−1)}. The left hand side can be
computed as
E
[
q
∫ T
0
Su du
]
=q
∫ T
0
s e
∫ u
0 µS(v) dv du
=q
J∑
j=1
∫ tj
tj−1
s e
∑j−1
k=1 µS,k (tk−tk−1) +µS,j(u−tj−1) du
=q · s ·
J∑
j=1
1
µS,j
(
e
∑j
k=1 µS,k (tk−tk−1) − e
∑j−1
k=1 µS,k (tk−tk−1)
)
,
where
∑j−1
k=1 ≡ 0 for j = 1. In the computation we have mainly used the Fubini theorem
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to interchange the order of integration and the piecewise constant property of the drift
coefficient. Finally we solve the equation above for q to obtain
q =
αEE a(T ) exp{∑Jj=1 µS,j (tj − tj−1)}∑J
j=1
1
µS,j
(
e
∑j
k=1 µS,k (tk−tk−1) − e∑j−1k=1 µS,k (tk−tk−1)) . (5.11)
Note that in case of a constant salary drift the matched employee contribution simplifies
to
q = a(T )αEE µS
(
1− exp(−µS T )
)−1
. (5.12)
The (fair) employee contribution rate q in equation (5.11) and (5.12) mainly depends on
the salary drift parameters and the length of the career periods. In particular, one can show
the the matched contribution rate increases with µS,j and decreases with T . Moreover, note
that our assumptions immediately ensure that q ≥ 0. The condition that q ≤ 1 requires
that the nominator in (5.11) is smaller than the denominator. This is the case for any
reasonable choice for the salary drift vector µS and contract maturity T .
In the second step, the total contribution rate c in the DC plan is determined by taking
the above specified employee’s contribution rate q and assuming that the employer simply
matches the employee’s contribution in the DC plan, i.e c = δ q, where δ ≥ 1 denotes the
matching factor.
5.3 Utility-Based Comparison
5.3.1 Utility Functions and Certainty Equivalents
We consider three frequently used utility functions in the financial and pension insurance
literature in our expected utility analysis: power utility, mean-shortfall and mean-downside
deviation.
For a payoff x, the power utility is defined as
u(x) =
{
1
1−γ x
1−γ, γ 6= 1
lnx, γ = 1
(5.13)
where γ is the constant coefficient of relative risk aversion. The power utility is abundantly
used in both theoretical and empirical research because of its nice analytical tractability.
More importantly, the use of the power utility is also motivated economically since the long-
run behavior of the economy suggests that relative risk aversion cannot depend strongly
on wealth, see Campbell and Viceira (2002). The certainty equivalent, that is the guaran-
teed amount of money that an economic agent would accept instead of the risky asset, i.e
u(CE) = E[u(x)], for the power utility is simply given CE(x) = (1 − γ)
(
E[u(x)]
) 1
1−γ
for
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γ 6= 1 and CE(x) = exp
{
E[u(x)]
}
for γ = 1.
The second utility function we consider, mean-shortfall is given by
u(x) =
{
x−R, x ≥ R ,
−η1 (R− x), x < R, (5.14)
where R is the reference value, in our context this is the desired target pension income
of the employee. Loss aversion boils down to penalizing realizations of x below R with a
penalty parameter η1. This specification is a linearized version of that originally proposed
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and also used for instance by Benartzi and Thaler (2005).
The Certainty equivalent for the mean-shortfall utility is obtained by solving the equation
E[u(x)] = u(CE) for the gain and the loss side separately. Then one obtains
CE(x) =
{
E[u(x)] +R, E[u(x)] ≥ 0 ,
R−
(
− E[u(x)]
η1
)
, E[u(x)] < 0. (5.15)
The last type of utility function, mean-downside deviation9 is comparable to mean-shortfall
with the essential difference that one uses a quadratic penalty specification. Large shortfalls
below the reference point R are penalized more severely:
u(x) =
{
x−R, x ≥ R
−η2 (R− x)2, x < R. (5.16)
The mean-downside deviation utility is proposed by Boender (1997) in the pension fund
context and has since then been adopted in the ALM practice in the Netherlands (see e.g.
Siegmann (2011)). Finally the certainty equivalent of the mean-downside deviation utility
is given by
CE(x) =
{
E[u(x)] +R, E[u(x)] ≥ 0 ,
R−
√
−E[u(x)]
η2
, E[u(x)] < 0.
(5.17)
5.3.2 Expected Utility Results
As in the previous chapter we compute the expected utilities under the real world measure
P for the defined benefit pension plan. We are not able to compute the expected utilities
for the DC fund since the stochastic differential equation (5.9) is a sum of two stochastic
processes which does not admit a closed-form solution. Therefore, we solve this with an
Euler discretization scheme and compute the corresponding expected utilities with Monte
Carlo simulation. For the DB plan we further allow for a piecewise constant and time-
varying job switching intensity,i.e λ =
{
λj tj ≤ t ≤ tj+1, j = 1...J
}
.
9In the sequel we will frequently abbreviate the mean-shortfall utility as LA utility and the mean-
downside deviation utility as DD utility.
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Proposition 5.3.1 (Expected Utilities under the DB plan.). The expected utility for the
power utility function is given by
E[u(BDBT )] =
1
1− γ (α s a(T ) )
1−γ exp
{
(1− γ) (
J∑
j=1
µS,j(tj − tj−1)− 1
2
σ2S T ) +
1
2
(1− γ)2 σ2S T
}
(5.18)
· exp
{
J∑
j=1
λj (tj − tj−1) (e(1−γ) ln (βj) − 1)
}
. (5.19)
For γ = 1 (log utility), we obtain
E[u(BDBT )] = ln (a(T )α s ) +
(
J∑
j=1
µS(tj − tj−1)− 1
2
σ2S T
)
+
J∑
j=1
λj(tj − tj−1) ln (βj) .
(5.20)
For the mean-shortfall we have
E[u(BDBT )]
=
∞∑
k1=0
∞∑
k2=k1
· · ·
∞∑
kJ=kJ−1
[
α s a(T ) exp
{
J∑
j=1
µS,j(tj − tj−1)
}
J∏
j=1
β
(kj−kj−1)
j Φ(d1(k1, ..., kJ))
−RΦ(d2(k1, ..., kJ))− η1RΦ(−d2(k1, ..., kJ))
+ η1 α s a(T ) exp
{
J∑
j=1
µS,j(tj − tj−1)
}
J∏
j=1
β
(kj−kj−1)
j Φ(−d1(k1, ..., kJ))
]
×
J∏
j=1
λj (tj − tj−1)(kj−kj−1)
(kj − kj−1)! e
−λj (tj−tj−1), (5.21)
where Φ again denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution
and d1(k1, ..., kJ) and d2(k1, ..., kJ) are given by
d1(k1, ..., kJ) =
ln
α s a(T )
∏J
j=1 β
(kj−kj−1)
j
R
+ (
∑J
j=1 µS,j(tj − tj−1) + 12σ2S T )
σS
√
T
,
d2(k1, ...kJ) =d1(k1, ..., kJ)− σS
√
T .
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Finally for the mean-downside deviation utility we obtain
E[u(BDBT )]
=
∞∑
k1=0
∞∑
k2=k1
· · ·
∞∑
kJ=kJ−1
[
α s a(T ) e
∑J
j=1 µS,j (tj−tj−1)
J∏
j=1
β
(kj−kj−1)
j Φ(d1(k1, ..., kJ))−RΦ(d2(k1, ..., kJ))
− η2R2 Φ(−d2(k1, ..., kJ)) + 2η2Rα s a(T ) e
∑J
j=1 µS,j (tj−tj−1)
J∏
j=1
β
(kj−kj−1)
j Φ(−d1(k1, ..., kJ))
− η2(α s a(T ) )2e(2
∑J
j=1 µS,j (tj−tj−1)+σ2S T )
J∏
j=1
β
2 (kj−kj−1)
j Φ(−d3(k1, ..., kJ))
]
×
J∏
j=1
λj (tj − tj−1)(kj−kj−1)
(kj − kj−1)! e
−λj (tj−tj−1), (5.22)
where
d3(k1, ..., kJ) =
ln
α s a(T )
∏J
j=1 β
(kj−kj−1)
j
R
+ (
∑J
j=1 µS,j(tj − tj−1) + 32σ2S T )
σS
√
T
.
Proof 5.3.2. The proof of the proposition is given in Appendix 5.6.
5.4 Numerical analysis
In our benchmark case we assume that the size of the portability losses β, the salary trend
µS and the job switching intensity λ are constant. The more realistic case, where these
parameters are time-varying is devoted as a sensitivity analysis to the next subsection.
We compare the DB and the DC pension plan mainly by computing the indifference job
switching intensity with a numerical search algorithm. This is the job switching intensity
which makes the employee equally well off in terms of the corresponding expected utility in
any of the two pension plans. We denote the indifference job switching intensity as λ∗. The
employee receives a higher expected utility from a lower value of λ as the overall portability
loss is smaller the less frequently he changes his job. It implies that the DB plan is more
attractive than the DC plan for values of λ < λ∗, while the DC plan is favored for values
of λ > λ∗. At λ = λ∗, the employee is indifferent between the two plans. Consequently, a
higher value of λ∗ implies that the DB plan becomes more attractive in more situations. Note
that if for a specific parameter combination there does not exist an indifference intensity, it
simply means that the DC plan is even preferable to a DB plan without portability losses,
which is the so-called cash balance pension plan.10 For our numerical analysis, we choose
10This is a so-called hybrid pension plan, which has the main features of DB plans but with the main
difference that pension benefits are portable.
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the following benchmark model parameters:
α = 0.2, αER = 0.15, µ = 0.0005, δ =
3
2
, S0 = 1000,
T =25, T 1 = 30, µS = 0.015, σS = 0.13, β = 0.95,
r = 0.02, µA = 0.055, σA = 0.25, ρ = 0.
Specifically, we assume that the employee makes a decision to enter one of the two retire-
ment plans at the age of 40 and he retires at 65. The replacement rate coming from the
employee’s contributions is αEE = 0.05. This implies that the employee’s contribution rate
q is approximately 5.2%. The values µS=0.015 and σS = 0.13 are empirically estimated by
Topel and Ward (1992). For the matching mechanism of the employee’s and the employer’s
contribution, we assume the standard matching mechanism in practice (see e.g Samwick
and Skinner (2004)): the employer contributes 0.5 $ on each dollar contributed by the em-
ployee. This implies that in our benchmark case the total contribution rate in the DC plan
is c = 7.8 % (= q δ). Furthermore, the correlation coefficient ρ between the salary process
and the risky financial asset is set to 0, following Davis and Willen (2000) who find a low
correlation for shocks in earnings and stock market returns. Most importantly, the value for
the portability loss size β is chosen to reflect the empirical estimates of Blake and Orszag
(1997). In particular, these authors estimated that a typical UK worker moving six times
in a career could end up with a pension of only 70 − 75% of a pension of a worker with
the same salary experience who remains in the same job for his whole career. The value
of β = 0.95 implies that a worker with six job changes only obtains 73.5%(= 0.956) of the
retirement income compared to one without job changes in our model.
We consider the following set of coefficient values for the risk aversion parameters, see
also Siegmann (2011) for similar values:
γ ∈ {1, 2, 4}, η1 = η2 ∈ {2.25, 5}. (5.23)
Furthermore, we assume that the reference point for the mean-shortfall utility and the
mean-downside deviation utility is a multiple of the value of the investment in the money
market account. In our benchmark case we choose R = 5 c s exp{r T}. We consider the
values pi = 0.4, pi = 0.57, pi = 0.75, pi = 0.75 and pi = 0.9 for the fraction invested in risky
assets. The fraction pi = 0.57 is our benchmark investment strategy, where the value is
estimated from DC pension asset allocation data for the US from Broadbent, Palumbo and
Woodman (2006).11 Finally we use the time discretization of dt = 1
12
for the Euler scheme
and n = 100000 simulation runs to evaluate the expected utilities of the DC pension plan.
Table 5.1 displays values for the indifference job switching intensity λ∗ for the three util-
ity functions and their corresponding risk aversion parameters under the four considered
investment strategies. An economically intuitive way to interpret this and the tables at
11The estimation method is the same as described in chapter 3.
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Utility Risk aversion pi = 0.4 pi = 0.57 pi = 0.75 pi = 0.9
CRRA γ = 1 0.3423 0.3169 0.3058 0.3088
γ = 2 0.2540 0.2690 0.3087 0.3673
γ = 4 0.0897 0.1724 0.3052 0.4309
LA η1 = 2.25 0.3068 0.2532 0.1929 0.1349
η1 = 5 0.2965 0.2504 0.1890 0.1399
DD η2 = 2.25 0.3526 0.3121 0.2831 0.2958
η2 = 5 0.3061 0.2801 0.2821 0.3442
Table 5.1: Values of λ∗ for the benchmark case.
hand is to compute the expected (average) number of job moves under which the DB plan
is still preferred by the employee, which is given by T × λ∗. For our benchmark investment
strategy pi = 0.57 the DB plan is on average preferred in ascending order of the risk aversion
parameters up to 7, 6 and 4 job moves for the power utility, 6 job moves for the LA utility
and 7 and 6 job moves for the DD utility.
Furthermore, the table shows that the investment strategy has a huge impact on the
indifference job switching intensities for all utility functions, where the impact is most pro-
nounced for the most risk averse power beneficiary and the LA beneficiary. More specifically,
one observes that there is no clear dominating investment strategy. In our context, the best
investment strategy (among the four values of pi) is the one with the lowest indifference job
switching intensity, which implies that the DC plan will be most frequently preferred. The
most risky strategy is best for the LA utility maximizer independent of his loss aversion.
Intuitively, the LA utility maximizer would choose the most risky strategy because gains
in the pension income through gains in the financial portfolio receive the highest weight
for this utility function. On the other hand, potential losses are not severely penalized,
therefore the LA utility maximizer tolerates the high financial risk. The investment strat-
egy pi = 0.75 is best for a less loss averse DD utility maximizer and the least risk averse
power beneficiary. The benchmark investment strategy is preferred by the more loss averse
power beneficiary. More risk averse power beneficiaries (γ = 2 and γ = 4) find the most
conservative investment strategy best.
Next we fix the best investment strategies above and make a comparison across the
different utility functions. We can state the following two interesting points. First, the
DC plan is most attractive for the most risk averse power beneficiary since this beneficiary
would prefer the DC plan after 3 job moves on average. Second, comparing the two utility
functions with the loss aversion property we see that the DB plan is considerably more
attractive for the DD beneficiary. Compared to the best strategy of a LA beneficiary, he
would on average need to have 4 more job moves to prefer the DC pension plan. It is
important to note that the latter point holds for any investment strategy. Intuitively this is
because the DD beneficiary is more loss averse than the LA beneficiary, therefore he prefers
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to take less financial risk than his LA counterpart.
Most interestingly, table 5.1 reveals that in our model the DC plan can become sig-
nificantly more attractive with increasing risk aversion. It is particularly the case for the
more conservative investment strategies pi = 0.4 and pi = 0.57 and most pronounced for the
power beneficiary, which also accounts for the result above that the DC plan is most attrac-
tive for the most risk averse power beneficiary. This result is to some extent inconsistent
with the known result in the literature that DB plans relative attractiveness increases with
increasing risk aversion of the beneficiaries, see e.g Siegmann (2011). Our result can be
explained by two effects. First, and probably most importantly, portability risk is modeled
as a jump risk, which represents a substantial source of risk for risk averse pension benefi-
ciaries. Second, the DC plan offers a better diversification than the DB plan because the
benefits here do not only depend on the evolution of the salary process. This effect is the
more pronounced the lower the investment in the risky asset is and also the lower the corre-
lation between the risky asset and the salary process is. For a very high equity holding like
pi = 0.9, however, the volatility of the financial portfolio, which is given by pi σA, becomes
fairly high such that the financial risk dominates the portability and the salary risk in the
DB plan. Accordingly, for a very risky investment strategy the DB becomes significantly
more attractive with increasing risk aversion.
5.4.1 Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection we investigate how far the more realistic model setup with a time-varying
portability loss size, salary trend and job switching intensity affects the above stated results.
As suggested in our model setup we assume the corresponding parameters to be piecewise
constant. Specifically we consider 3 time periods, where t = [0 10 20 25]. The first 10
years are referred to as the early career, the next 10 years as the mid-career and the last
5 years as the end of the career. In each case we let one parameter be time-varying while
keeping the other parameters constant.
In table 5.2 we compute the indifference job switching intensity for the more realistic
case of hump-shaped portability losses, i.e U-shaped portability loss size β, see Blake and
Orszag, Chapter 4 (1997). That is, portability losses are increasing up to the end of the
mid-career and reach a maximum there, reflected by the high portability loss size (β2 = 0.9),
while they are very small at the end of the career, accordingly β3 = 0.99. The portabil-
ity loss size at the early career is assumed to be the same as in our benchmark case, i.e
β1 = 0.95. We observe that our main results stated above, about the impact of the invest-
ment strategy, the effect of the risk aversion and also that DD beneficiaries relatively prefer
more DB plans than LA beneficiaries, remain unchanged. More specifically, we observe that
the more pronounced portability losses in the mid-career imply that the employee would
prefer the DC plan after 1 or 2 less job moves on average for any utility function. This
indicates that portability losses play a considerable role in the relative attractiveness of the
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DB plan.
Utility Risk aversion pi = 0.4 pi = 0.57 pi = 0.75 pi = 0.9
CRRA γ = 1 0.2721 0.2533 0.2413 0.2441
γ = 2 0.1989 0.2089 0.2431 0.2857
γ = 4 0.0631 0.1268 0.2288 0.3374
LA η1 = 2.25 0.2503 0.2032 0.1531 0.1102
η1 = 5 0.2501 0.2019 0.1528 0.1145
DD η2 = 2.25 0.2742 0.2447 0.2260 0.2321
η2 = 5 0.2360 0.2147 0.2179 0.2583
Table 5.2: Values of λ∗ for a piecewise constant and U-shaped portability loss size with
β = [0.95 0.9 0.99] (original β = 0.95).
In table 5.3 we compute the indifference job switching intensities for a piecewise constant
and time-decreasing salary trend. Specifically we assume that the employee’s salary growth
has the highest trend in the early career µS,1 = 2.25% and then this trend decreases grad-
ually in the mid-career (µS,2 = 1.75%) and the late career (µS,3 = 1%). With a piecewise
constant and time-decreasing salary drift we can capture the often, i.e for many workers,
empirically observed concave shape of the salary curve, see Blake and Orszag, Chapter 5
(1997). The main results observed in our benchmark case of a constant salary drift still
carry over. In addition we see that the higher salary growth rate in the early and mid-
career mainly leads to a slight increase in the relative attractiveness of the DB plan. The
corresponding economic effects are discussed in the next subsection in figure 5.1.
Utility Risk aversion pi = 0.4 pi = 0.57 pi = 0.75 pi = 0.9
CRRA γ = 1 0.3500 0.3257 0.3118 0.3148
γ = 2 0.2601 0.2733 0.3164 0.3692
γ = 4 0.0974 0.1797 0.3068 0.4370
LA η1 = 2.25 0.3247 0.2695 0.2032 0.1506
η1 = 5 0.3195 0.2687 0.2021 0.1595
DD η2 = 2.25 0.3773 0.3324 0.2972 0.2917
η2 = 5 0.3344 0.3050 0.2895 0.3442
Table 5.3: Values of λ∗ for a piecewise constant and decreasing salary trend with µS =
[0.0225 0.0175 0.01] (original µS = 0.015).
As a last robustness check we consider a deterministic and time-decreasing job switching
intensity λ. It is empirically confirmed that workers change jobs much more frequently when
they are younger than when they are older, see for instance Booth, Francesconi and Garcia-
Serrano (1997). Accordingly, we set λ = [0.3 0.2 0.1]. As we have fixed the job switching
intensity, we can now not report the indifference job switching intensity. Therefore we
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consider here the ratio of the certainty equivalents of the DB plan CEDB and that of the
DC plan CEDC as the relevant statistic. It has qualitatively the same meaning as the
indifference job switching intensity. That is, a ratio above 1 indicates that the DB plan is
relatively preferred to the DC plan and the opposite holds if this ratio is less than 1. Table
5.4 again confirms our benchmark results. Specifically, given the best investment strategy
is taken, less risk averse power beneficiaries and the DD beneficiaries relatively prefer the
DB plan, while the more risk averse power beneficiary and LA utility maximizers would opt
for the DC plan.
Utility Risk aversion pi = 0.4 pi = 0.57 pi = 0.75 pi = 0.9
CRRA γ = 1 1.1707 1.1339 1.1216 1.1185
γ = 2 1.0430 1.0615 1.1254 1.2099
γ = 4 0.8257 0.9379 1.1188 1.3342
LA η1 = 2.25 1.1179 1.0388 0.9632 0.9088
η1 = 5 1.1105 1.0256 0.9604 0.9150
DD η2 = 2.25 1.2814 1.1812 1.1223 1.1583
η2 = 5 1.2350 1.1616 1.1494 1.3493
Table 5.4: Values for the certainty equivalent ratio CE
DB
CEDC
for a piecewise constant and
decreasing job switching intensity λ = [0.3 0.2 0.1].
5.4.2 Comparative Statics
In the following subsection we investigate the impact of the crucial contract parameters
more closely. To do so we fix our benchmark investment strategy pi = 0.57, and set the risk
aversion parameters γ = 2 and η1 = η2 = 2.25. We investigate the impact of the salary
process, the career length and the employee’s contributions more closely. To better see the
effects of the parameters we consider our benchmark case with a constant salary trend,
portability loss size and constant job switching intensity.
Figure 5.1 shows values for the indifference job switching intensities λ∗ for different levels
of the salary drift µS. Note first that the employee’s contribution rate q will be adjusted
according to equation (5.12) for each value of µS. We observe the standard result in the
literature that an increase in the salary drift, i.e salary growth rate, makes the DB plan
more attractive, see e.g Coco and Lopes (2011). The salary drift has a higher impact on
the relative attractiveness of the DB plan for the two utility functions with loss aversion.
Intuitively, the impact of the salary drift depends on 3 effects in our model. First, for any
utility function a higher salary drift implies that it becomes more likely that the beneficiary
will receive a higher final salary, which leads to a higher retirement benefit in the DB plan.
Second, a higher salary drift also leads to higher contributions in absolute terms in the DC
plan. Third, the comparison matching condition (5.12) implies that the matched contribu-
tion increases with an increase in the salary drift. As the first effect slightly (moderately)
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dominates the second and third effect the DB plan becomes relatively more attractive for
any utility function.
Figure 5.1: Values for the indifference job switching intensity λ∗ for different levels of the
salary drift µS.
Figure 5.2 again shows a standard result in the literature. A higher salary volatility
decreases the relative attractiveness of the DB pension plan. This is most pronounced for
the power utility function, for the LA utility the salary volatility has a negligible impact
while for the DD utility the impact becomes fairly pronounced for higher levels of the salary
volatility. Intuitively, in general a higher salary volatility makes the final salary more un-
certain, in particular it increases the likelihood of a lower final salary and thus of a lower
pension benefit. This effect dominates the effect of more uncertain contributions in the
DC plan. More specifically, for the LA utility losses, i.e shortfalls below the target pension
income R, are not severely penalized. This implies that the LA beneficiary almost ignores
the higher risk of a loss which comes with an increase of the salary volatility, therefore the
effect of σS is negligible for him. For the DD utility however, losses are penalized more
severely, therefore for higher levels of σS (≥ 10%) an increase also considerably increases
the likelihood that the benefits fall below the target pension income. Accordingly, the rel-
ative attractiveness of the DB plan substantially decreases for higher values of the salary
volatility. Interestingly, there is a critical volatility level, here σS ≥ 15%, where the DD ben-
eficiary prefers the DC plan more than the LA beneficiary. In other words if the salary risk
is very high the DC plan can become more attractive for the more loss averse DD beneficiary.
Comparing figures 5.1 and 5.2 we can state that the evolution of the salary process af-
fects the DB retirements more than the DC pension retirements. This is intuitive as the DB
formula is solely based on the final salary whereas the DC pension plan also considerably
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depends on the investment performance of the financial portfolio.
Figure 5.2: Values for the indifference job switching intensity λ∗ for different levels of the
salary volatility σS.
In figure 5.3 we investigate the impact of the career length, or the maturity of the pen-
sion retirement contracts, on the relative attractiveness of the two pension retirement plans.
A longer (shorter) career length means that the employee enters into the retirement plan
when he is younger (older). Again recall that the employee’s contribution rate q is computed
for each T according to equation (5.12). One clearly sees that the longer the career length
of the employee, or the longer the maturity of the pension plan is, the considerably more
attractive the DC plan becomes for any utility function. Intuitively, for the older worker the
DB plan is considerably more attractive since the overall portability loss is also substantially
lower. On the other hand, the DC plan is less attractive because the employee has less time
to benefit from the equity premium and to contribute sufficient funds. These two effects
substantially dominate the effect that through the contribution matching condition (5.12)
the matched contribution rate decreases with the contract maturity. The line of reasoning
reverts for the younger employee.
Finally, we investigate how a change in the employee’s contribution rate q affects the
relative attractiveness of the two pension retirement plans. Therefore, we revert equation
(5.12) and compute for each level of q the corresponding employee’s replacement rate αEE.
αEE increases in q for given µS. We observe that the DC plan becomes substantially
more attractive with an increasing employee contribution rate q for any utility function
as the effect of a higher contribution dominates the effect of a higher replacement rate.
This is particularly the case because the employer contribution also increases with the
employee contribution in the DC pension plan, which is due to the matching mechanism.
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Figure 5.3: Values for the indifference job switching intensity λ∗ for different levels of the
career length T .
Most interestingly, we see that for contribution rates which converge to 0 the DB pension
plan is more attractive for any reasonable number of average job moves, while for higher
contributions rates, q ≥ 8.5%, the DC plan is always preferred in expected utility terms for
any utility function. This result is in line with Samwick and Skinner (2004) who emphasize
that primarily inadequate contributions lead to retirement incomes which are on average
lower than the DB counterparts, while adequate contribution rates result in a higher median
pension income under the DC plan. Samwick and Skinner (1997) even mention that a large
number of workers eligible for a DC plan fail to contribute. This figure nicely illustrates
that for these workers the DB plan is the better pension plan regardless of their preferences.
5.5 Conclusion
The present chapter models the most important properties from a representative bene-
ficiaries perspective in DB and DC plans: salary risk present in both the DB and DC
plan, portability losses in DB plans due to job switchings, and asset price risk born in
DC plans. We make comparisons between DB and DC plans by analyzing the expected
utility of the pension beneficiary under three preferences: power utility, mean-shortfall and
mean-downside deviation preferences. Most of our findings are consistent with the existing
literature. Independent of the preferences, the attractiveness of DB plan increases in the
salary growth rate and decreases in the salary volatility and the contract maturity. Our
model further indicates that portability losses considerably reduce the relative attractive-
ness of the DB plan. Moreover, we show that for the utility functions with the loss aversion
property, a mean-downside deviation beneficiary prefers the DB plan in most cases relatively
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Figure 5.4: Values for the indifference job switching intensity λ∗ for different levels of the
employee’s contribution rates q.
more than the mean-shortfall beneficiary. Finally we have a result, which is inconsistent
with existing findings. We find that the attractiveness of the DB plan can decrease in the
level of risk aversion. It is justified by the fact that the disutility caused by the portability
loss (jump risk) can be particularly severe for very risk averse beneficiaries.
This chapter can be extended by relaxing several assumptions. First, one could also
include endogenous or strategic job moves and unemployment in our setup by allowing
the salary process to have jumps. Second, the portability risk could be also modeled more
realistically by specifying the pension income at retirement as B(T ) =
∑N(T )
i=1 τi S(τi), where
τi denotes the time the employee has worked for employer i. Then the portability losses
could be defined as the difference of a pension income without job moves and the pension
income with job moves, i.e T S(T ) −∑N(T )i=1 τi S(τi). In this framework we would link the
portability risk to the salary risk and thus better capture the major type of portability losses,
the cash equivalent losses. Finally, one could allow the beneficiary to have a combination of
both, a DC and DB pension plan, or to change the pension plan at some time in his career.
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5.6 Appendix: Derivation of Proposition 4.3.1
a) Power Utility: u(x) = x
1−γ
1−γ
The expected utility of the power utility is computed by using the independence between
W S and the increments of the Poisson process N(tj)−N(tj−1), j = 1, ..., J . 12. This implies
that the expectation in (5.6) factors, thus we can write the expected utility as
E[u(BDBT )] =
1
1− γ (a(T )α s)
1−γ E
[
exp
{
(1− γ) (
J∑
j=1
µS,j(tj − tj−1)− 1
2
σ2S T ) + σSW
S
T
}]
× E[ exp{ J∑
j=1
(N(tj)−N(tj−1)) (1− γ) ln (βj)
}]
To evaluate the first expectation we just use that the exponent is normally distributed to
obtain
E
[
exp
{
(1− γ) (
J∑
j=1
µS,j(tj − tj−1)− 1
2
σ2S T ) + σSW
S
T
}]
= exp
{
(1− γ) (
J∑
j=1
µS,j(tj − tj−1)− 1
2
σ2S T ) +
1
2
(1− γ)2 σ2S T
}
.
Next one can show that
E[ecj (N(tj)−N(tj−1))] = exp {λj (tj − tj−1) (ecj − 1)} ,
for any time tj ≥ 0 and any piecewise constant cj, j = 1, ....J . Collecting the last two
expectations one ends up with (5.18).
b) Mean-Shortfall: u(x) = x−R for x ≥ R and u(x) = −η1(R− x) for x < R.
To compute the expected utility for the mean shortfall we mainly use the law of iterated
expectations, to first condition on the number of job moves N(tj) in every career period
j = 1, ...J and compute the standard Black Scholes expectation. In the second step we
derive the joint distribution of all job moves and evaluate the outer expectation. First we
have
E[u(BDBT )] =E
[
E[1{BDBT ≥R}B
DB
T |N ]
]
− E[E[1{BDBT <R} η1 (R−BDBT )|N ]]
Conditioned on the number of job moves being kj up to career period j, where kj is an
increasing sequence, the two conditional expectations are standard Black Scholes integrals,
12Note that the independence of WS and the Poisson process N immediately implies this independence.
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therefore we have
E[1{BDBT ≥R} (B
DB
T −R)|N(t1) = k1, ...N(tJ) = kJ ]
=α s a(T ) exp
{
J∑
j=1
µS,j(tj − tj−1)
}
J∏
j=1
β
(kj−kj−1)
j Φ(d1(k1, ..., kJ))−RΦ(d2(k1, ..., kJ));
E[1{BDBT <R}η1 (R−B
DB
T )|N(t1) = k1, ..., N(tJ) = kJ ]
=− η1RΦ(−d2(k1, ..., kJ)) + η1 α s a(T ) exp
{
J∑
j=1
µS,j(tj − tj−1)
}
·
J∏
j=1
β
(kj−kj−1)
j Φ(−d1(k1, ..., kJ));
d1(k1, ..., kJ) =
ln
αsa(T )
∏J
j=1 β
(kj−kj−1)
j
R
+ (
∑J
j=1 µS,j(tj − tj−1) + 12σ2S T )
σS
√
T
,
d2(k1, ...kJ) =d1(k1, ..., kJ)− σS
√
T .
where Φ denotes the standard normal cdf.
Next we compute the joint distribution of the number of jumps in each career period as
P (N(t1) = k1, ..., N(tJ) = kJ)
=P (N(t1) = k1, N(t2)−N(t1) = k2 − k1, ..., N(tJ)−N(tJ−1) = kJ − kJ−1)
=
J∏
j=1
P (N(tj)−N(tj−1) = kj − kj−1)
=
J∏
j=1
λj (tj − tj−1)(kj−kj−1)
(kj − kj−1)! e
λj (tj−tj−1).
In the second step we have rewritten the number of jumps up to time point j in terms
of its increments. In the third equation we have then used the independence of the Poisson
process increments. In the last step we have used the law of a (in)homogeneous Poisson
process with a piecewise constant intensity.
Finally we use the distribution of the number of jumps in each career period and evaluate
the outer expectation by integrating over the range of possible jumps in each career period
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and obtain
E[u(BDBT )]
=
∞∑
k1=0
∞∑
k2=k1
· · ·
∞∑
kJ=kJ−1
[
α s a(T ) e
∑J
j=1 µS,j (tj−tj−1)
J∏
j=1
β
(kj−kj−1)
j Φ(d1(k1, ..., kJ))−RΦ(d2(k1, ..., kJ))
− η2R2 Φ(−d2(k1, ..., kJ)) + 2η2Rα s a(T ) e
∑J
j=1 µS,j (tj−tj−1)
J∏
j=1
β
(kj−kj−1)
j Φ(−d1(k1, ..., kJ))
− η2(α s a(T ) )2e(2
∑J
j=1 µS,j (tj−tj−1)+σ2S T )
J∏
j=1
β
2 (kj−kj−1)
j Φ(−d3(k1, ..., kJ))
]
×
J∏
j=1
λj (tj − tj−1)(kj−kj−1)
(kj − kj−1)! e
−λj (tj−tj−1).
c) Mean-Downside Deviation: u(x) = x for x ≥ R and u(x) = −η2(R− x)2 for x < R
To compute the expected utility for the mean-downside deviation utility we simply need
to compute the additional conditional expectation
E[1{BDBT <R} (B
DB
T )
2|N(t1) = k1, ..., N(tJ) = kJ ]
=− η2(α s a(T ) )2e(2
∑J
j=1 µS,j (tj−tj−1)+σ2S T )
J∏
j=1
β
2 (kj−kj−1)
j Φ(−d3(k1, ..., kJ));
d3(k1, ..., kJ) =
ln
α s a(T )
∏J
j=1 β
(kj−kj−1)
j
R
+ (
∑J
j=1 µS,j(tj − tj−1) + 32σ2S T )
σS
√
T
.
The other conditional expectations almost carry over from the ones for the mean-shortfall
utility, accordingly we eventually have
E[u(BDBT )]
=
∞∑
k1=0
∞∑
k2=k1
· · ·
∞∑
kJ=kJ−1
[
α s a(T ) e
∑J
j=1 µS,j (tj−tj−1)
J∏
j=1
β
(kj−kj−1)
j Φ(d1(k1, ..., kJ))−RΦ(d2(k1, ..., kJ))
− η2R2 Φ(−d2(k1, ..., kJ)) + 2η2Rα s a(T ) e
∑J
j=1 µS,j (tj−tj−1)
J∏
j=1
β
(kj−kj−1)
j Φ(−d1(k1, ..., kJ))
− η2(α s a(T ) )2e(2
∑J
j=1 µS,j (tj−tj−1)+σ2S T )
J∏
j=1
β
2 (kj−kj−1)
j Φ(−d3(k1, ..., kJ))
]
×
J∏
j=1
λj (tj − tj−1)(kj−kj−1)
(kj − kj−1)! e
−λj (tj−tj−1).
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
In this dissertation we study three very important types of insurance, equity-linked life,
pension insurance and the insurance provided by (pension) insurance guarantee funds.
When dealing with the pricing problem of equity-linked life insurance contracts with
surrender guarantees one has to take different sources of risk, as the financial risks like the
interest or volatility risk and insurance risks like mortality or longevity risk, into account.
In addition one has to model the surrender behavior of the policyholder. Concerning the
last point it is important to allow for both exogenous and endogenous surrender. Due to
the long maturities of these contracts, it is also important to capture the economic changes
which affect both the dynamics of the underlying financial portfolio and the surrender be-
havior of the policyholder. Our regime-switching rational expectation model in chapter 2,
where the regimes represent economic states, captures all these points and hence extends
the existing literature on the pricing of surrender options in equity-linked life insurance.
The main modeling contribution is that exogenous and endogenous surrender are linked to
the economic states. Specifically, we show that the economic state has a significant impact
on the contract and particularly surrender option value and that the American style sur-
render model, which relies on the assumption that policyholders behave monetary optimal,
substantially overestimates the surrender option value in any economic state.
Beside the modeling of the financial risk factors more realistically in a specific stochastic
model, one could also extend our regime-switching framework, which relies on two simplify-
ing assumptions: firstly, there are no jumps in the financial portfolio value when the regime
switches and secondly we can exactly observe the regime-switches. Dealing with the first
extension one would have to solve a coupled nonlinear system of partial integro differential
equations (PIDE’s). For the second extension one would assume that the economic regimes
follow a hidden markov chain (HMM) and use filtering techniques to back out the current
economic regime.
Insurance guarantee funds, which exist for many insurance types and in many countries,
have the shortcoming that their premium charges are not (sufficiently) risk-based. In chap-
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ter 3 we consider the largest pension guarantee fund, the US PBGC pension insurance, and
derive a risk-based premium in a contingent claim distress termination model. The distress
termination is the most common type of termination where the pension fund is terminated
by the sponsoring company due to its own financial distress. Apart from providing a formal
distress termination model with a closed-form solution for the risk-based premium we also
present an empirical analysis. With a dataset of the largest 100 US DB plan sponsors, we
illustrate our theoretical pricing formula and show that the premiums paid to the PBGC
differ substantially once sponsor and pension fund specific risks are taken into consideration.
As our regime-switching model in chapter 2, our distress termination model could also
be extended by modeling further financial risks stochastically. For instance a simple Vasicek
model for the short rate would probably still allow for at least semi-closed form solutions. A
more interesting theoretical extension would be to incorporate the variable deficit type con-
tributions DB sponsoring companies make into the pension fund and to study their impact
on the risk-based premium paid to the pension insurance guarantee fund. It would be also
very interesting to extend our empirical part. One could infer further interesting statistics
as the shortfall probability of the sponsoring companies and relate this to the premiums
they should pay to the PBGC according to our model. In addition, one could also perform
a more accurate econometric analysis with the data.
Although a risk-based premium for pension guarantee funds is very appealing from the
economic perspective and hence the corresponding authorities are encouraged to introduce
such a premium calculation, the law in many countries gives pension guarantee funds only
the possibility to intervene by closing underfunded pension funds. Accordingly, optimizing
the involuntary termination mechanism is the only means pension guarantee funds have
thus far to protect the employees in insured DB pension plans. In chapter 4 we derive the
optimal timing of intervention in terms of a critical funding ratio of an insured DB pension
plan, that is the funding ratio when the pension guarantee fund prematurely terminates
the underfunded pension plan and activates its financial guarantee. To this end, we assume
that the pension guarantee fund represents the interests of the policyholders and maximizes
their expected utilities subject to two constraints. The pension guarantee fund controls the
shortfall probability of insured DB plans and the expected losses of underfunded but not
terminated pension plans. By controlling these quantities the pension guarantee fund can
better manage its financial guarantee and thus additionally protect the employees. The
two main qualitative results of our analysis are: firstly, a premature termination is not
beneficial for risk neutral and less risk averse beneficiaries when only the SPC is considered,
whereas a premature termination rule is always applicable regardless of the risk aversion
of the beneficiaries when the ESC is included. Secondly, additional regulation in terms of
adding the ESC leads to disutility for risk neutral and less risk averse beneficiaries, while
more risk averse beneficiaries are not harmed by this additional regulation.
To compare (private) DB and DC pension plans one has to model a specific tradeoff since
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the risks the employee bears differ or are not equally pronounced in the two pension plans.
It is also important to model the preferences of the policyholder. In chapter 5 we perform
a continuous-time expected utility comparison with different preferences in a model with
stochastic wages, stochastic job moving and stochastic asset prices. Our modeling frame-
work takes the driving risk factors into account, that is salary risk in both the DB and the
DC plan, portability risk in the DB plan and investment risk in the DC plan. In practice
one has observed a rapid demise of DB plans in the last two decades. Our findings that the
average portability losses significantly reduce the relative attractiveness of DB plans and
that DC pension plans offer better diversification through the participation in the invest-
ment portfolio account for this phenomenon. However, we also find that there are some
cases where the DB plan is the more appropriate pension plan. This is particularly the case
if the employee does not make sufficient contributons into the DC plan or an employee with
a not very volatile salary is fairly loss averse.
The last chapter can be extended by following Blake and Orszag (1997) and model
portability losses in our framework more realistically taking the two types of portability
losses, the cash equivalent losses and the backloading losses, better into account. Moreover
one could allow the policyholder to switch between the different pension contracts and for
instance compute the utility loss or gain if the employee switches from a DB to a DC
pension plan somewhere in the mid-career. Another interesting research question would be
to compare the standard DB and DC plan with hybrid pension plans like the cash balance
plan. The share of such hybrid contracts has grown in the last years and therefore it would
be intersting to illustrate some advantages these plans have over a standard DB plan.
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